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ARTICLES 
THE PATHOLOGY OF PROPERTY 
NORMS: LIVING WITHIN 
NATURE'S BOUNDARIES 
LYNDAL. BUTLER• 
INTRODUCTION 
For centuries property rights have played a critical role in defining a 
society's fundamental relationship with its foundation ecosystem.1 In 
colonial America, for example, the expectation of property rights in land 
contributed to the development of America's capitalist economy, private 
property system, republican political structure, and exploitative attitude 
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Jones, John Liethen, Patrick O'Leary, and Beth Silverman for their able research assistance. Finally, I 
would like to express my gratitude to Della Harris and Felicia Burton for their dedication and hard wodc 
in providing hours of word processing support. 
I. See generally BEIJER INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EcOLOGICAL ECONOMICS, THE ROYAL 
SWEDISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, RIGHTS TO NATURE (Susan S. Hanna et al. eds., 1996) (discussing 
the relationship between property rights regimes and the natural environment). For a discussion of the 
importance of private property to ancient and modern civilizations, see RICHARD SCHLA TIER, PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1951). 
927 
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toward natural resources.2 On a more global scale, the quest for water 
resources and rights has had similarly profound effects.3 Scholars have 
explained how mathematics and engineering were developed in part to 
design irrigation systems,4 astronomy was used to predict seasonal and 
climatic changes affecting the availability of water,5 civil engineering was 
developed to deal with flooding and water supply projects,6 and legal and 
political systems were needed to impose water allocation rules.7 What 
these linkages often ignore is the importance of water and soil to ecological 
systems, and the impact of urbanization and land development on 
watersheds and ecosystems. 
This failure to give serious consideration to the connections between 
land development, water use, and ecosystem health reflects a fundamental 
problem within American property law and current ecosystem and resource 
management practices. The problem is adherence to a value system that 
poses serious obstacles to effective management of ecosystems and natural 
resources. The obstacles raised by property norms are especially evident in 
the core justifications, fundamental principles, and key policies of 
American property law, and in the legal principles governing allocation and 
management of natural resources. For the most part, disputes over natural 
resources are resolved by determining who has the right to conduct a 
2. The abundance ofland in colonial America apparently created expectations in immigrants of 
becoming private landowners. Almost from the beginning, colonists settling in Virginia expected to be 
able to acquire land from the colony's seemingly inexhaustible supply. Efforts by the Crown and royal 
governors to assert royal prerogatives over colonial lands "never were successful in convincing the 
Virginia colonists that land grants were a matter of royal grace and generosity.'' LYNDA LEE BUTLER & 
MARGITLMNGSTON, VIRGINIA TIDAL AND COASTAL LAW§ 8.1, at 266 (1988). See also FREDERICK 
JACKSON TuRNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 168-69 (1920) (maintaining that frontier 
conditions, and not the character of the earlier settlers, primarily influenced the development of 
American democracy). See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 
(1992) (discussing the role of property in shaping the American constitutional order). 
3. See generally LUDWIK A. TEcl.AFF, WATER LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1-4 (1985) 
(discussing the impact of water on the past development of civilization). 
4. See ROBERT BRITTAIN, RIVERs, MAN AND MYTHS: FROM FISH SPEARS TO WATER MILLS 
83-84, 92-96, 108-10, 183-84 (1967). See also After the Warming: Episode One (PBS Television 
Broadcast, Nov. 21, 1990) (discussing the ecological evolution of the world and its effect on the 
development of civilization). 
S. See BRITTAIN, supra note 4, at 77-79. See also After the Warming, supra note 4 (discussing 
the importance of water to ancient cultures and the development of mathematical systems to predict 
weather changes). 
6. See LUDWIKA. TEcl.AFF, THERIVERBASININHISTORY AND LAW 16-17 (1967). 
7. See id. at 24. See generally MORTON J. HORWI1Z, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW, 1780-1860, at 31-62 (1977) (discussing the great impact of water law on the transfonnation of 
property law into a pro-development body oflaw). 
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use-that is, by engaging in "rights talk."8 Although issues relating to 
ecosystem health and resource conservation also may arise in disputes, 
these issues generally do not control resolution of the disputes.9 Rather 
private property norms tend to drive allocation of interests in natural 
resources, particularly water resources, and management of natural 
systems.10 
Although the precise meanings and expectations attributed to private 
property norms may vary from group to group or person to person, the 
norms generally involve a belief in the existence or necessity of certain key 
attributes of property, particularly land ownership. Basic characteristics of 
property include:11 a preference for private ownership;12 exclusivity, or the 
power and right to exclude others;13 free transferability, or the right to 
8. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGIITS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POUTICAL DISCOURSE 
3-4 (1991); Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1269, 1286-87 
(1993). 
9. The obstacles raised by property nonns are especially evident in the legal principles 
governing water resources. For a discussion of the evolution of watershed protection laws and 
programs, see BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWAL OF EcOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS {Lance 
H. Gunderson et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter BARRIERS AND BRIDGES]. See also Robert \V. Adler, 
Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 2S ENVTL. L. 973 (1995). 
10. See infra Part I. 
11. For hundreds of years scholars have debated and discussed the key characteristics of 
property. According to Honore, for example, property has eleven key characteristics: the right to 
possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to the derivative income, the right to the capital, 
the right to security, the power of transmissibility, the absence of tenn, the prohibition of hannful use, 
liability to execution, and residuary character. See LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGIITS: 
PmLOSOPmc FOUNDATIONS 18-20 (1977) (discussing Honore's concept of ownership). Richard 
Posner, on the other hand, identifies four characteristics that are, in his view, necessary for the efficient 
use of resources and therefore are critical traits of property. According to Posner, property must be: 1) 
valuable ("scarce as well as desired"); 2) owned by someone (or as Posner states, subject to ''the 
criterion of universality"); 3) exclusive (giving the owner the power to exclude others from using a 
resource); and 4) freely alienable or transferable. RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
§ 3.1, at 36-38 (5th ed. 1998). 
12. See 2 SIR \VILIJAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 3-5 
(Dawsons of Pall Mall ed. 1966) (1766); POSNER, supra note 11, § 3.2. See also Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972) (developing a legal framework, based on the concept of entitlement, for 
analyzing various aspects of the pollution problem). 
13. See POSNER, supra note 11, § 3.1. The Supreme Court has, in various cases, recognized the 
importance of exclusivity. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (deciding 
that government could not, without payment of just compensation, condition the approval of a 
rebuilding permit on the landowners' transfer to the public of lateral access across their beachfront 
property); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (deciding that a law 
requiring landlords to permit cable companies to install cable facilities on rental property was an 
unlawful taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (holding that government could 
not, without payment of just compensation, require owners of a marina to open the marina to the 
public). CJ. JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 48-49, 73-77, 142-44 (1988) 
(discussing different kinds of property falling along a spectrum of exclusivity). 
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alienate property;14 and a reasonable expectation of gain, including the 
right to conduct an economically viable use free from unfair government or 
private interference.15 The phrase ''unfair government or private 
interference" is intended to capture a variety of legal standards defining 
when government or private interference with property rights is unlawful. 
The phrase, for example, would include government interference that 
denies a landowner a reasonable return, 16 or singles out a landowner "to 
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole."17 It also would include private action that directly 
interferes with a property owner's lawful attempt to make a gain from her 
own property18 or engages in unfair competition or unfair trade practices to 
reap the benefits of another property owner's investment and labor.19 The 
key attributes of property reflect an image of private ownership that 
separates the owner from the owned resource and that gives the owner 
general control over the property as against all others.20 Though some 
legal restrictions on land use exist, stringent restrictions are the exception 
rather than the rule. That is, a property owner "can, for the most part, do as 
she likes."21 
14. See POSNER, supra note 11, § 3.1. Restraints on alienation have been disfavored for 
hundreds of years. See generally 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY§§ 26.1-.4 (1952) (discussing the 
long-standing policy favoring freedom of alienation). 
15. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (recognizing a property 
owner's right to be free from government action that denies all economically beneficial or productive 
use ofland); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31, 136 (1978) (focusing on 
permitted uses to determine whether the challenged government law allowed the landowner to receive a 
reasonable return); International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918) (recognizing 
the right to acquire property by honest labor and the right to a reasonable opportunity to reap the 
benefits of one's skill, labor, or stock in trade free from unfair competition); Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 
Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B. 1707) (recognizing the right to make a livelihood from one's property free from 
unlawful interference). During certain periods in the development of American legal thought, the 
expectation of freedom from government interference with property rights has been expressed in 
absolutist terms even by jurists. See G. EDWARD WHITE, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: 
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, in PATTERNS OF AMERICAN 
LEGAL 'IHOUGHT 99, 102 (1978). 
16. See Penn Cent .• 438 U.S. at 130-31, 136. 
17. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960). 
18. See Keeble, 103 Eng. Rep. at 1128. 
19. See International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 236. 
20. See Freyfogle, supra note 8, at 1274-75. 
21. /d. at 1275. See also Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. 
REV. 55,55 (1987) ("Whoever is allocated an ownership right .•• is largely free to do with it as he sees 
fit •... "); WHITE, supra note 15, at 100-02 (discussing the late nineteenth century notion of absolute 
property rights). Statements that property rights are absolute can have different meanings. See JOHN 
CHRISTMAN, THEMYrHOFPROPERTY29-31 {1994). 
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This article will demonstrate the pervasive and pathological effects of 
property norms on land and water use, natural resource allocation, and 
ecosystem management. Those norms have played a significant role in the 
development of water and other resource allocation systems, affecting the 
rules, standards, and criteria guiding allocation of rights and resolution of 
use conflicts.22 The norms also have significantly affected the focus, 
scope, and stringency of watershed and land use management programs in 
ways that detrimentally impact the effectiveness of the programs and the 
health of ecosystems.23 Land ownership norms, in particular, have 
contributed to the development of a pathology of escalating land and water 
use, and of ineffective watershed or ecosystem management over the long 
term. Land norms have controlled the development of principles governing 
water allocation and use, producing water allocation systems that generally 
ignore ecological values, cumulative and ecosystem-wide impacts of water 
use, and mounting evidence of the need for stronger water conservation and 
growth control measures.24 In addition, while some ecosystem or 
watershed management programs have achieved success over the short 
term,25 land norms have had pathological effects on management programs 
over the long term. These effects have contributed to the development of 
less resilient ecosystems that are more prone to becoming persistently 
degraded by disturbances once absorbed by the ecosystem.26 
To demonstrate the pervasive and pathological influence of property 
norms on ecosystem health, the article first discusses the inherent conflict 
between traditional private property norms and effective ecosystem 
management, and then explores the pathological effects of property norms 
on resource allocation systems and ecosystem management programs. 
Part I examines the rights-based nature of resource allocation and 
management systems. The discussion will demonstrate that even when 
allocation and management decisions are based on scientific evidence and 
22. See infra Part I.A. 
23. See infra Part I.B. 
24. See infra Part II.A. 
25. For example, Virginia's ban on phosphate detergents produced surprisingly quick results. 
Effective January 1, 1988, the ban reduced the concentration of phosphorus discharged from secondary 
treatment plants by about 50% in only one year. See CHESAPEAKE EXECUI1VE COUNCIL, THE FiRST 
PROGRESS REPORT UNDER THE 1987 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT 21 (Jan. 1989) [hereinafter 1989 
CHESAPEAKE EXECUI1VE COUNCIL PROGRESS REPORT]. 
26. See infra Part II.B. Traditional forest management policies, for example, have placed a high 
priority on preventing forest fires and minimizing the occurrence of insect infestation. This priority has 
led to greater contiguity of forest areas and therefore to greater devastation once fires or defoliating 
insects disturb an area. Disturbances of forests having more contiguous area tend to result in more 
extensive damage. See generally Gordon L. Baskerville, The Forestry Problem: Adaptive Lurches of 
Renewal, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 9, at 37-102. 
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principles, the decisions reflect the inflnence of land ownership nonns. 
Part II then explores the pathological effects of property nonns on land and 
water use choices and on watershed and ecosystem management programs. 
These pathological effects will be studied in the use context through a 
narrative of conflict over water, and in the management context through an 
examination of studied managed ecosystems. Particular emphasis in the 
watershed management context will be placed on the Chesapeake Bay 
management program, one of the world's most watched programs. 
Finally, in Part m, the article offers some thoughts on how to stop the 
pathologies of escalating land and water use and of ineffective ecosystem 
management over the long tenn. Three principal solutions will be 
proposed: first, an internal solution that calls for the reexamination of 
property nonns shaping the behavioral incentives of land use 
decisionmakers;27 second, an external solution that advocates the adoption 
of an adaptive approach to watershed and ecosystem management to guide 
the reexamination of property nonns and, when necessary, apply pressure 
on the private property system to account for the ecological costs of land 
use;28 and third, a bridge-building and fairness-enhancing solution that 
recommends more effective monitoring of ecosystems for surprise in order 
to gauge ecological integrity and ensure rough proportionality between 
redefmed property rights and the scales of private use.29 All of the 
proposed solutions recognize that humans must continually reassess their 
impact on the foundation ecosystem in defining their nonns, rules, and 
standards. 
I. THE INHERENT CONFLICT BETWEEN 1RADITIONAL 
PROPERTY NORMS AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 
Many of the nonns, principles, and policies of traditional American 
property law inherently conflict with the goal of effective ecosystem 
management over the long tenn.30 These key norms, principles, and 
27. See infra Part lilA. 
28. See infra Part III.B. 
29. See infra Part III.C. 
30. The tenn "ecosystem" has been defined in a variety of ways to include different levels of 
complexity and scale. See Anthony W. King, Considerations of Scale and Hierarchy, in EcoLOGICAL 
INTEGRITY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF EcOSYSTEMS 19, 20 (Stephen Woodley et al. eds., 1993) 
[hereinafter EcoLOGICAL INTEGRITY]. One widely used definition describes an ecosystem as "[t]he 
organisms living in a particular environment ..• and the physical part of the environment that impinges 
on them. The organisms alone are called the community." EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF 
LIFE 396 (1992) (glossary). As Oliver Houck has noted, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
has used this definition to conclude that "an ecosystem can be anything from 'a drop of water' to 'the 
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policies reflect a strong "societal preference for individualism and 
autonomy"31 that has thwarted efforts to develop effective ecosystem-based 
management. Captured in some of the basic attributes of private property, 
this social preference has shaped the development of resource allocation 
systems and management programs. Standards and rules governing 
resource allocation, management, and use all have been affected by the 
private-rights-based thinking of traditional property law.32 
The strong ties between private property norms and resource 
allocation and management systems necessarily limit the systems' ability to 
recognize and account for ecological interests. As numerous scholars have 
explained, the private property system does not effectively account for 
ecological values that are not easily measured, particularly values that 
reflect intangible interests or have long-term implications.33 The private 
property system also does not effectively include environmental resources 
that are too plenteous to make creation of a private property system 
worthwhile,34 or that are public goods involving either economies of scale 
entire biosphere."' Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 
MINN. L. REV. 869, 874 n.l3 (1997) (quoting U.S. FlSH & Wn.DLIFE SERVICE, AN EcOSYSTEM 
APPROACH TO FlSH AND WilDLIFE CONSERVATION 6 (1994)). The ecosystem concept implicitly 
includes the concepts of ecosystem function and ecosystem structure. Ecosystem function refers to the 
"functioning or opemtion of the ecosystem, its integmted holistic dynamics, and not the role or job of 
the ecosystem." King, supra, at 20. Ecosystem structure genemlly means the "disttibution of matter 
and energy among system components." ld. The tenn "watershed" tmditionally has been defined from 
a hydrological perspective to mean "a unit of natural or disturbed land on which all the water that falls 
(or emanates from springs) collects by gravity and fails to evapomte and runs off via a common outlet" 
Pim:R E. BLACK, WATERSHED HYDROLOGY 278 (2d ed. 1996). 
31. Sterk, supra note 21, at 90. For a discussion of colonial laws governing land disttibution and 
use, see Bun.ER& LMNGSTON, supra note 2, §§ 8.1-.5, at 245-303; ELY, supra note 2, at 10-25; John 
F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modem Takings Doctrine, I 09 HARV. L. REV. 
1252, 1259-81 (1996). 
32. For examples, see infra Parts I.A & I.B. 
33. See, e.g., STEVEN C. HACKETI, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL REsOURCES EcONOMICS 
42-59 (1998) (explaining why markets fail to protect environmental quality); MARK SAGOFF, THE 
EcONOMY OF TilE EARTH 24-49, 74-98 (1988) (discussing issues relating to valuation of environmental 
interests). For a discussion of some of the issues raised by economic perspectives to environmental 
values, see Lynda L. Butler, Private Land Use, Changing Public Values, and Notions of Relativity, 
1992 BYU L. REV. 629, 641-44, 648-51. For provocative discussions of the services provided by 
ecosystems and of the value of those services to society, see NATURE'S SERVICES (Gretchen C. Daily 
ed., 1997) and Robert Costanza, Ralph d' Arge, Rudolf de Groot, Stephen Farber, Monica Grasso, Bruce 
Hannon, Karin Limburg, Shahid Naeem, Robert V. O'Neill, Jose Paruelo, Robert G. Raskin, Paul 
Sutton & Mrujan van den Belt, The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 
NATURE 253 (1997). 
34. Two resources typically given as examples of plenteous resources are the oceans and air. See 
Lynda L. Butler, Environmental Water Rights: An Evolving Concept of Public Property, 9 VA. ENVTI.. 
LJ. 323, 358 (1990). The costs of implementing a private allocation system for such resources would 
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or high but diffused public demand.35 Resource allocation and 
management systems accordingly favor consumptive uses and private 
interests over ecological uses and public interests.36 While current thinking 
on water allocation and watershed management recognizes and attempts to 
correct the limitations of traditional approaches, current systems still are 
limited in many ways by the norms underlying property rights, particularly 
land ownership. Parts I.A and I.B examine the rights-based nature of 
resource allocation systems and ecosystem management programs. 
A. THE RIGHTS-BASED NATURE OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION SYSTEMS 
In the United States, traditional resource allocation systems are largely 
based on private property principles and policies that defme and allocate 
private rights of use, control, exchange, and expectation of gain.37 This 
focus on private rights exists not only in fundamental principles defining 
original acquisition of property rights and key theories, policies, and 
instrumental ends of property law, but also in the basic principles 
governing allocation of specific natural resources. A comparison of some 
of the principles, policies, and allocation rules governing private property 
generally and natural resources specifically will demonstrate the rights-
based nature of resource allocation systems. Because of their rights-based 
focus, resource allocation systems inherently conflict with effective 
ecosystem management over the long term. 
1. Key Principles, Policies, and Rules Defining the Private Property 
Concept 
The fundamental principles governing original acquisition of property 
rights reward the first laborer, first discoverer, and first captor. Preference 
basically is given to those who have controlled, cultivated, developed, or 
otherwise conquered nature.38 The common law doctrines used to promote 
this preference "presuppose[] ... an agrarian or a commercial people" who 
outweigh the benefits, and the resources thus are generally treated as exceptions to the private property 
approach. See id. at 358-59. 
35. The "public goods exception" typically occurs when the private market system "predictably 
fails to produce socially optimal uses." /d. at 353. Government control arguably is needed in the public 
goods situation to correct the market's failure and achieve proper allocation of resources. See id. 
36. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Rights and the Common Wealth, 26 ENVTL. L. 27, 28-30 
(1996). 
37. For a discussion of whether property norms include the profit motive, see infra notes 241-
243 and accompanying text 
38. See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 87-83 
(1985). 
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value "lasting control" of resources for purposes of promoting commerce 
and trade.39 By awarding property rights to the first possessor, the common 
law of property is giving "significance and form to what might seem the 
quintessentially individualistic act: the claim that one has, by 'possession,' 
separated for oneself property from the great commons of unowned 
things.'740 People who want to live in harmony with the land, without 
controlling and developing it, generally are not protected by the principles 
governing original acquisition ofproperty.41 
Consider also the fundamental legal conception of property as a 
preference-satisfying device-a commodity that allows individuals to 
satisfy their preferences through market exchanges.42 As Gregory 
Alexander explains in his thoughtful work Commodity & Propriety: ''Legal 
writing, especially scholarly writing and judicial opinions, has increasingly 
come to reflect the idea that the basic, if not the sole, purpose of property is 
the satisfaction of individual preferences through market transactions.'743 
Although the commodity view of property has influenced America since its 
colonization, this view has gained strength in the last twenty-five years as 
the law and economics movement has grown.44 Adherence to the market 
view of property has meant the development of market-oriented policies of 
property law. Those policies have affected natural resource allocation and 
management systems in ways that undermine ecological integrity. 
One key policy is the promotion of present use and development, 
particularly short-term productive use. The central importance of this 
policy to property law can be seen in its incorporation into a wide variety 
of property law doctrines. The present use and development policy, for 
example, is reflected in the theory of economic takings developed by the 
Supreme Court to protect economically beneficial use of land,45 the present 
39. !d. at 87. 
40. !d. at 88. 
41. See id. at 87. This point is implicitly reflected in Justice Marshall's opinion in Johnson v. 
M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 590 (1823). See generally HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 32-34 
(discussing the evolution of the first-in-time priority rule from an agrarian, natural use doctrine to "an 
offensive doctrine justified by its power to promote economic development''); Christopher Vecsey, 
American Indian Environmental Religions, in AMERICAN INDIAN ENVIRONMENTS 1, 1-37 (Christopher 
Vecsey & Robert W. Venables eds., 1980) (discussing the relationship between American Indians and 
nature). 
42. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIE1Y 1-17 (1997) (introducing the 
commodity, or market, and the propriety, or public good, conceptions of property). 
43. /d. at 379. 
44. See id. at 8-9, 379-84. See generally HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 31-62 (discussing the 
transformation of property law from a system based on an agrarian vision of absolute dominion and use 
to a utilitarian vision of productive development and use). 
45. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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use orientation of water allocation laws,46 and the mechanical settlement 
and use requirements of colonial and early statehood land distribution 
laws.47 In other words, from its fundamental constitutional context to its 
mechanical allocation rules, the traditional property system has been 
designed to promote short-term productive use-"to ensure prompt and 
tangible financial retums.'"'8 This goal generally conflicts with the 
"lengthy observation periods and managerial forbearance" required for 
effective ecological management.49 
Another key policy of property law, the promotion of certainty and 
stability, also conflicts with some basic components of effective ecosystem 
management. As many have already explained, property law needs to 
promote certainty and stability in order to encourage investment and use, 
reduce transaction costs, facilitate the administration of property regimes 
and the resolution of property conflicts, and clarify the deterrents and 
incentives faced by property owners.50 The importance to property law of 
promoting certainty is evidenced by its impact on a wide range of laws 
affecting natural resources, including wild animals,51 oil and gas,52 water, 53 
and land.54 Because ecosystems are ever changing and unpredictable, 
protection of ecosystems will require policies that conflict with the 
certainty goal underlying many property law principles. 55 
2. Private Property's Domination of Resource Allocation Systems 
The fundamental principles, values, and policies defining the private 
property concept have controlled the development of America's natural 
resource allocation systems. Two of those systems-land distribution laws 
46. See infra notes 67-69, 75-88, 91-95 and accompanying text. 
47. Throughout Virginia's colonial and early statehood periods, for example, its land distribution 
system was used to promote various economic, political, and social goals. See generally BlJil.ER & 
LIVINGSTON, supra note 2, §§ 8.1-.5, at 245-303 (discussing Virginia's colonial and early statehood 
land laws). 
48. Robert B. Keiter, Ecosystems and the Law: Toward an Integrated Approach, 8 EcoLOGICAL 
APPUCATIONS 332, 332 (May 1998). 
49. Id. 
SO. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805) (discussing the importance of certainty 
and stability to wild animal law). 
51. See, e.g., id. 
52. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Central Ky. Nat. Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1934) (applying the 
wild animal escape rule to terminate ownership rights over gas when the gas escapes), overruled by 
Texas Arner. Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1987). 
53. See infra notes 81,90 and accompanying text (discussing the flfSt-in-time rule governing use 
of surface waters in western states). 
54. See, e.g., Tapscott v. Cobbs, 52 Va. (II Gratt.) 172 (1854) (protecting the flfSt possessor). 
55. See Keiter, supra note 48, at 332. 
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and water allocation systems-are discussed briefly to highlight the 
pervasive influence of the private property concept. 
The land laws used to distribute interests in real property in the 
colonial and early statehood periods demonstrate the influence of core 
values underlying property law: individualism, self-autonomy, and 
certainty. Although a communal system of landholding initially was tried 
in Jamestown, the first permanent settlement in America, it was abandoned 
seven years after its adoption. In granting power to a group of investors to 
establish the Virginia colony, King James I authorized the distribution of 
land to private parties upon nomination and approval by the King.56 
Eventually known as the London Company, the group of investors decided 
initially to hold land in the colony for the common use and benefit of the 
settlers.57 The investors apparently feared that immediate distribution of 
private land rights would leave them with insufficient funds to cover the 
costs of colonization. One of the London Company's pamphlets explained 
that a party interested in purchasing land in the Virginia colony would need 
to buy stock in the Company and hold it for a seven-year period. At the 
end of the period, the purchaser would receive land from the Company.58 
When the first seven-year period ended in 1616, the Company carried out 
its promised land distribution, abandoning its communal (or plantation) 
system. 59 The Company apparently realized that the communal system was 
thwarting development60 and replaced it with a land distribution system 
that favored greater distribution to private parties.61 
American land laws generally distributed geometrically distinct tracts 
of land to individuals who met land settlement requirements designed to 
promote land use and development for various social, political, and 
56. See Letters Patent to Sir Thomas Gate, Sir George Somers, and others, for two several 
Colonies and Plantations, to be made in Virginia, and other parts and Territories of America, 4 Jam.-
Stith's App. No. 1. pa. 1 (Apr. 10, 1606), reprinted in 1 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATIJTES AT 
LARGE 57-66 (1823); The Second Charter to the Treasurer and Company, for Virginia, erecting them 
into a Corporation and Body Politic, and for the further enlargement and explanation of the privileges of 
the said Company and FlfSt Colony of Virginia, 7 Jam.-Stith's App. No.2 (May 23, 1609), reprinted 
in HENING, supra, at 80-98. 
57. See NOVA BRITANNIA: OfFERING MOSTEXCELLENI'FRUITES BYPLANilNG IN VIRGINIA 23-
24 (1609), reprinted in I TRAcrs AND OTHER PAPERS VI (Peter Smith ed. 1947) (Peter Force coli. 
1835) (advertisement pamphlet to entice settlers to Virginia colony). 
58. See id. The pamphlet indicated that shareholders would receive land dividends at a rate of at 
least 500 acres per share. See id. at 24. 
59. See Bun.ER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 2, § 8.1, at 245. 
60. See id. at 245. 
61. See Instructions to Governor Yeardley, 1618, reprinted in 2 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 
154 (1894). 
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economic purposes.62 Some sort of use-for example, pasturing and 
clearing-typically was required to acquire title.63 Other requirements 
might include payment of consideration, surveying and locating the 
specified amount of land, returning a completed plat, and defeating 
objections to the issuance of a grant.64 All of the requirements were part of 
a lengthy process of separating not only the purchased land from the waste 
and unappropriated lands still available for entry and grant, but also the 
purchaser from his neighbors.65 Property rights in land, in other words, 
reflected notions of separateness and boundedness that are at odds with the 
principles of connectedness and fluidity at the core of ecosystem science. 
The traditional American systems of law governing water use in both 
the water-rich East and the water-poor West also have reflected the 
preferences for individualism, autonomy, separateness, and economic 
development promoted by American land laws and underlying the private 
property concept.66 Water allocation and management systems are 
especially important to effective ecosystem management goals because of 
the importance of water to ecosystems and land use. From a physical 
perspective, water both constrains and enables land development. Despite 
the two-sidedness of this link between water resources and land use, 
American water allocation systems generally only focus on the enabling 
role of water. That is, the traditional water allocation systems generally 
encourage out-of-stream, consumptive uses of water designed to enable 
land development and do not allow ecosystem characteristics and needs to 
dominate water use decisions.67 This clear preference for consumptive use 
62. See Bun.ER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 2, § 8.1, at 262-68; Sterk, supra note 21, at 55. For 
a discussion of the land settlement and land grant process in Virginia, see Bun.ER & LIVINGSTON, 
supra note 2, §§ 8.1-5, at 245-303. See generally PAUL W. GATES, HiSTORY OF PuBUC LAND LAW 
DEVELOPMENT 33-74 (1968) (discussing colonial land systems, state cessions of western land claims, 
and the development of public land laws and policies); HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 101-08 (discussing 
the relationship between property rights and individualism); PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, TilE LEGACY 
OF CONQUEST: ntE UNBROKEN PAST OF TilE AMERICAN WEST (1987) (discussing the role of the 
federal government in promoting and regulating land development in the American West). 
63. See Bun.ER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 2, § 8.1, at 262-63. 
64. See id. § 8.3, at 279-81. 
65. See Sterk, supra note 21, at 90 ("The geometric-box allocation generally pennits landowners 
to avoid interaction with others, including neighbors, unless both the landowner and the other provide 
for interaction by explicit agreement."). See generally AlEXANDER, supra note 42, at 97-126 
(discussing the revision of land law during the Jacksonian era to promote the economic conception of 
property); Bun.ER & LIVINGSTON, supra note 2 (discussing the colonial and early statehood land 
distribution Jaws in Virginia). 
66. See HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 34. 
67. See Butler, supra note 34, at 326-30; Freyfogle, supra note 36, at 27-30. 
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is reflected in the alienability of traditional water rights68 and in the 
traditional systems' treatment of water as a commodity to be used and 
transported to meet human ends. 69 A brief discussion of the traditional 
systems will demonstrate their enabling effect on land development and 
use, as well as their unsuccessful constraining effect. 
Under the system traditionally governing the water-rich East, rights in 
a watercourse arise as an incidence of owning land adjoining the 
watercourse. 70 Owners of such riparian land generally have the right to 
make reasonable use of the water in the watercourse for the benefit of their 
riparian land.71 Because other riparians along the watercourse have a 
similar right, each riparian's right to reasonable use is subject to the 
correlative rights of other riparians.72 
Two key aspects of the riparian doctrine define the scope of water use 
rights. First, the water use must be tied to riparian land; a riparian 
proprietor can only exercise her rights for the benefit of riparian landP 
Second, the riparian use must, in most traditional riparian jurisdictions, be 
reasonable.74 Both requirements incorporate land ownership norms. The 
riparian land requirement restricts the land that can benefit from the use of 
a watercourse by recognizing that riparian rights inhere in the ownership 
rights of riparian landowners. The reasonable use requirement defines the 
quantitative use rights of riparian owners.75 In developing this standard, 
the courts traditionally have assumed that the riparian user is a private 
agrarian who supplies all his or her consumptive water needs.76 
68. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND REsOURCES§ 5.17 (11th ed. 1999). See 
also Lynda L. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian Jurisdiction: Defining the 
Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 41 U. Prrr. L. REV. 95, 137-56 (1985) (discussing 
the transferability of consumptive and nonconsumptive water rights in a riparian jurisdiction); infra note 
80 and accompanying text (discussing the transferability of riparian rights). 
69. See Freyfogle, supra note 36, at 35. 
70. See Butler, supra note 34, at 327. 
71. See Butler, supra note 68, at 105. In the nineteenth century most courts followed the natural 
flow theory, which generally gave each riparian the right to receive the natural flow of the watercourse. 
Under this approach a downstream riparian could enjoin a use by an upstream riparian if the use 
diminished the quality or quantity of water, regardless of whether the downstream riparian was injured. 
See TARLOCK, supra note 68, § 3.12[1]. 
72. See Butler, supra note 68, at 106-07. A riparian is entitled to the use of the flow of a 
watercourse after reasonable use by upstream riparians but may not unduly interfere with the correlative 
rights of downstream riparians. See id. 
73. See id. at 107-25. 
74. See id. at 125-30. 
75. See id. at 125-26. 
76. See id. at 125. 
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The riparian doctrine incorporates private property nonns in a number 
of ways. Besides reflecting a preference for private ownership of water 
rights, the doctrine treats riparian rights as vested property rights whose 
allocation is tied to the ownership of riparian land-not to the jurisdiction, 
the needs of political units, or the interests of the public. Additionally, the 
traditional riparian system prefers consumptive riparian uses through the 
reasonable use requirement and through the principles and rules governing 
resolution of water use conflicts. Riparians along a watercourse know that 
upstream riparians have the right, and therefore the opportunity, to conduct 
their reasonable uses before the water reaches the downstream users.77 
Under certain circumstances this right entitles "an upstream riparian to 
exhaust the water in the watercourse."78 Further, when an unlawful 
riparian use has been conducted, typically only riparian landowners who 
can establish injury are entitled to relief from the courts.79 Finally, like 
other property interests associated with ownership, riparian rights are 
transferable and sometimes even severable.80 
Under the system traditionally governing the water-poor West, 
allocation of water rights is based upon priority in time: a water user who 
diverts water from a watercourse and uses it for a beneficial purpose 
acquires rights superior to subsequent users.81 Although the prior 
appropriation doctrine does not require holders of water rights to own 
riparian land,82 the doctrine clearly encourages the actual, present, and 
consumptive use of water. To perfect their right, appropriators must 
physically divert water from the watercourse.83 Through this requirement 
the courts have ensured that a party must have physical control of the 
claimed water before the party may successfully assert an appropriative 
77. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
78. Butler, supra note 68, at 126-27. 
79. See id. at 136-37. In a riparian jurisdiction, the injury requirement means that the 
complaining riparian must own riparian land that is downstream from the point of diversion. See id. at 
136 n.l12. 
80. Courts have allowed riparian rights to be transferred in one of two ways. A riparian 
landowner generally has the right to transfer his or her water rights along with the riparian land, much 
as easements transfer as incidents to the benefited land when the land is conveyed. See TARLOCK, 
supra note 68, § 3.18. See generally id. § 3.04 (discussing the nature of riparian rights, which resemble 
a number of different property interests). Alternatively, a riparian can, in some riparian jurisdictions, 
sever the riparian rights from the land to which they are appurtenant and separately transfer the rights. 
See Butler, supra note 68, at 139-42. Though the extent of this sevembility rule is not clear, the rule 
does implicitly recognize the importance of redistribution and reallocation of water rights. See Butler, 
supra note 68, at 138-39. 
81. See TARLOCK, supra note 68, §§ 5.05[2], 5.10; Butler, supra note 34, at 329. 
82. See TARLOCK, supra note 68, § 5.07[1]. 
83. See id. § 5.15. 
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right.84 Further, courts traditionally have interpreted the beneficial use 
requirement of the prior appropriation doctrine to include uses that provide 
economic or commercial benefits regardless of the environmental 
consequences or the foreseeability of a water shortage. 85 Courts following 
this interpretation view instream uses as inherently wasteful because they 
leave water in place in the stream and thus reduce the water available for 
consumptive use. 86 Actual, present use is also encouraged by the prior 
appropriation rule that nonuse can result in loss of appropriative rights; 
appropriators should regularly use a definite quantity of water to avoid this 
possibility.87 Finally, once an appropriative right is perfected, it generally 
is transferable. 88 
Like the riparian doctrine, traditional prior appropriation law 
incorporates private property perspectives into its requirements. In 
addition to treating appropriative rights as a form of property,89 prior 
appropriation law is based on a basic principle of property law: priority in 
time, priority in right.9° Furthermore, the prior appropriation doctrine 
encourages private parties to divert water from a watercourse and use it for 
beneficial purposes.91 Traditional definitions of beneficial use include 
almost any type of consumptive use of water "without regard for 
environmental consequences or foreseeable shortages";92 as "long as a 
single drop remained in the stream or aquifer," users could continue to 
appropriate the water.93 The "dominant message" of the traditional prior 
appropriation doctrine is that "water is a commodity, an object that exists 
for humans to move and manipulate, a thing that exists primarily to serve 
human needs.'o94 Like other objects of property rights, water is treated as a 
"tool for one person-the owner-to use to gain economic advantage over 
other persons.'o95 
84. See Butler, supra note 34, at 330. 
85. See Freyfogle, supra note 36, at 42. 
86. See Butler, supra note 34, at 329. 
87. See TARLOCK, supra note 68, § 5.18[1]. 
88. See id. § 5.17[1]. 
89. See Freyfogle, supra note 36, at 28. 
90. See TARLOCK, supra note 68, § 5.08[1]. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the 
Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REv. 1221 (1979) (discussing the justifications for first possession systems); 
Rose, supra note 38 (discussing the meaning of the first possession rule). 
91. See TARLOCK, supra note 68, § 5.08[1]. 
92. Freyfogle, supra note 36, at 42. 
93. !d. at 28. 
94. !d. at 35. 
95. ld. 
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Although the courts and legislatures of many states have modified 
their traditional system to provide for protection of ecological and other 
instream uses, the reforms generally suffer from numerous problems and 
limitations.96 Like the traditional common law systems, the reforms tend to 
treat instream water use as another category of water use rather than as a 
responsibility of the holders of traditionally recognized water rights. Thus, 
consumptive water users generally are not held accountable for some of 
their significant external use costs.97 
Resource allocation systems developed for land and water resources 
traditionally have relied on private property norms to define the scope and 
nature of interests allocated under the systems. Because those norms 
include preferences for consumptive use, separate and discrete privately 
held interests, transferability of interests, private control, and freedom to 
seek economic advantage from the interests, resource allocation systems 
conflict in a number of ways with ecosystem management goals. Property 
norms have had a similar, but less direct, impact on natural resource and 
ecosystem management programs. 
B. THE RIGHTS-SENSITIVE NATURE OF RESOURCE 
AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 
Resource and ecosystem management efforts also reflect the influence 
of property rights and land ownership norms.98 A brief discussion of the 
nature and scope of property's influence will reveal how responsive natural 
resource and ecosystem management programs are to property norms. That 
influence then will be contrasted with an approach recommended by 
experts-an ecosystem-based approach to management. The contrast will 
highlight even more the rights-sensitive nature of current management 
programs. 
96. See Butler, supra note 34, at 330-56 (discussing these modifications and their resultant 
problems and limitations). 
97. See Freyfogle, supra note 36, at 30-31,50. 
98. Resource management programs developed separately from environmental management 
programs. Years before concerns about air and water quality led to the development of environmental 
programs, resource management programs had been formulated and implemented to manage renewable 
natural resources (like forests, water, and wildlife) and nonrenewable resources (like soil and minerals). 
See generally WILLIAM R. MAN GUN & DANIEL H. HENNING, MANAGING Till! ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 
1-19, 111-82 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing environmental and natural resource administrntion, and 
renewable and nonrenewable resource management). Environmental programs, in comparison, 
developed much later in response to widespread concern for environmental degradation. Because of 
their focus on specific pollution or degradation preblems, environmental laws generally do not provide 
comprehensive management and use systems for natural resources. See id. at 111. 
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Programs 
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Several key aspects of the property system have influenced natural 
resource and ecosystem management programs. These characteristics 
include the property system's preference for private ownership,99 the 
system's tendency to allow severability or divisibility of interests in 
resources, 100 its rights basis, 101 its focus on present use, 102 its protection of 
reasonable expectations of gain, 103 and its presumption of transferability .104 
Consistent with these traits, tangible natural resources generally are divided 
into separate, discrete categories for purposes of ownership, management, 
and use. The underlying assumption appears to be that natural resources 
are materials to be exploited by humans.105 
Consider the basic approaches to management and use of land and 
water resources. For centuries the primary focus of land programs has been 
the allocation of ownership rights in surface land. That allocation has 
involved the "division of surface area into discrete parcels separated by 
rigid boundary lines."106 Often the boundaries used to define those 
categories reflect human values rather than ecological concerns or scientific 
99. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
100. See Freyfogle, supra note 8, at 1274-75. For an example of this tendency, see ROGER A. 
CUNNINGHAM, WIWAM B. STOEBUCK, DALE A. WffiTMAN, 'nm LAW OF PROPERTY§§ 8.9, 8.11 (2d 
ed. 1993) (discussing the scope, divisibility, and apportionability of easements and profits). 
101. See Freyfogle, supra note 8, at 1275-76, 1286-88. 
102. See Butler, supra note 33, at 632-40 (discussing private land use expectations); Lynton Keith 
Caldwell, Land and the Law: Problems in Legal Philosophy, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 323-25 
(discussing the extent to which land use systems based on individual rights and social rights consider 
present and future consequences of use decisions). 
103. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
104. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. See also ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 127-33, 
138-49 (discussing the commodification and marketability of property). 
105. See Vecsey, supra note 41, at 33. Sometimes this assumption has resulted in the transfer of 
ownership of natural resources to private parties; other times it has led to the creation or protection of 
private interests in resource use. See, e.g., MANGUN & HENNING, supra note 98, at 114 (discussing the 
transfer of forests to private ownership); id. at 126-31 (discussing private grazing interests). It has also 
led to the creation of public resource management programs that stress human use over environmental 
quality and ecosystem health. Public land management, for example, has stressed timber production, 
grazing, and oil and mineral extraction over environmental quality. "Beaver populations are controlled 
to maximize timber revenue, while net wetlands loss continues; riparian habitat is stripped by livestock, 
lowering water tables and degrading water quality; careless lumbering clogs the streams with silt." 
ALICE OUTWATER, WATER 183 (1996). Although many resource managers now claim to "use 
ecological approaches in management activities[, i]n reality, this orientation may be confined to 
superficial treatment and short-range planning." MANGUN & HENNING, supra note 98, at 3. 
106. Sterk, supra note 21, at 55. 
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understandings.107 This "geometric-box allocation is generally well 
adapted to a society whose members highly value individualism and 
autonomy."108 Water management programs similarly have drawn boxes 
around different types of waters, separating surface water from 
groundwater despite principles of hydrology.109 
The approaches of land and water programs reflect the rights basis and 
present use orientation of the American property system, which have 
encouraged the development of a homocentric approach to resource and 
ecosystem management. The rights basis and present use orientation have 
caused the focus of management efforts to shift from the managed system 
or resource to "the relative interests of humans."110 As a result, traditional 
management programs sometimes have serious gaps in coverage, focusing 
primarily on those ecological resources widely valued or recognized as 
needing immediate action, and often exempting or even ignoring other 
resources that are either not as degraded or valued, or that are privately 
owned.lll Additionally, the property rights of transferability and 
reasonable expectation of gain have infused management programs with an 
economic perspective that affects the scope and implementation of the 
programs. 
The influence of the economic perspective can be seen in the atomistic 
approach of traditional watershed management programs, which tend to 
ignore the system as a whole and focus instead on individual elements or 
resources within the system in ways that are consistent with property law 
107. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 9, at 991-93 (discussing the political fragmentation of water 
programs); Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, as They Apply to Environmental 
Law, 69 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 893, 905-06 (1994) (discussing the need to detennine ecosystem 
boundaries by ecological principles, not politics). 
108. Sterk, supra note 21, at 90. 
109. See TARLOCK, supra note 68, §§ 4.03, 6.06. This approach still is well embedded in the law. 
In a 1997 decision, a federal district court held that discharges to groundwater from an unlined pond did 
not qualify as a point source discharge subject to the Clean Water Act despite a hydrological link to the 
surface water. The court explained that, according to legislative history, Congress did not intend to 
regulate even hydrologically connected groundwater. See Umatilla Waterquality Protective Ass'n v. 
Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1312, 1318-19 (D. Or. 1997). 
110. Freyfogle, supra note 8, at 1276. See also Noss, supra note 107, at 894 (noting the utilitarian 
approach of traditional natural resource management policies). For examples of the private 
rights/human use approach, see MANGUN & HENNING, supra note 98, at 114-26 (discussing the use 
orientation offorest policy); id. at 126-31 (describing the overuse of rangeland and the ineffectiveness 
of range policy in protecting rangeland); id. at 131-45 (discussing the use orientation of water policy). 
111. See Lynda L. Butler, State Environmental Programs: A Study in Political Influence and 
Regulatory Failure, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 881-92 (1990) (discussing the scope of state 
environmental legislation). 
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policies and land ownership norms.112 The influence of the economic 
perspective also can be seen in the targeting of specific ecological 
resources for regulatory action designed to promote economic interests.113 
Other examples of the atomistic and targeting perspectives include: 
wetlands regulations that focus on selected land use changes and ignore 
other activities in wetlands (like soil removal, drainage, and destruction of 
plant life) that affect their health;114 fishery management plans that focus 
on the adequacy of fish populations for economic purposes, and ignore 
factors affecting the health of the population;115 water flow protection plans 
that maintain flow because of its value for consumptive or out-of-stream 
uses, not because of its instream value;116 and forest ecosystem programs 
that stress the continuous production of goods and services from the forest 
over other policy goals.117 
112. For examples of this approach, see supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing water 
management programs that separate surface waters from groundwater); infra note 113 and 
accompanying text (discussing estuarine watershed programs). See generally Robert B. Keiter, 
Conse111ation Biology and the lilw: Assessing the Challenges Ahead, 69 CHJ.-KENT L. REV. 911, 913-
20 (1994) (discussing the domination of the consumptive use ethic and utilitarian considerations over 
biological concerns). Some scholars attribute the development of an atomistic approach to the 
neoclassical economic view of ecology. See Ernest Partridge, Holes in the Cornucopia, in THE 
BUSINESS OF CONSUMPTION 247, 263-64 (Laura Westra & Patricia H. Werhane eds., 1998). This 
economic view is replicated in the libertarian concept of property. See id. at 264. 
113. FIShery management programs often reflect this economic perspective. See, e.g .• Geraldine 
McCormick-Ray, A Watershed Perspective for Chesapeake Bay Management, in TOWARD A 
SUSTAINABLE COASTAL WATERSHED: THE CHESAPEAKE EXPERIMENT, PROCEEDINGS OF A 
CONFERENCE 235, 2~1 (Paula Hill & Steve Nelson eds., 1994) [hereinafter SUSTAINABLE COASTAL 
WATERSHED] (discussing the effects of targeting oyster production in the Chesapeake Bay). Cf. Noss, 
supra note 107, at 894-97 (discussing the emergence of conservation biology in reaction to the 
utilitarian focus of management programs). See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 42 (discussing the 
economic, or commodity, and the public good, or propriety, conceptions of property). 
Protection of estuarine watersheds traditionally has included both the atomistic and targeting 
perspectives. In the Chesapeake Bay, for example, management efforts have focused on oyster 
production and have ignored the ecological functions of oyster reefs and the processes that sustain 
oysters. See McCormick-Ray, supra, at 241. Management efforts also have stressed the productivity of 
Bay species over the role of freshwater in maintaining the habitats on which those species depend. See 
id. at 236-40. 
114. See THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, THE FINAL REPORT OF TIIE NATIONAL WETLANDS 
POUCY FORUM, PROTECilNG AMERICA'S WETLANDS: AN ACTION AGENDA 44-47 (1988) (discussing 
regulatory gaps in wetlands programs); WILLIAM L. WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION §§ 
4.06[3]-[6] (May 1999) (discussing activities that may not be regulated by federal wetlands laws even 
though they destroy wetlands). 
115. See, e.g., McCormick-Ray, supra note 113, at 236-40. 
116. See Freyfogle, supra note 36, at 41-42. 
117. See MANGUN & HENNING, supra note 98, at 114-23. See also Keiter, supra note 112, at 
913 (noting that "Congress historically has subsidized commodity production activities ... at such 
disproportionately high levels that biological considerations have all but been forgotten" in the 
management of public lands). 
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Further, even when watershed management efforts rely on scientific 
principles, they often do so with a twist-a property or land ownership 
norm twist. For example, riverine watershed management programs 
traditionally have focused on the hydrologic functions of watersheds to 
ensure the return of water to the waterway for future use by riparian 
owners.118 From a hydrologic perspective, a watershed serves the functions 
of water collection, storage, and discharge.119 An ecological perspective, in 
comparison, recognizes that a watershed also provides a habitat for flora 
and fauna, and serves as a pathway for the processing of environmental 
chemicals.12° Consistent with the hydrologic perspective, traditional 
riverine management programs have promoted the rehabilitation of abused 
or naturally altered lands for the purpose of controlling rnnoff and 
enhancing water flow,121 the protection of sensitive areas to minimize the 
need for rehabilitative measures, 122 and the enhancement or manipulation 
of the water resource characteristics that influence hydrologic functions.123 
These traditional programs tend to ignore the ecological functions of 
watersheds, and concentrate instead on improving or maintaining water 
flow through the control of runoff, erosion, and other disturbances to water 
flow.124 
A good example of the traditional perspective is the federal 
government's channelization policy, which promotes the straightening of 
rivers or streams to produce a swifter and more efficient water flow. 
Although the policy enhances water flow for consumptive use and prevents 
some natural flooding of adjoining private lands, its ecological costs are 
significant. Besides increasing runoff and erosion, the policy results in the 
removal of vegetative land cover and in increased flooding of downstream 
118. Courts use the same reasoning to explain why they restrict riparian land to land within the 
watershed. See, e.g., Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 88 P. 978, 980 (Cal. 1907); Town of 
Gordonsville v. Zinn, 106 S.E. 508, 511 (Va 1921). For a discussion of the watershed restriction, see 
Butler, supra note 68, at 111-17. For a discussion of the physical processes and charncteristics of 
rivers, see LUNA B. LEOPOlD, A VIEW OF THE RIVER (1994). See generally JEFFREY F. MOUNT, 
CALIFORNIA RIVERS AND S1REAMS (1995) (providing an overview of the physical and biological 
processes shaping California's rivers and discussing the interaction of land use practices with those 
processes). 
119. See BLACK, supra note 30, at 300. 
120. See id. at 301. 
121. See id. at 322-23. Examples include removal or restriction of the cause of disturbances to 
water flow and manipulation of vegetative cover to minimize runoff and augment flow. See id. at 323. 
For a discussion of methods for rehabilitation, see id. at 323-28. 
122. See id. at 322. For a discussion of protection techniques, see id. at 329-34. 
123. See id. at 312-13, 322. For a discussion of enhancement techniques, see id. at 334-38. 
124. See MOUNr, supra note 118, at xiii (describing the different perspectives to riverine 
watersheds taken by geologists, biologists, hydrologists, and engineers). 
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areas. 125 Government agencies implementing the channelization policy 
ignore these ecological costs and focus instead on maximization of 
hydrologic functions. 
2. Ecosystem-Based Approaches to Management 
For years experts have called for the development of ecosystem-based 
approaches to watershed management that would differ markedly from 
traditional programs influenced by property norms.126 According to current 
thinking, an ecosystem-based approach to watershed management 
recognizes the importance of the natural processes affecting the 
watershed's health, the spatial and temporal dimensions of the ecosystem, 
the system's inputs, the need for a top-down ecological approach to 
management, the dynamic nature of the watershed, and the 
interdependencies and interactions within the watershed.127 The ecological 
characteristics of coastal ecosystems, for instance, suggest the need for a 
holistic, ecosystem-based approach to watershed management. Coastal 
ecosystems are characterized by complex interactions occurring between 
the land and water resources of the watershed over time.128 Because of the 
complex interactions, management efforts that focus solely or primarily on 
localized areas, individual resources, or particular sources of pollution 
generally fail to halt, much less reverse, ecosystem degradation. Indeed, 
despite years of point source regulation, the health of species in many 
125. See MANGUN & HENNING, supra note 98, at 140. 
126. See Adler, supra note 9, at 974-78. 
127. See McConnick-Ray, supra note 113, at 235-40, 242-44. See also COUNCIL ON 
ENVIRONMENfAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENfAL QUALITY: THE TwENfY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 206-
10 (1993) (federal agency report discussing principles and guidelines for ecosYstem management); 
Keiter, supra note 112, at 927-33 (discussing the ecosystem management concept). For further 
discussion of the need for an integrated and dynamic or adaptive approach to ecosystem management, 
see BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 9; EcOLOGICAL INfEGRITY, supra note 30; Carl J. Walters & 
Ray Hilborn, Ecological Optimization and Adaptive Management, 9 ANN. REV. EcOLOGY & 
SYSTEMATICS 157 (1978). For a discussion of changes in thinking on ecosystem functioning, see 
BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 9, at 20-23; C.S. Holling, The Resilience of Terrestrial 
Ecosystems: Local Surprise and Global Change, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENf OF THE BIOSPHERE 
292, 29&-300, 306-08 (W.C. Clark & R.E. Munn eds., 1986). 
128. See Adler, supra note 9, at 981-86. See also David L. Correll, Thomas E. Jordan, & Donald 
E. Weller, The Chesapeake Bay Watershed: Effects of Lond Use and Geology on Dissolved Nitrogen 
Concentrations, in SUSTAINABLE CoASTAL WATERSHED, supra note 113, at 639 (discussing the effects 
ofland use and geology on nutrient dynamics); S. Diane Eckles, Toward a Sustainable Watershed: The 
Wetlands Londscape Analysis Project, in SUSTAINABLE COASTAL WATERSHED, supra note 113, at 259 
(discussing a project to assess the impact of changes in landscape structure on ecosystem functioning); 
Leonard Shabman, Sustainable Development for the Chesapeake: Lond Settlement Connection, in 
SUSTAINABLE COASTAL WATERSHED, supra note 113, at 3 (discussing the impact of land settlement 
policy on the Chesapeake Bay). 
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watersheds has continued to decline.129 Many experts now attribute this 
continued decline, at least in part, to nonpoint sources of pollution.130 
Controlling those sources of pollution requires a broader approach. 
One key element of an ecosystem-based approach to watershed and 
ecosystem management is recognizing the importance of natural 
processes-in particular, interactions between the biological, physical, and 
chemical processes affecting the health of watersheds.131 Although a single 
product or resource within a watershed still may be important to a 
management plan, and especially to efforts to gain public support, key 
structuring processes must be the primary focus of watershed management 
efforts. 132 According to experts, such a focus results in more effective 
protection of ecosystems.133 
For example, management efforts that understand the essential role of 
freshwater flow in the Chesapeake Bay watershed system will, in the long 
run, provide more effective protection of target species and their habitats 
than product-oriented efforts.134 Freshwater flow serves as an 
"environmental connector"135 in the Chesapeake Bay system, connecting 
"the habitats and species to the dynamics of the watershed system[,] ... 
deliver[ing] energy, particles, and chemicals that mix with saline water" to 
affect the topography, shoreline, species distribution, chemical 
composition, and habitats of the system.136 Without an appreciation of the 
impact of freshwater flow on the quality and quantity of suitable habitats 
for target species, watershed management efforts would not adequately 
protect the habitats; such management efforts would ignore the paramount 
129. See Adler, supra note 9, at 987-88. 
130. See id. at 989-91. 
131. See Alan Brandt, Physical Processes in the Chesapeake Bay and Their Bio-Chemical Effects, 
in SUSTAINABLE COASTAL WATERSHED, supra note 113, at 99; Eckles, supra note 128, at 261; 
McConnick-Ray, supra note 113, at 235, 240. 
132. See McConnick-Ray, supra note 113, at 235, 240. See also C.S. Holling, What Barriers? 
What Bridges?, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 9, at 3, 26-28 [hereinafter Holling, What 
Barriers? What Bridges?] (discussing the key structuring variables and processes that affect ecological 
organization); C.S. Holling, Cross-Scale Morphology, Geometry, and Dynamics of Ecosystems, 62 
EcOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS 447, 451-52 (Dec. 1992) [hereinafter Holling, Cross-Scale Morphology] 
(discussing the extended keystone and entrainment hypotheses). 
133. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 28-34. See generally Lance 
H. Gunderson, C.S. Holling, & Stephen S. Light, Barriers Broken and Bridges Built: A Synthesis, in 
BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 9, at 489, 489-532; McConnick-Ray, supra note 113, at 235, 240. 
134. See McConnick-Ray, supra note 113, at 235, 236-40. 
135. I d. at 239. 
136. /d. at 239-40. 
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importance of "[e]stuarine connectivity" to "maintenance and restoration of 
ecosystem function."137 
A second key element of an ecosystem-based approach recognizes the 
importance of considering ecologically appropriate spatial and temporal 
scales in making management decisions.138 In a riverine watershed, for 
instance, spatial and temporal dimensions include not only the longitudinal 
or upstream/downstream dimension of the river, but also the lateral or 
upland/floodplain dimension, the vertical or groundwater/surface water 
dimension, and the temporal dimension.139 The longitudinal dimension 
recognizes that the activities and conditions existing in upstream areas 
cannot be isolated from downstream conditions and uses.140 The lateral 
dimension reflects the notion that watershed management cannot focus 
solely on the water body, but rather must also include connections between 
the water body and the surrounding land and ecosystems.141 The vertical 
dimension reinforces the hydrologic principle of interconnectedness 
between surface water and groundwater.142 The temporal dimension 
suggests that management take into account changes in the other 
dimensions over time.143 
Another key element of an ecosystem-based approach recognizes the 
importance of focusing on system inputs that sustain productivity, rather 
than on system outputs.144 A management approach that focuses primarily 
or solely on the products of an ecosystem ultimately isolates the managed 
products and the decisionmaking process from the ecosystem, creating a 
more vulnerable ecosystem.145 Consideration of system inputs at the 
137. /d. at 240. 
138. See Adler, supra note 9, at 982; Keiter, supra note 112, at 929; King, supra note 30, at 22-
24, 28-30, 35-39; Robert V. Thomann, The Significance of Resource Scale in Water Quality and 
Ecosystem Modeling and Decision Making, in SUSTAINABLE COASTAL WATERSHED, supra note 113, at 
20. 
139. See Adler, supra note 9, at 982. See generally MOUNT, supra note 118, at 12-15 (discussing 
a model river system and the dependent and independent variables affecting it). 
140. See Adler, supra note 9, at 982. See also MOUNT, supra note 118, at 134-42 (discussing the 
longitudinal profile of a river). 
141. See Adler, supra note 9, at 982. See also Correll et al., supra note 128 (discussing the effects 
of land use and geology on the nutrient dynamics of the Bay watershed); James A. Lynch & Edward S. 
Corbett, Nitrate Export from Managed and Unmanaged Forested Watersheds in the Chesapeake Bay 
Watershed, in SUSTAINABLE COASTAL WATERSHED, supra note 113, at 656 (discussing changes in 
stream chemistty due to timber harvesting). 
142. See Adler, supra note 9, at 982. See also MOUNT, supra note 118, at 83-99 (discussing the 
relationship between river flow and groundwater). 
143. See Adler, supra note 9, at 982. 
144. See McCormick-Ray, supra note 113, at 244. 
145. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 25, 28-34; McCormick-Ray, 
supra note 113, at 240. 
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watershed scale provides a more complete view of ecosystem structures 
and functions, which can lead to more effective management decisions.146 
For instance, consideration of nutrient-loading activities-instead of just 
particular products or resources-can result in more effective protection of 
the Chesapeake Bay system and its species.147 Restricting nutrients 
(nitrogen and phosphorous) that enter the Bay improves water quality and 
protects submerged aquatic vegetation beds that provide nursery grounds 
for juvenile species.148 
The remaining elements of an ecosystem-based approach to 
management recognize the need for a top-down, biocentric approach that 
reflects the dynamic nature of ecosystems and the interconnectedness of 
their components. Such an approach requires monitoring and managing 
species and other variables that play a central role in the health of the 
ecosystem, regardless of their economic importance; it also requires 
maintenance of system integrity to ensure habitat continuity, including 
protection of the ecosystem's ability to rebuild habitats in response to 
change.149 To be scientifically sound, a management program must 
respond to the dynamic nature of ecosystems and their hierarchies. 150 In 
addition, it must recognize the principle of vertical and horizontal 
interconnectedness. Under this principle an ecosystem or watershed is 
greater than the sum of its parts because of the interactions, 
interdependencies, and feedbacks that relate the parts horizontally and 
vertically.151 Due to these complex connections, a disturbance in one small 
part of an ecosystem or watershed can affect the whole system.152 
146. See McCormick-Ray, supra note 113, at 244-45. 
147. See id. 
148. See McCormick-Ray, supra note 113, at 236, 244; James T.B. Tripp & Michael 
Oppenheimer, Restoration of the Chesapeake Bay: A Multi-state Institutional Challenge, 47 Mo. L. 
REv. 425,428-38 (1988). See generally SUSTAINABLE COASTAL WATERSHED, supra note 113, at 397-
504 (discussing long-term trends in the Bay's water quality and living resources). 
149. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 32-33; McCormick-Ray, 
supra note 113, at 235-36, 240. System integrity "implies the integrity of both system structure and 
function, a maintenance of system components, interactions among them, and the resultant behaviour or 
dynamic of the system." King, supra note 30, at 25. "Assessment of ecosystem integrity is strongly 
dependent upon the perspective from which observations are organized." I d. at 27. One way to 
counteract this problem of perspective is to include indicators of integrity from ns many different 
perspectives ns practical. See id. 
150. See Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 
875, 875-83 (1994). Estuarine ecosystems, for example, are constantly changing in reaction to coastal 
erosion and accretion, climate, and salinity flux. See McCormick-Ray, supra note 113, at 242-44. 
151. See Freyfogle, supra note 36, at 35-38; Holling, What Barriers? What Bridge.v?, supra note 
132, at 24-25; King, supra note 30, at 30-39; McCormick-Ray, supra note 113, at 235. 
152. See Robert Costanza & Jack Greer, The Chesapeake Bay and Its Watershed: A Model for 
Sustainable Ecosystem Management?, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 9, at 169, 178-80, For 
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Modem mapping techniques have provided compelling evidence of 
the need for a holistic approach to watershed and ecosystem management 
that considers time and space scales as well as human and ecological 
systems. Until space satellites allowed us to see the entire Chesapeake Bay 
system all at once, maps of the Bay system typically just portrayed the 
Chesapeake Bay as a great body of water with numerous coastal 
communities located on outlying areas.153 Mapping by satellite imagery, 
however, has given us the ability to see the Bay system as one tremendous 
drainage basin with the Bay proper at the receiving end of the land use 
activities of almost fifteen million people.154 That drainage basin includes 
more than forty significant rivers and one thousand streams, and stretches 
from Vermont, west into West Virginia, and south almost to North 
Carolina.155 
Until landowners become responsible in a cumulative, temporal, and 
spatial sense for the impact of their land uses on the health of a watershed, 
land development and water use will continue to increase virtually without 
restraint. Lawmakers and landowners alike must realize that the impact of 
a land use occurring early in the development of an ecosystem probably 
will not be the same as the impact of a similar land use occurring later. 
They must realize that the impact of a residential development project 
occurring at the same time as two other residential projects is probably not 
as detrimental as the impact of a similar residential development project 
occurring simultaneously with fifty other such projects. The ability of an 
ecosystem to absorb adverse ecological impacts often decreases as the 
ecosystem becomes increasingly stressed and tightly connected.156 Equally 
as important to ecosystem integrity, the ability of human systems to 
respond to adverse ecological change tends to decrease as the management 
example, the cumulative effect of land use activities in the Chesapeake Bay watershed, which have 
increased runoff, and overfishing of the oyster population, which had filtered the water during feeding, 
led to greater sedimentation in Bay waters. Because of the resulting cloudier waters, the amount of 
algae and phytoplankton has increased. This increase has reduced the available light in the waters. As 
the available light decreases, the quantity of aquatic grasses decreases. The decline in aquatic grasses, 
in turn, means less food or shelter for ducks, crabs, and other wildlife. See id. at 179-80. 
!53. See VIRGINIA MARINE REsOURCES COMM'N, TIDEWATER VIRGINIA A 1LAS I (I st ed. 1977). 
154. The most famous map using modern technology is probably the 1987 map that the 
Chesapeake Bay Foundation distributed in poster form. The map is based on landsat data gathered and 
distributed by the Earth Observation Satellite Company located in Lanham, Maryland. 
155. See Tom Horton, Chesapeake Bay-Hanging in the Balance, 183 NAT'L GEOGRAPlllC, June 
1993, at 16. 
156. As an ecosystem stores nutrients and accumulates biomass, it becomes more connected in its 
organizational structure and competitive interactions. Eventually competitors are prevented from using 
accumulated energy and materials, and some organisms are destroyed. See Holling, supra note 127, at 
299-300, 306-09. 
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unit becomes more localized and product-oriented.157 The right to use and 
develop land, in other words, cannot be frozen in time; it cannot have the 
same meaning for all landowners over time and space. Effective watershed 
and ecosystem management requires the consideration of temporal and 
spatial scales as well as ecological hierarchies in defining land rights, 
especially the right to use and develop land. 
Recent thinking on ecological systems views those systems as 
complex, nonlinear systems that normally involve discontinuous behavior 
and structural change. Traditional thinking viewed ecosystems as highly 
ordered systems evolving along a linear path leading toward a sustained 
equilibrium point.158 Today experts recognize that ecological succession is 
much more chaotic and subject to chance, with unpredicted events (for 
example, a new business innovation or new institution) causing moves to 
unexpectedly different systems.159 Even with their more random, chaotic 
nature, ecological systems still can have their evolutionary paths readjusted 
and new opportunities for renewal created. 160 That is, ecosystems still can 
be positively affected by management if the pathological effects of 
property norms on management efforts are recognized and addressed. 
ll. THE PATHOLOGY OF PROPERTY NORMS 
Property norms have contributed to the development of a pathology of 
escalating land and water use, and of ineffective watershed and ecosystem 
management over the long term. These pathologies result, in part, from the 
influence of property norms on the allocation and use of land and water 
resources, and on the rights-based focus of watershed and ecosystem 
management programs-even initially successful programs. Property 
norms have contributed to the legal system's treatment of water as a 
discrete resource to be exploited and allocated to individual private users. 
Property norms also have encouraged landowners to develop linearly along 
waterfronts, despite the ecological significance of undisturbed riparian 
habitats and the adverse effects of sprawling, linear development. Further, 
even when a holistic approach to watershed or ecosystem management is 
157. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 28-34. 
158. See id. at 19-20; Holling, Cross·Scale Morphology, supra note 132, at 466. 
159. See DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW EcOLOGY FOR TilE TwENTY-
FiRST CENTIJRY 6-13 (1990); Gunderson et al., supra note 133, at 511; Holling, What Barriers? What 
Bridges?, supra note 132, at 21; Holling, Cross·Scale Morphology, supra note 132, at 466-67. For a 
discussion of the development of the science of ecology, see Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tnrlock, The 
Influence of Ecological Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 847 (1994). 
160. See Gunderson et al., supra note 133, at 509-11. 
HeinOnline -- 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 953 1999-2000
2000] THE PATHOWGY OF PROPERTY NORMS 953 
adopted, property norms tend to affect the focus, scope, and stringency of 
the program, as well as its future direction, in ways that detrimentally 
impact the effectiveness of the program and the health of ecosystems. The 
pathologies of escalating land and water use and of ineffective watershed 
management are discussed in Parts II.A and II.B. 
A. THE PATIIOLOGY OF EsCALATING LAND AND WA1ER USE 
The pathological effects of land ownership norms on allocation and 
use of land and water resources are pervasive and profound. In addition to 
failing to consider the cumulative impact of private use in defining the 
scope and nature of individual rights, property owners and decisionmakers 
generally have preferred consumptive uses over the preservation, 
conservation, or maintenance of natural resources. Decisionmakers also 
have been unwilling to ban or even seriously restrict land use to protect the 
ecological health of a watershed, and have tended to find no significant 
environmental impact even when projects involve diversions and transfers 
of significant amounts of water from a watercourse.161 Many land use 
planners and policymakers are reluctant to adopt growth controls that 
reflect sound science and ecosystem management principles or that 
recognize moral or ethical bases for imposing some responsibility for 
ecosystem integrity on property owners. The land ownership norms 
producing these pathological effects may have been appropriate when 
natural resources were more plentiful, ecological degradation was minimal, 
land ownership was the main source of wealth, and land development 
generally occurred in compact urban areas. The norms, however, do not 
reflect the current ecological conditions found in stressed ecosystems, the 
sprawling land settlement patterns of modem, developed societies, or the 
powerful economic incentives now captured in a landowner• s power to 
subdivide, transfer, and profit from land development. 
Land development and use continue to escalate in America• s coastal 
areas. Although the size of America•s heartland is significantly larger than 
the size of its coastal areas, the population of the coastal areas outuumbers 
the population of the vast heartland by more than 16 million.162 America•s 
coastal areas now are home to about one-half of the nation•s population, 
but account for only 20% of the total land area of the United States if 
161. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428, 432 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (discussing the 
Army Corps of Engineers' finding of no significant impact in a water supply project involving the City 
of Virginia Beach, Virginia). 
162. See Thomas J. Culliton, Population: Distribution, Density and Growth-National Picture 
(visited May 25, 1999) <http://state_o(_coast.noaa.gov/buUetinslhtmllpop_Ollnational.html>. 
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Alaska is included and only 11% if Alaska is excluded.163 Experts predict 
that the population of America's coastal areas will increase by an average 
of 3,600 people per day, a rate of growth that exceeds the national rate.164 
By 2015 the coastal population is expected to reach 165 million, 165 an 
increase of over 100% since 1960.166 Not surprisingly, the population 
density of America's coastal areas (excluding Alaska) has "increased 
dramatically since 1960,"167 rising from an average of 275 to nearly 400 
people per square kilometer by 1990.168 The significant increase in coastal 
population and development is now imposing serious pressure on coastal 
ecosystems.169 
Although a desire to live in coastal areas may be the primary cause of 
the population increase in those areas, property norms have had a 
significant impact on the land settlement patterns of the population. Until 
the middle of the nineteenth century, settlement and growth occurred 
primarily in urban areas. Beginning in the 1950s, Americans began 
spreading out into rural areas, including less protected, more open coastal 
areas. 170 By the 1960 census, the population of suburban areas exceeded 
the population of central cities for the first time. 171 In coastal areas 
development related to population growth has been particularly intense. 
Though comprising only 11% of the nation's land area (excluding Alaska), 
coastal areas accounted for about one-half of all residential and 
163. See THOMAS J. CULUTON, MAUREEN A. WARREN, nMomY R. GOODSPEED, DAVIDA G. 
REMER, CAROL M. BLACKWElL, & JOHN J. MCDONOUGH, III, U.S. DEP'T OF CoMMERCE, FIFTY 
YEARS OF POPULATION CHANGE ALONG THE NATION'S COASTS: 1960-2010, at 3 (1990) [hereinafter 
CULUTON, FIFTY YEARS]; Thomas J. Culliton, Population: Distribution, Density and Growth-
Introduction (visited May 25, 1999) <http:state_of_coast.noaa.govlbulletins/htmUpop_O 1/intro.html> 
[hereinafter Culliton, Coastal Population]. Although Virginia's coastal areas have only 22% of the 
state's land area, they are predicted to have 63% of its population by 2000. See CUl.UTON, FIFTY 
YEARS, supra, at 8. The same imbalance in population distribution exists worldwide. Over 50% of the 
world's population lives within 200 kilometers of the coast on only about 10% of the earth's nonpolar 
land space. See DON HINRICHSEN, CoASTAL WATERS OF THE WORlD I (1998). 
I 64. See Culliton, Coastal Population, supra note 163. 
165. See id. 
166. See CUl.UTON, FIFTY YEARS, supra note 163, at 3. By 2025 almost 75% of Americans arc 
expected to live in America's coastal areas. See HINRICHSEN, supra note 163, at 14. 
167. CULUTON, FIFTY YEARS, supra note 163, at 6. 
168. See HINRICHSEN, supra note 163, at 14. 
169. See CUl.UTON, FIFTY YEARS, supra note 163, at I. Globally, "[m]orc than half of the 
world's coastlines suffer from severo development pressures." HINRICHSEN, supra note 163, nt 7. 
170. See Jeffrey A. Zinn, Coastal Demographics and Development Patterns (visited Mar. 10, 
1999) <http://www .cnie.org/nle/mar-20/j.html>. 
171. See Rt.rrHERFORD H. PLATT, LAND USE AND SOCIETY 393 (1996). In 1980 an estimated 68 
million people lived in central cities compared to 101 million in suburbs. See id. at 22 fig.I-5. 
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nonresidential construction between 1970 and 1989.172 During that period 
an average of 384,000 new single-family homes were authorized for 
construction in coastal areas each year, while the early 1970s saw almost 
700,000 new multi-family homes authorized for construction in coastal 
areas each year.173 The demographic shift away from urban areas thus has 
led to more sprawling, linear development of land and greater 
fragmentation of local government power as new local governments have 
been formed. 174 At the core of the problem of sprawling development is 
America's preference for low-density, single-family 'residential 
development-detached homes separated from neighbors' homes by 
adequately sized lots and situated in a rnral setting.175 
These land settlement patterns are due in part to the incentives that 
private property norms and changing economic conditions have created. 
The private property attributes of transferability, severability, divisibility, 
and a reasonable expectation of gain have combined with the diminishing 
supply of undeveloped land and the changing role of land as a source of 
wealth to create powerful economic incentives to subdivide tracts of land 
and develop linearly. For centuries land was not only the main source of 
wealth and power, but also the main basis for survival. Alexis de 
Tocqueville once observed that although the "laws of the United States are 
extremely favorable to the division of property ... [,] a cause more 
powerful than the laws prevents property from being divided to excess."176 
He explained how estates in land were rarely divided, because the eldest 
son usually took the estate intact to provide a parcel sufficiently large to 
support his family.177 Today survivorship and support of families no 
longer depend on owning land, and wealth no longer is derived primarily 
from landholdings; property rights now involve far more than property in 
land.178 The constraints on the division of land that Alexis de Tocqueville 
172. See THOMAS J. CULUTON, JOHN J. MCDONOUGH, III, DAVIDA G. REMER, & DAVID M. 
LoiT, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Bt.niDING ALoNG AMERICA'S COASTS 5, 8 (1992) [hereinafter 
CULUTON, COASTALBI.niDING]. 
173. See id. at 8-9. 
174. SeePl.AIT,supranote 17l,at393. 
175. Coastal areas have experienced an increase in both lot and house size since 1970. See 
CULLITON, COASTAL Bt.niDING, supra note 172, at 8. See also Doug Porter, Reinventing Growth 
Management for the Twenty-First Century, 23 WM. & MARY ENVIL. L. & PoL'Y REv. 705 (1999) 
(discussing Americans' fixation with single-family homes in the suburbs). 
176. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage 
Classics 1990) (1835). 
177. See id. at 293-94. Siblings of the eldest son usually went out into the wilderness "to seek 
their fortune." Id. at 293. 
178. See ALExANDER, supra note 42, at 259-61 (discussing the decreasing economic importance 
of land and the emergence of the property-as-value concept). 
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once recognized are gone. When this change is combined with a 
decreasing supply of undeveloped land, an increasing population, and a 
landowner's power to transfer, subdivide, and profit from land use, a recipe 
for sprawling development and environmental degradation is created. 
Though private property norms may not be the sole cause of the sprawling 
development or ecological degradation, the norms nevertheless are an 
important part of the problem. 
Another equally dramatic story of escalating land use concerns 
America's loss of wetlands. Since the late 1700s, over half of the 
approximately 220 million acres of wetlands in the continental United 
States have been drained and converted to various uses.179 Twenty-two 
states have lost at least 50% of their original wetlands, while seven have 
lost over 80%.180 Although the rate of loss has decreased since the 1970s 
due to government regulation, acquisition of environmentally sensitive 
lands, and other factors, estimates of losses on nonfederal lands indicate 
that between 70,000 and 90,000 acres of wetlands still are lost annually.181 
Escalating land use has also taken a significant toll on America's 
forests. A recent study of 11.4 million acres within the Chesapeake Bay 
watershed-roughly one quarter of the watershed-revealed that average 
tree cover declined from 51% in 1973 to 39% in 1997.182 Once covering 
95% of the watershed, Chesapeake Bay forests are becoming increasingly 
fragmented even in unanticipated places. In the study region, rapid tree 
loss occurred not only in expected locations around urban areas but also in 
unanticipated areas throughout the region.183 The widespread tree loss 
indicates that forests are being cut down not only in urban areas but also in 
agricultural areas.184 One expert disheartened by the results noted that the 
rapid and extensive tree loss ''nearly forecloses any hope of preserving 
large, unfragmented forest tracts" in the region.185 Explaining the 
magnitude of the tree loss in more concrete terms, the expert noted that the 
flood control benefits that would have been provided by the lost tree cover 
in just the Baltimore-Washington corridor of the study region were 
179. See WILLIAM]. MITsCH &JAMES G. GoSSEUNK, WE'lLANDS 45-47 (2d ed. 1993). 
180. See id. at46-47 fig.3-4. 
181. See U.S. ENVrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA843-K-95-001, AMERICA'S WE'lLANDS (Dec. 
1995). See generally MITSCH & GOSSEUNK, supra note 179, at 565-75 (discussing legnl protection of 
wetlands in the United States). 
182. See Karl Blankenship, Forests closest to Bay losing ground to development, BAY J., May 
1999, at 1. 
183. See id. at 6. 
184. See id. 
185. /d. 
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estimated to be about $1.08 billion, while the benefits in annual air 
pollution control for the same corridor would have totaled about $88 
million.186 Other benefits that could no longer be provided by the lost tree 
cover include water pollution control, wildlife habitat, and energy 
savings.187 
Virginia Beach, a coastal city in Virginia, demonstrates well the 
pathological effects of property norms on land and water use. For years the 
city has been attempting to secure a permanent water supply that would 
meet its. present and future needs. The saga of Virginia Beach's 
unwavering quest for water reveals that land ownership norms, economic 
development goals, and individual rights-based thinking all have 
contributed to escalating land and water use. 
Located on the Atlantic Ocean in the lower Chesapeake Bay 
watershed, Virginia Beach is a resort city of approximately 430,000 
inhabitants188 that has been without an adequate water supply since the 
1970s.189 Tired of being dependent on other localities for water, 190 the city 
began searching for an alternative water supply to protect it even in times 
of drought.191 To alleviate some of its immediate water needs, the city 
186. Seeid.at6-1. 
187. See id. at 7. See generally Forests Offer Tree·mendous Benefits, BAY J., May 1999, at 7 
(describing the many quantifiable benefits provided by trees). 
188. See BUREAU OF TilE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1997, at47 (117th ed. 1997) [hereinafter 1997 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT). 
189. See FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT: NONPROJECT USE OF PROJECT LANDS AND WATER FOR THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
WATER SUPPLY PROJECT, BRUNSWICK COUNTY, VIRGINIA, FERC No. 2009·003, at xvii (1995) 
[hereinafter FERC FEIS ON GASTON). 
190. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, WATER SUPPLY STUDY HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA 
1-8 (1984) [hereinafter ACE WATER SUPPLY STUDY). Two other localities, Norfolk and Portsmouth, 
own the major water storage reservoirs and treatment facilities in southeastern Virginia. See Jan Harris, 
Build It and the Water Might Come, PROGRESSIVE ENGINEER, Nov .-Dec. 1997, at 11. 
191. Virginia Beach had relied on Norfolk to meet its non-emergency water needs. When drought 
conditions existed, Virginia Beach also received some water from wells owned by Isle of Wight 
County, Suffolk, and Southhampton. See ACE WATER SUPPLY STUDY, supra note 190, at 1-8, 1-9; 
VIRGINIA DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUAUTY, HAMPTON ROADS WATER SUPPLY UPDATE, at 11-5 
(1993) [hereinafter DEQ WATER SUPPLY UPDATE). Drought conditions, for example, existed in 1917, 
1980, 1981, 1986, and 1991. See id. at 11-8, 11-9. In 1992 the City of Norfolk limited Virginia Beach's 
supply of water to 30 million gallons of water per day during wet weather and 15 million gallons per 
day during droughts. See id. at 11-9; Harris, supra note 190. Estimates by the Federal Energy 
Regulatoxy Commission, however, indicate that Virginia Beach's demand for water will reach 54 
million gallons per day by the year 2030. See North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatoxy Comm'n, 
112 F.3d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1036 (1998). The Army Corps of 
Engineers concluded that the Virginia Beach area would need 60 million gallons per day by 2030. See 
id. at 1181. 
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adopted water conservation measures.192 The conservation measures 
included requiring the installation of low-use plumbing fixtures in new 
construction, offering incentives for retrofitting existing plumbing with 
low-use fixtures, holding public education programs, promoting water 
recycling programs, and maintaining low water line pressure.193 Although 
the conservation measures produced a low per capita water demand (about 
82 gallons per day per person), they did not solve the city's long-term 
water supply problems}94 Further, according to the city, the adverse 
economic impact of the water restrictions was significant, costing between 
eight and ten thousand jobs and about $2 billion in capital 
improvements.195 . The city considered a number of other alternatives, 
including waste water reuse, desalinization, groundwater use, and 
withdrawal from lakes and rivers, before deciding on a plan to divert and 
pipe water from Lake Gaston in the Roanoke River Basin.196 
The Roanoke River flows from the mountains of Virginia, near the 
City of Roanoke, southeasterly to the coast of North Carolina.197 Dams 
have been constructed on the River in several places to control flooding 
and facilitate power production.198 Many lakes have been created by the 
dams, including Gaston, Kerr (mostly in Virginia), and Roanoke Rapids (in 
North Carolina).199 The Virginia Power Company200 has a license from the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("PERC") to operate one of the 
dams on the Roanoke River.201 The reservoir formed by this dam, Lake 
Gaston, is located partly in Virginia but primarily in North Carolina. 
Under Virginia Beach's plan, the city proposed to construct a 60-inch 
pipeline to carry 60 million gallons of water per day from Lake Gaston 
some 84.5 miles across southern Virginia to the city.202 Virginia Beach 
192. See DEQWATERSUPPLYUPDATE,supranote 191 atll-17. 
193. See id. 
194. See id. at 11-18. 
195. See Katrice Franklin, Plug Pulled o111Ast Water limit, Beach Hopes Move Will Bring a 
Steady Flow of Economic Opportunity, VmGJNIAN PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Sept. 2, 
1998, at Bl, available in 1998 WL 15062283. The city lifted the last of the conservation measures in 
September 1998 after its alternative water supply project finally was completed. The City Council 
ultimately reserved 38% of the new water supply provided by the project for economic development 
initiatives. About forty thousand new homes could be served by the additional water. /d. 
196. See North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428,432 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 
197. See id. at432;FERC FEIS ON GASTON, supra note 189, at3-3. 
198. See FERC FEIS ON GASTON, supra note 189, at 3-4. 
199. See id. at3-17, 3-18. 
200. Virginia Power was formerly known as the Virginia Electric & Power Company (VEPCO). 
See North Carolina v. City of Virginia Beach, 951 F.2d 596,599 (4th Cir. 1991). 
201. See id. 
202. See North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428,432 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 
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would receive 80% of the water, while nearby Virginia localities would get 
the remaining portion. 203 The pipeline project required the permission of 
the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps,) because the project affected 
navigable waters of the United States.204 The pipeline project also required 
the permission of FERC because certain hydropower lands and waters 
would be involved.205 Both EPA and FERC ultimately decided that a full 
203. The pipeline project included plans to allocate 48 of the 60 million gallons per day (mgd) to 
Virginia Beach, 10 mgd to Chesapeake, and 1 mgd each to Franklin and Isle ofWight County. See id. 
204. On July 15, 1983, Virginia Beach applied to the Corps for two permits needed to begin the 
project. One permit would allow construction of the pipeline itself, as well as a water intake system at 
Lake Gaston. The second permit would allow execution of a water storage reallocation contract for 
Kerr Reservoir pursuant to the Water Supply Act of 1958,43 U.S.C. § 390b (1994). See North Carolina 
v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428,432-33 (E.D.N.C. 1987). In January 1984, after holding public hearings 
on the environmental assessment, the Corps issued a final environmental assessment and granted 
Virginia Beach a construction permit. See id. at 432. After the Corps' permit decision was made, 
several lawsuits were filed. One suit involved the state of North Carolina, which sued to prevent 
construction of the pipeline. See id. at 433. The Roanoke River Basin Association subsequently 
intervened as plaintiffs. See id. The challenge to the permit was based primarily on the project's 
detrimental environmental impact on the basin, on the need for a full environmental impact statement, 
and on the water needs of Virginia Beach as compared to localities actually situated in the basin. See 
id. at 436. In another case, Virginia Beach sued to obtain a declaratory judgment that the permit was 
valid. See City of Virginia Beach v. Roanoke River Basin Ass'n, 776 F.2d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 1985). 
The court refused to grant the city relief, holding that the original court had no jurisdiction over the 
North Carolina defendant. See id. at 488. The court, however, allowed the city to join the case filed in 
the Eastern District of North Carolina, which involved the same issues. See id. The city accordingly 
transferred its action to the federal district court in North Carolina. See Hudson, 665 F. Supp. at 433. 
Ultimately, after years of litigation, the issuance of the permit was upheld. See Roanoke River Basin 
Ass'n v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58,66 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1092 (1992). 
205. Virginia Power filed an application with FERC, asking it to approve the withdrawal of water 
from Lake Gaston, the construction and operation of a water intake facility, and the transfer of 
necessary easements. This application was made in February 1991-some seven years after Virginia 
Beach obtained its construction permit from the Corps. See In re City of Virginia Beach, 42 F.3d 881, 
883 (4th Cir. 1994). FERC is the licensor of the hydropower facility at Lake Gaston and the 
immediately surrounding land that is included in the project. See North Carolina v. City of Virginia 
Beach, 951 F.2d 596,598 (4th Cir. 1991). Virginia Power sought permission from FERC to grant the 
necessary easements to Virginia Beach and to amend its license from FERC to allow the withdrawals. 
See id. at 599; North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 112 F.3d 1175, 1181-82 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Order Approving Non-Project Use of Lands and 
Waters and Amending License, Project No. 2009-003, 72 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 
'][61,075 (July 26, 1995) [hereinafter FERC Gaston Order]. For 22 miles, the pipeline follows a utility 
easement held by Virginia Power. See Harris, supra note 190, at 13. 
For almost two years, FERC waited while the Department of Commerce considered North 
Carolina's argument that the project was inconsistent with the North Carolina Coastal Zone 
Management ("CZM") plan. See City of Virginia Beach v. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 585, 587 (E.D. Va. 
1994). Under the Coastal Zone Management Act ("CZMA"), no federal agency can issue or alter a 
permit for a project that a state has determined will interfere with its CZM plan unless the project is 
approved by the Secretary of Commerce. See Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1456(c)(3)(A) (1994). The Department of Commerce and the Justice Department (which was called 
in for legal advice) considered and changed their positions on the question of whether the CZMA 
allowed North Carolina to object to the pipeline project even though the project would be located 
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environmental impact statement (''EIS") was needed, despite earlier 
findings to the contrary. Becoming impatient with the bureaucratic delays, 
Virginia Beach brought suit against FERC to compel it to enter a fmal 
decision on the application for approval of the pipeline. Although the court 
denied the petition because of the extraordinary remedy it would have 
required, the court expressed concern about the administrative burdens 
imposed on Virginia Beach: "[W]hile we cannot be happy about the overall 
time elapsed, we confirm that there are rational explanations for the length 
of each time segment."206 Finally, in July 1995, some four and one-half 
years after FERC received Virginia Power's application, FERC issued a 
fmal EIS,207 and approved the application.2°8 
The long and highly contested regulatory review process ultimately 
produced a number of findings and conclusions in Virginia Beach's favor. 
For example, in issuing a final environmental assessment and granting 
Virginia Beach a construction permit, the Corps found that the proposed 
withdrawal would have no significant environmental impact on Lake 
Gaston itself or on downstream areas.209 More specifically, the Corps 
relied heavily on Virginia Beach studies to conclude that, even in a worst-
case scenario, downstream wildlife populations would not be affected by 
the proposed pipeline project.210 Proponents of the pipeline maintained 
that the water withdrawals would have minimal effect. Minimum 
downstream fiows apparently could be maintained even in times of drought 
by withdrawing water from the Kerr Reservoir. Furthermore, proponents 
stressed that the water level in Lake Gaston would not decrease because of 
the pipeline withdrawals, though the level in Kerr could fall about three 
inches during a serious drought.211 FERC reached similar conclusions in 
issuing a final environmental impact statement and approving the use of 
entirely in Virginia. See Brown, 858 F. Supp. at 587. Eventually, this legal question became moot in 
May 1994, when the Department of Commerce overruled North Carolina's objection to the project. See 
id. at590. 
206. In re City of Virginia Beach, 42 F.3d 881, 886 (4th Cir. 1994). 
207. See FERC FElS ON GASTON, supra note 189, at 6-11. 
208. See FERC Gaston Order, supra note 205, at 61,389 & 61,400-01. 
209. See North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428,437-38 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 
210. See id. at 442. The federal district court found the Corps' worst-case scenario analysis to be 
unreliable and directed the Corps to conduct analysis that was independent of the Virginia Beach 
studies. The court concluded that, without this independent analysis, the Corps' decision was arbitrnry 
and capricious. See id. at 443. After conducting its independent analysis, the Corps issued a second 
environmental assessment, which came to the same conclusions as the fii'St. The court subsequently 
upheld the conclusions of the second assessment See North Carolina v. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. 1261, 
1273 (E.D.N.C. 1990), alfd sub nom. Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 
1991). 
211. See Harris, supra note 190, at 13. 
HeinOnline -- 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 961 1999-2000
2000] THEPATHOLOGYOFPROPERTYNORMS 961 
hydropower lands and waters. It concluded that the pipeline project would 
relieve Virginia Beach of "serious water supply problems that have 
severely constrained the life style of its citizens and clouded its economic 
future."212 The Commission also noted that the downstream effects of the 
withdrawals could be sufficiently mitigated by upstream water release 
measures.213 
Despite all of Virginia Beach's regulatory and judicial victories, North 
Carolina has not yet given up its fight to stop the project214 and appears to 
212. FERC Gaston Order, supra note 205, at 61,399. 
213. See FERC FEIS ON GASTON, supra note 189, at 6-11, 6-12. 
214. Despite receiving FERC approval, Virginia Beach has experienced a number of setbacks. In 
April 1995, Virginia Beach and North Carolina agreed to a mediated settlement that provided a way to 
end their eleven-year dispute. See Agreement on the Gaston Pipeline: Go with the Flow, VIRGINIAN-
Pn.OT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va), Apr. 29, 1995, at AS. Among other provisions, the negotiated 
settlement proposed to limit the City of Norfolk's ability to sell water outside southeastern Virginia. See 
Karen Weintraub & Alex Marshall, Lake Gaston Deal Irks Noifolk, VIRGINIAN-Pn.OT & LEDGER STAR 
(Norfolk, Va), May 11, 1995, at Al. It also proposed to give certain North Carolina cities the right to 
drain up to 20 million gallons of water per day without Vrrginia localities being able to object. See 
W.W. ''Ted" Bennett Jr., The Lake Gaston Pipeline: Let's Have Fair Play for all Virginians, 
VIRGINIAN-Pn.oT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va), June 8, 1995, at A 10. Due to partisan posturing, and 
to the objections of Norfolk delegates, the Virginia General Assembly failed to approve the settlement 
See Ken Stolle, Denwcrats Blocked Special Session, VIRGINIAN-Pn.OT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va), 
July 1, 1995, at A12. 
Other setbacks include difficulties between Virginia Beach and several Virginia localities, as well 
as new challenges raised by North Carolina See, e.g., Toni Guagenti, Pipeline Fight's Not over Til It's 
Over In Victory's Wake, Beach Awaits N.C.'s Next Shot, VIRGINIAN-Pn.OT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, 
Va.), May 11, 1997, at A1 (discussing the costly legal battles waged in Virginia and North Carolina 
over the pipeline). One Virginia locality, Isle of Wight, had refused to approve Virginia Beach's 
request to lay pipe through the county. See JoAnn Frohman, lW Jilts Beach on Water Proposal: City 
Says '87 Deal with County Moot, DAILY PREsS (Newport News, Va.), Dec. 13, 1995, at B1. After over 
a year of arguing and threats, the dispute was resolved in May 1996, when Virginia Beach agreed to pay 
Isle of Wight $3 million for pennission to have the pipeline discharge water into Ennis Mill Channel in 
the county. See JoAnn Frohman, lW Board Approves Lake Gaston Pipeline: County to Receive 
$3 Million Payment, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va), May 17, 1996, at Cl. A similar dispute 
occurred in 1989 when Brunswick County threatened to deny Virginia Beach pennission to construct 
the intake portion of the pipeline in the county. See Gaston Pipeline Warning Issued, DAll..Y PREss 
(Newport News, Va.), Feb. 23, 1989, at B3. After another $3 million payment, tbe city received the 
necessary pennission. See Water Project Pact Reached, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.), Aug. 18, 
1989, at B7. In addition, a dispute recently arose between Virginia Beach and the City of Suffolk over 
the expansion of a pumping station needed to treat Lake Gaston water being piped to Virginia Beach. 
The City of Suffolk had placed strict limitations on tbe expansion of the Norfolk water treatment plant, 
which will treat the Gaston water. Norfolk, Virginia Beach, and the City of Chesapeake jointly brought 
suit against Suffolk to challenge the limitations. In addition, Virginia Beach sought damages for the 
expense of delaying completion of the projeet. See City of Suffolk v. City of Norfolk, No. 97-85 (Va 
5th Cir. 1998) (order granting joint motion for dismissal); John Murphy, Cities Hope to Settle Local 
Gaston Lawsuit, VIRGINIAN-Pn.OT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va), July 10, 1997, at Al. In October 
1997, the cities settled the dispute; Suffolk agreed to allow the expansion in exchange for more than $4 
million. See City of Suffolk v. City of Norfolk, No. 97-85 (Va 5th Cir. 1998); Katrice Franklin & 
Karen Weintraub, Suffolk Makes Regional Peace in Long Water War, VIRGINIAN-Pn.OT & LEDGER 
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be willing to play what it regards as its "trump card"-a challenge to the 
renewal of Virginia Power's fifty-year license to operate the hydroelectric 
dam which created Lake Gaston.215 That license expires in 2001.216 In a 
January 1997 press release, James Gilmore, the Virginia Attorney General 
at the time and currently the Governor of Virginia, described North 
Carolina's battle against Virginia as an attack on Virginia's "sovereign 
rights."217 
To date, what has Virginia Beach's Lake Gaston project produced? In 
addition to actual construction of the pipeline,218 the project has involved a 
tremendous amount of judicial and legal resources, producing at least 13 
published court opinions through May 1997.219 The record for one 1990 
STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Oct. 16, 1997, at B13. Finally, in July 1995, North Carolina challenged FERC's 
issuance of licenses allowing Virginia Beach to complete the pipeline. See North Carolina v. Federal 
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 112 F.3d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1997). On May 9, 1997, a three-judge 
panel of the D.C. Circuit denied North Carolina's petition for review, concluding that the FERC order 
was not arbitrary or capricious. See id. at 1194. In November 1997, North Carolina appealed the 
decision to the Supreme Court, which allowed the prior rulings to stand without comment. See id., cert. 
denied, 522 U.S. 1108 (1998). 
215. See Guagenti, supra note 214, at AI. On January 28, 1999, Virginia Power filed a license 
application for the Gaston hydropower project. See Virginia Power & Electric Co., Notice of 
Application Tendered for Filing With the Commission and Soliciting Additional Study Requests, Project 
No. 2009·018 (Feb. 22, 1999) <http://cips.ferc.fed.us/hydro/p/p-2009.00n.txt>. 
216. See Guagenti, supra note 214, at AI. 
217. VA Attorney General News Release, Attorney General Gilmore Files Brief ln Support Of 
Lake Gaston Pipeline: Vows to Continue Fight (Jan. 10, 1997) (on file with author). 
218. Despite ongoing legal challenges, the Lake Gaston pipeline began pumping water on August 
5, 1997. See Lake Gaston Pipeline is Running Despite Ongoing Fight in the Courts, WINSTON-SALEM 
JOURNAL. Aug. 8, 1997, at B7. The first water pumped from Lake Gaston took 15 days to reach the 
Hampton Roads region. See Lake Gaston Water Finally Reaches Hampton Roads, DAILY PRESS 
(Newport News, Va.), Aug. 22, 1997, at CS. Construction was completed in November 1997, and the 
pipeline became operational in January 1998. See Interview with Tom Leahy, Water Resources 
Division Manager, Dep't of Public Utilities, City of Virginia Beach, Virginia (July 17, 1998); Local 
Update, VIRGINIAN· PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Jan. 7, 1998, at B3. 
219. The legal issues raised by those lawsuits have covered a wide range of topics. See generally 
North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 112 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (challenging 
FERC approval of the pipeline project as arbitrary and capricious); ln re City of Virginia Beach, 42 
F.3d 881 (4th Cir. 1994) (seeking a writ of mandamus to compel FERC to render a decision on the 
city's pipeline application); Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 991 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(challenging the disposition oflawyer's fees); North Carolina v. City of Virginia Beach, 951 F.2d 596 
(4th Cir. 1991) (considering whether Virginia Beach could continue construction of portions of the 
pipeline that were outside FERC's jurisdiction prior to completion ofFERC's review); City of Virginia 
Beach v. Roanoke River Basin Ass'n, 776 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1985) (seeking a declaratory judgment 
that the Corps' permits were properly issued and raising a personal jurisdiction issue); City of Virginia 
Beach v. Brown, 858 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Va. 1994) (questioning North Carolina's authority to review 
the water withdrawal project under its Coastal Management Plan); City of Virginia Beach v. United 
States Dep't of Commerce, 805 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D. Va. 1992) (challenging the refusal to release 
information requested under the Freedom oflnformation Act), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 995 F.2d 
1247 (4th Cir. 1993); North Carolina v. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D.N.C. 1990) (upholding 
HeinOnline -- 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 963 1999-2000
2000] THE PATHOLOGY OF PROPERTY NORMS 963 
decision alone consists of 23 volumes of material.220 In addition, as of 
May 1997, the City of Virginia Beach had paid $8.6 million in legal fees.221 
Countless federal, state, and local governmental units have been involved 
in the dispute, and some have even changed their position more than once 
on the project's desirability.222 
Will the legal system ultimately allow the most populated city in 
Virginia and geographically one of the largest cities in the United States223 
to obtain an adequate water supply? Certainly. Like many states in the 
water-rich East, Virginia's water allocation laws link water use to 
ownership of riparian land, but seem to allow creation of public water 
supplies as long as the necessary property rights, defined according to 
traditional norms, and the consent of affected local jurisdictions are 
obtained.224 Furthermore, American property law historically has 
recognized a landowner's right to use his land.225 One of the most 
important ways to exercise that right is to develop the land; development 
requires water. When the property right of use and enjoyment is coupled 
issuance of the pennits despite the alleged significant impact of the project on the striped bass 
population), ajfd sub nom. Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(upholding issuance of the pennits despite concerns about the striped bass population, water quality, 
and the future water needs of North Carolina); North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428 (E.D.N.C. 
1987) (challenging the Corps' issuance of pennits under NEPA, the Water Supply Act, and the Clean 
Water Act); City of Virginia Beach v. Board of Supervisors of Mecklenburg County, 246 Va. 233 
(1993) (challenging Virginia Beach's ability to use water stored in a reservoir located in two counties 
without the consent of those counties); Tidewater Ass'n of Homebuilders, Inc. v. City of Virginia 
Beach, 241 Va. 114 (1991) (challenging the constitutionality of a fee imposed by Virginia Beach on 
new and expanding water users to fund the pipeline project). 
220. See North Carolina v. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 n.2 (E.D.N.C. 1990), ajfd sub nom. 
Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1991). 
221. See Guagenti, supra note 214, at A1. 
222. See City of Virginia Beach v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 805 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D. 
Va. 1992), ajfd in part & rev'd in part, 995 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1993). 
223. Virginia Beach ranked 17th in land area out of 77 United States cities having a 1992 
population of 200,000 or more. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COUNTY 
AND CITY DATA BOOK 1994, at xxvii (12th ed. 1994) [hereinafter 1994 COUNTY AND CITY DATA 
BOOK]. 
224. See Butler, supra note 68, at 156-79 (discussing public consumptive water rights under the 
riparian doctrine). See generally Tarlock, supra note 68, §§ 3.12, 3.20 (discussing the allocation of 
riparian rights under the common law and under statutory modifications of the common law). 
225. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992) 
(declaring that a regulation denying a landowner all economically viable or productive use of his land is 
a compensable taking); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-16 (1922) (recognizing 
that government action can go too far under the Constitution in restricting private land use); I GEORGE 
\V. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § I, at 3-5, § 5, at 25-31 
(1980 rep!.) (discussing the meaning of ownership and property). See generally 6A AMERICAN LAW OF 
PROPERTY§ 28.1 (1954) (discussing a possessor's right to "exclusive use and enjoyment of his estate"). 
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with recent takings caselaw,226 it is difficult to envision a locality or state 
prohibiting or significantly restricting private land development to control 
water use and protect a watershed.227 Yet without such a prohibition or 
restriction, private property owners will continue to develop their land, and 
water use will continue to rise. 
From an ecological perspective, it is difficult to understand how the 
social and legal systems could allow a city without an adequate freshwater 
supply to continue to grow and develop its land virtually without restraint. 
During the period from 1980 to 1990, Virginia Beach experienced almost a 
60% increase in households228 and saw its population grow almost 131,000 
(from 262,199 to 393,089).229 By the year 2010, Virginia Beach's 
population is expected to reach approximately 580,000, an increase of over 
185,000 persons from the 1990 population.23° From 1980 to 1986, Virginia 
Beach authorized 45,195 building permits for new private housing units.231 
These permits represented 49.1% of the 1980 housing stock of Virginia 
Beach. 232 In comparison, during the same time period, the entire state of 
Virginia approved building permits for new private housing units that 
represented only 17.2% of its 1980 housing stock.233 Statistics for the 
United States reveal that building permits issued during the 1980-1986 
period represented 11.3% of the 1980 housing stock.234 
226. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (invalidating, under the Takings 
aause, a city's decision to condition the issuance of a building pennit on the dedication of a portion of 
the applicant's private property for a public greenway and for a bicycle/pedestrian pathway); Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (invalidating, under the Takings Clause, a state 
law that prevented construction of a pennanent habitable structure on private beachfront property and 
that deprived the landowner of all economically viable use); NoUan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 
U.S. 825 (1987) (deciding that a state could uot, without payment of just compensation, condition 
issuance of a permit to rebuild a house located on privately owned beachfront property on the transfer 
of an easement allowing public access through the property). 
227. For an analysis of recent Supreme Court takings cases, see T AKJNGS (David L. CnUies ed., 
1996). 
228. See 1994 COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK, supra note 223, at 608. 
229. See id. at 606. 
230. See id.; CENTER FOR PuBUC SERVICE, UNIV. OF VA., VIRGINIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 598 
(1994-1995). 
231. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 
1988, at 566 (1988). This figure excludes mobile homes, motels, hotels, group residential structures 
(e.g., college dormitories and nursing homes), and conversions of or altemtions to existing buildings. 
See id. app.G, at G-8. A housing unit is defined as "a house, apartment, mobile home or tmiler, group 
of rooms, or single room occupied or, if vacant, intended for occupancy as sepamte living quurters." !d. 
232. See id. at 566. 
233. See id. at 540. 
234. See id. at 6. 
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Although property norms may not be the primary or even key reason 
for Virginia Beach's significant increase in population, property norms 
have had a significant impact on how Virginia Beach is handling its 
growth. Efforts by Virginia Beach to control development have produced 
mixed results. In 1986 Virginia Beach attempted to control its 
"leapfrogging" development by downzoning 3,500 acres of land from unit 
development to agricultural use.235 The Virginia Supreme Court 
invalidated the city's attempt as "piecemeal" (as opposed to 
comprehensive) downzoning that was not justified by a change in 
circumstances or prior mistake affecting the public health, welfare, or 
safety.236 Because other neighboring properties were not similarly 
downzoned, the city's action did not appear to promote its goal of 
promoting orderly growth and discouraging leapfrog development.237 
Since that decision, the commitment of Virginia Beach to controlling 
growth and development has been questionable and unpredictable. One of 
the city's main tools for controlling growth, the Green Line created in the 
city's 1979 Comprehensive Plan, has been violated by developers and city 
officials alike. The Green Line establishes a boundary beyond which no 
city services are to be offered.238 As recently as 1997, the Virginia Beach 
Planning Commission approved housing projects that were located beyond 
the Green Line and included services provided by the city .239 In an effort 
to attract tourism, the city also approved a golf course to be located in an 
area beyond the Green Line.240 
Some might question whether the private property concept is actually 
responsible for the escalating development and environmental degradation, 
or whether the real culprit is the profit motive. This line of inquiry would 
distinguish the private property concept from the profit motive, and ask 
whether environmental degradation would exist even in the absence of a 
private property rights regime. Because private property rights help to 
internalize externalities, it is tempting to respond that degradation probably 
would occur more rapidly when private property rights did not exist and 
235. See City of Virginia Beach v. Virginia Land Investment Ass'n No. 1, 239 Va. 412, 415-16 
(1990). 
236. See id. at416. 
237. See id. at414-16. 
238. See CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH, VA., COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 26 (Nov.4, 1997) (retaining and 
claiming rigid adherence to the Green Line as a "defense against sprawl") (on file with author); Tom 
Holden, Beach Commission Approves Rezoning for Houses Below Green line, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & 
LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va.}, May 15,1997, at AI. 
239. See Holden, supra note 238; Toni Guagenti, Beach Planners Approve Golf Course, 108 
Homes, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va.), June 12, 1997, at Bll. 
240. See Guagenti, supra note 239. 
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that therefore property rights do not necessarily cause escalating 
development and environmental degradation. 
The strength of this view depends in part on whether the distinction 
between private property norms and the profit motive is real. The profit 
motive has been defined by some as the desire to increase individual wealth 
and by others as the seemingly insatiable desire for more.241 Because 
private property rights include the power to take economic gambles 
through the exercise of the rights of use, transferability, reasonable 
expectation of gain, and exclusive control, it is difficult to separate the 
desire to maximize individual wealth from private property norms. The 
rights of use, transferability, and reasonable expectation of gain all revolve 
around the desire to promote wealth maximization for the individual 
property owner. Under current economic thinking, property rights are 
recognized when it is efficient to do so.242 Property norms thus incorporate 
and promote the profit motive, however it is defined.243 
Further, to the extent that a distinction between property norms and 
the profit motive exists, it does not negate all of the harms that private 
property owners have caused to the environment. Even if a private 
property regime is less likely to cause environmental ruin than other 
regimes, that fact does not address the environmental harms that private 
property owners have caused. The point is not that private property norms 
are the sole or primary cause of environmental degradation, but rather that 
traditional private property norms are biased against environmental quality 
and ecological integrity, and therefore are part of the problem. Solving the 
problem of environmental degradation thus will require some 
reexamination of private property norms. 
Accepting that private property norms are part of the problem of 
escalating land and water use does not mean the abandonment of the 
private property regime. To the contrary, less drastic solutions, like the 
redefinition of private property norms, should be tried first. What the 
Virginia Beach situation makes clear is that water rightholders and their 
consumers-here collectively an entire city-have relied on property 
241. See Mark Sagoff, Do We Consume Too Much?, in THE BUSINESS OF CONSUMPTION, .mpra 
note 112, at 271, 285. 
242. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 51 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & 
PRoc. 347 (1967). 
243. Evidence of this incorporation can even be found in the Supreme Court's gradual shift away 
from viewing property as a physical thing having only use value to recognizing property as including 
"the exchange value of anything." JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 14 
(1924). See also ALExANDER, supra note 42, at 259-61 (discussing property as exchange value in the 
Supreme Court). 
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norms to escape responsibility for escalating growth and water use even 
when the growth and use exceed the capabilities of the rightholders' water 
resources. Cumulative impacts of private land use on the ecosystem are 
basically ignored. Private land development is allowed even in times of 
mandated water restrictions. Economic development is used as the 
justification for spending over $250 million on a water supply project that 
will allow more growth and water use to occur.244 Little, if any, 
relationship exists between water supply and water demand.245 Some sense 
of accountability-even a vague sense of responsibility for ecosystem 
integrity-is noticeably absent from the discussions of many developers, 
property owners, and city officials, who instead promote land development 
and economic growth. Property norms, in other words, have had 
pathological effects on the land use preferences and decisions of many 
private landowners and public officials. 
These effects could be minimized or reversed if actual ecological 
conditions and costs were considered in defining property rights. Instead 
of raising the property rights banner to demand more water to enable 
greater land use, decisionmakers could be using water supply as a "crucial 
control factor'' in distributing population and growth and avoiding overuse 
and excessive concentration.246 Instead of correlating water needs to 
population, industrial, and urban projections, decisionmakers could be 
breaking the "self-fulfilling propheey" of water allocation decisions247 by 
using water supply as an ecological constraint on development and use. 
Decisionmakers could prefer uses that return water or at least minimize its 
use over uses that consume large quantities of water. 
Importing water is not like importing food, drugs, and other goods. 
Indeed, the need to import water reveals much about the ecological 
conditions of the receiving area. Although water is a renewable resource, it 
is not a fungible good that can be mass produced. At some point in time, 
its removal will drastically alter ecological conditions in the exporting and 
importing systems. The effectiveness of management programs in taking 
such an ecologically conscious approach is considered next. 
244. Some of the estimated costs of the project include $150 million for construction of the 
pipeline, $100 million to upgrade water treatment processes, and $10 million in legal and regulatory 
expenses. See Harris, supra note 190, at 11, 13. 
245. See MANGUN & HENNING, supra note 98, at 133. 
246. See id. at 133-34. 
247. /d. at 133. 
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B. THE PATHOLOGY OF INEFFECTIVE 
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT OVER THE LONG TERM 
[Vol. 73:927 
While some management programs have achieved success in 
managing ecosystems or watersheds over the short term, property norms 
have pathologically affected management programs over the long term. 
These effects have contributed to the development of less resilient 
ecosystems that are more likely to become persistently degraded by 
disturbances once absorbed by the ecosystem.248 Even when the 
management program is comprehensive in scope, program administrators 
and policymakers have tended to integrate property norms into the 
management program. This integration has affected not only the setting of 
goals and standards, but also the focus of management efforts, the 
implementation of goals, the enforcement of standards, the subsequent 
monitoring of ecological indicators, and the internal operations of the 
management institutions.249 The integration of property norms into 
management programs is evidenced by the widespread adoption of the 
atomistic and product-oriented perspectives underlying the private property 
system.250 Such perspectives typically result in the targeting of specific 
ecological indicators (e.g., water, trees, or fish) to promote social objectives 
(e.g., maintaining employment, promoting economic activities, or 
protecting livelihoods)-all under the guise of environmental protection.251 
Studies of managed ecosystems indicate that targeting an ecological 
variable to minimize problems caused by fluctuation in that variable 
ultimately results in lower resilience in the managed ecosystem, greater 
rigidity in management institutions, and greater societal dependence on the 
controlled variable.252 Management strategies that target ecological 
variables admittedly have been successful in reducing the variability of the 
ecological target, and even in reversing or slowing environmental 
degradation over the short term.253 Those strategies, however, have 
adversely affected ecosystems over the long term, causing a reduction in 
spatial heterogeniety that makes a system more vulnerable to large-scale 
248. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 6-8. 
249. See id. at 7-9. 
250. A wide variety of ecosystem management programs have incorpomted the atomistic and 
product-oriented perspectives into their management programs. Those systems include eastern North 
America forests, the forests of the Siena Nevada, the savannas of South Africa, the Everglades, the 
Chesapeake Bay system, the Columbia River basin, the Great Lakes, and the Baltic Sea. See id. at 7, 
10-11. 
251. Seeid.at6-1. 
252. See id. at 6, 8. 
253. See id. at 7-8. 
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disturbances.254 Further, the initial successes of the targeting strategies 
have led to changes iil the management institutions and in the incentives of 
people benefited or burdened by the management program; these changes 
have decreased their ability or desire to respond to future ecological 
crises.255 Once initial successes were achieved, the management 
institutions tended to shift their focus to the efficiency of their internal 
operations. Ecological monitoring programs received less financial 
support, became less concerned about detecting unexpected ecological 
changes in the ecosystem, and focused more on local needs.256 Success in 
controlling the variability of the ecological target led to the development of 
dependent industries which pressed for the continued targeting of the 
ecological variable.257 The initial success also led to changes in society; 
those citizens who were not directly benefited tended to become more 
passive over time, relying on the management institutions which had 
achieved the initial success and which were slowly becoming more rigid.258 
These pathological effects can be countered by decisionmaking 
processes and management approaches that are more flexible259 and that 
recognize the need to reevaluate and, if necessary, redefine underlying 
norms. Greater flexibility is needed to enable managers to identify changes 
in the health of ecosystems and to .ensure adaptation of the ecological and 
human systems to the changes.260 Greater flexibility can be achieved, in 
part, by recognizing that controlled monitoring programs produce more 
rigid management institutions incapable of adapting to unexpected change. 
Rather than being tied to past successes or to economically significant 
ecological variables, monitoring must be experimental, looking for 
unexpected ecological crises, and must allow for active intervention and 
corrective responses.261 The pathological effects of rights-based ecosystem 
management can be broken by an approach that looks beyond policies and 
research goals designed to control targeted ecological variables valued by 
social and economic systems. Traditional property norms should not 
control the setting or definition of ecosystem management goals, especially 
not when the norms are defined or applied in a static way. Policymakers 
and managers must recognize the need for-and the legitimacy 
254. See id. at 7-8. 
255. See id. at 8. 
256. See id. at 8-9. 
257. See id. at 8. 
258. Seeid. 
259. See id. at 9. 
260. Seeid. 
261. See id. at 9, 30. 
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of-redefining underlying property norms, as well as the accompanying 
rights and obligations, in light of new or evolving information and 
conditions. Although property norms may capture traditional political or 
cultural beliefs,262 property norms do not reflect principles of ecology, 
especially those principles relating to ecosystem integrity and to the spatial, 
temporal, and hierarchical scales of landscape ecology .263 
An examination of the Chesapeake Bay management program will 
provide some insights into the pathological effects of property norms on 
watershed and ecosystem management. Those insights will suggest 
potential ways for breaking the pathology of rights-based ecosystem 
management through more flexible, adaptive management and through 
considerations of scale and integrity in decisionmaking processes. 
1. The Chesapeake Bay Management Program 
The Chesapeake Bay Management Program "has become a model" of 
effective ecosystem management.264 A voluntary effort involving 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, the District of Columbia, and the federal 
government,265 the Bay program has, over time, evolved from a water 
quality program aimed at the decline in living resources to "the integrated 
ecosystem management of land, air, water, and living resources."266 The 
Bay program involves what some experts have characterized as a "best-
case scenario."267 Development of the program occurred after there was 
widespread recognition of the ecological problems in the Bay system, 
significant scientific study and analysis of the problems, extensive 
community support for protecting the Bay ecosystem, and well-coordinated 
262. Scholars disagree about the degree to which property nonns reflect traditionnl politicnl 
beliefs or constitutionnl vnlues. Compare, e.g., ELY, supra note 2 (assessing the role of property and 
economic rights in constitutionnl history), and RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 3-18 (1985) (discussing 
the politicnl tradition reflected in the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution), with William Michael 
Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Proces.r, 95 COLUM. L. 
REv. 782 (1995) (discussing the originnl understanding and subsequent misunderstandings of the 
Takings Cause). 
263. For a discussion of scale considerations, see infra Part li.B.2. 
264. Ann Pesiri Swanson, Governing the Chesapeake Bay--.m~ Evolution of Ecosystem 
Management, in SUSTAINABLE COASTAL WA'!EtSHED, supra note 113, at 14, 14. 
265. See CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO TilE GENERAL ASSEllfBUES OP 
VIRGINIA, MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA 1993, at 1 [hereinafter 1993 CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM'N 
REPORT). The Chesapeake Bay Commission is a tri-state legislative commission which guides 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia "in cooperatively managing the Chesapeake Bay." /d. The 
Commission acts as "the legislative ann of the Chesapeake Bay Program," implementing program 
decisions and helping to develop policy. /d. 
266. Swanson, supra note 264, at I 4. 
267. Costanza & Greer, supra uote 152, at 170, 196. 
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efforts by scientists, government leaders, private environmental groups, and 
members of the media to highlight and deal with the Bay's problems.268 
Since early European settlers arrived in Jamestown in 1607, the 
Chesapeake Bay has undergone significant ecological change. The largest 
single estuary in the United States, the Chesapeake Bay covers an area of 
4,400 square miles and has 8,100 miles of shoreline.269 Its drainage basin 
extends some 6,400 square miles into six states and the District of 
Columbia.270 Once providing, acre for acre, the most productive fishing 
grounds in the world, 271 the Chesapeake Bay supported bountiful 
populations of oysters, crab, and finfish harvest and extensive beds of 
submerged aquatic vegetation-all existing in water so clear that one could 
often see to the bottom.272 Oysters used to be so numerous that some 
experts estimate they were capable of filtering and cleaning the equivalent 
of the entire volume of water in the Bay in less than a week.273 Today this 
self-cleaning function is no longer effective because of the drastic decline 
in the oyster population. Increased nutrient and sediment inputs into Bay 
waters have altered the chemical, physical, and ecological balance of the 
waters, adversely affecting water quality and causing catastrophic declines 
in the abundance of submerged aquatic vegetation. Overfishing and 
disease have decimated major fisheries and, in turn, caused further changes. 
Thrbidity, primary production, and the oxygen content of the Bay waters all 
have been affected. 274 
With a population currently totaling about 14 million and projected to 
exceed 17 million by 2020,275 the Chesapeake Bay watershed is facing 
even greater ecological deterioration unless its management program can 
overcome some serious obstacles to effective management. The same 
characteristics that make the Bay especially sensitive to stress also indicate 
that the Bay's ecological problems will be difficult to address as long as 
traditional property norms and rights-based thinking contro1.276 Because 
the Bay is a broad, shallow estuary, it experiences constant mixing of 
freshwater, seawater, and nutrients in unpredictable patterns. These 
268. See id. at 170, 195-98. 
269. See id. at 173. 
270. Seeid. 
271. See id. at 177. 
272. See id. at 179; STEvEN G. DAVISON, JAY G. MERWIN, JR., JOHN CAPPER, GARRETT POWER 
& FRANK R. SmVERS, JR., CHESAPEAKE WATERS 18-19,50-54,76-82 (2d ed. 1997). 
273. See Costanza & Greer, supra note 152, at 180. 
274. See id. at 177-81. 
275. See id. at 182. 
276. See id. at 170. 
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interactions cause nutrients to be recycled easily, contributing both to the 
Bay's productivity and sensitivity.277 When combined with the Bay's 
openness and vast, habitable coastline, this productivity makes the Bay 
watershed an especially attractive area for settlement and use.278 Its 
complexity, productivity, and unpredictability mean not only that the Bay 
system is relatively resilient,279 but also that the limits of the Bay's 
resilience are hard to detect. 
The management program for the Bay system evolved slowly over 
several decades. In the mid-1960s to mid-1970s, government leaders, 
environmentalists, and citizens became increasingly concerned about 
deteriorating conditions in the Bay.280 In the late 1970s, a period of intense 
scientific study began with the support of political leaders.281 Then, in 
1983, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, the District of Columbia, and the 
EPA initiated the period of formal ecosystem management by executing the 
first Chesapeake Bay Agreement.282 At the beginning of this formal 
period, the environmental agenda of the Bay program consisted primarily 
of "a very loose commitment to cooperate in efforts to protect the Bay."283 
For the most part, joint ventures and meetings among the participating 
jurisdictions were "relatively rare;"284 voluntary programs adopted by 
individual participants made up most of the early Bay program.285 The one 
key exception to this "loose commitment" was reflected in the efforts of the 
Chesapeake Bay Commission, which worked to protect the Bay through 
cooperative efforts. 286 
It was not until the execution of the Chesapeake Bay Agreement of 
1987 that the participating jurisdictions agreed to work together to develop 
and implement programs that produced a healthier Bay.287 The agreement 
established specific goals, objectives, and commitments for living 
277. See id. at 170-71. 
278. See id. at 171. 
279. See id. at 170-71. 
280. See id. at 197-98. 
281. See id. at 198-99. 
282. See id. at 199-201. 
283. CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL AsSEMBUES OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, MARYLAND & VIRGINIA: 1988 AND 1989, at 1 [hereinafter 1988-1989 CHEsAPEAKE 
BAYCOMM'NREPORT]. 
284. !d. 
285. See CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBUES OP 
PENNSYLVANIA, MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA: 1986, at 7 [hereinafter 1986 CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM'N 
REPORT]. For a discussion of those individual programs, see id. at 7-12. 
286. !d. at 13. 
287. See 1988-1989 CHEsAPEAKEBAYCOMM'NREPORT, supra note 283, at 1, app. B. 
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resources, water quality, and population growth and development, among 
other topics.288 Some of the more ambitious commitments in the 1987 
agreement included commitments to achieve 40% reductions in the Bay's 
nitrogen and phosphorus levels by 2000,289 develop a Bay-wide wetlands 
protection policy,290 develop and adopt basin-wide strategies for reducing 
toxins and conventional pollutants,291 and adopt resource management 
strategies for important species.292 In a relatively short period of time, the 
1987 agreement resulted in the implementation of special restoration 
programs for certain commercially valuable and stressed fisheries, 
programs to reestablish and protect submerged aquatic vegetation, 
regulation of point source discharges by wastewater treatment facilities, 
enforcement of sediment controls, and development of regulatory programs 
for critical coastal areas. 293 
Although the famed ''toes" or "sneaker'' test still cannot be met, the 
Chesapeake Bay program has made some progress. Under the "toes" test, 
the Bay will be far along the road to recovery when the waters of 
Maryland's Patuxent River are so clear that people can wade in the River 
up to their chest and see their toes.294 Scientists cannot yet see their toes, 
but have observed reductions in the Bay's phosphorous levels, as well as a 
gradual recovery of submerged aquatic vegetation?95 The restoration 
program for striped bass also has produced positive results.296 Despite 
these successes, much work remains to be done. Development and 
implementation of a formal management program has revealed the "full 
288. See id. app. Bat B-1. 
289. See id. at 21, app. Bat B-3. 
290. See id. at 20-21, app. B at B-2. 
291. See id. at21-22, app. B atB-3. 
292. See id. at 20, app. B at B-2. 
293. See 1989 CHEsAPEAKE EXECtmVE COUNCIL PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 25, at 18-25. 
294. See DAVISON ET AL., supra note 272, at 195-96; Horton, supra note 155, at 23, 26. This lay 
person's test for water quality originated with Bernie Fowler, a former Maryland politician and 
waterman who remembers once being able to wade into water and see his sneakers no matter how deep 
he waded. By 1988, Fowler could not see his feet after wading into water just eight inches deep. By 
June 1995, that distance had improved to 40 inches. See DAVISONET AL., supra note 272, at 195. See 
generally Tributary teams plan June wade-ins to promote water quality awareness, BAY J., June 1999, 
at 6. The wade-ins have expanded beyond the Patuxent River to include other Bay tributaries. See id. 
295. See 1993 CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 265, at 1. But see DAVISON ET 
AL., supra note 272, at 186 (suggesting that phosphorus concentrations appear to be rising). The Bay 
watershed once had over 600,000 acres of submerged grass. By 1984 that figure had shrunk to 38,000 
acres. Since then, acreage has improved to 64,000 in 1994. See id. at 190. 
296. See 1993 CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 265, at 1, 42; Costanza & Greer, 
supra note 152, at 178. 
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extent of the bay's problems"297 and has highlighted the need for a holistic, 
ecosystem-based approach. 298 
One of the Bay's most serious and complex problems involves 
nonpoint source pollution. Although the Bay program has reduced some 
nutrient levels through regulation of industries, sewage treatment plants, 
and other point sources discharging directly into waterways, the program 
has experienced greater difficulty in restricting nonpoint sources that 
indirectly contribute nutrients and sediment to waterways through 
runoff. 299 Controlling nonpoint sources requires moving beyond the 
immediate coastal area to land "far from the water's edge."300 Effective 
control of nonpoint source pollution also requires an understanding and 
recognition of the scales of individual land use-of the connection between 
an individual user and the Bay ecosystem. 
Consider the impact of farmers on the Chesapeake Bay system. 
Although no one farmer is causing serious harm to the Bay, the cumulative 
impact of agricultural use is both significant and serious. Farmers 
represent less than 3% of the Bay's population yet use approximately 25% 
of the 41 million acres in the Bay's watershed and apply almost 700 million 
pounds of fertilizer annually.301 One estimate places 90% of the 8 million 
acres of fertilized cropland in the Chesapeake Bay watershed beyond the 
control of comprehensive management plans to restrict nitrogen and 
297. Costanza & Greer, supra note 152, at 200. 
298. Seeid. 
299. See CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N, ANNuAL REPORT TO TIIE GENERAL ASSEMBLIES OF 
MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA & VIRGINIA: 1992, at 17-19, 25 [hereinafter 1992 CHEsAPEAKE BAY 
COMM'N REPORT]; Costanza & Greer, supra note 152, at 200. See also CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM'N, 
ANNuALREPORTTOTIIE GENERAL AsSEMBLIES OF MARYLAND, VIRGINIA & PENNSYLVANIA: 1996, at 
49-55 [hereinafter 1996 CHEsAPEAKE BAY CoMM'N REPORT] (discussing the status of nutrient levels 
and management efforts). The Bay Program recently completed a review of its decade-old goal of 
reducing nutrients 40% by the year 2000. A report of that review concluded that the 40% goal would 
not be met unless efforts to reduce nutrients were accelerated and that the 40% goal, in any event, 
would not be enough to restore the Bay. See Kart Blankenship, Review warns 40% goal will not be 
enough, BAY J., Dec. 1997, at 1. See also DAVISONET AL., supra note 272, at 215-16 (discussing the 
difficulties in meeting the Bay program's nitrogen goals). See generally Special Report: Chesapeake 
Bay Nutrient Report Card, BAY J., Apr. 1998 (providing a report on the nutrient loads of individual 
river basins). 
300. Shabman, supra note 128, at 3. See generally 1992 CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM'N REPORT, 
supra note 299, at 25-33 (discussing nutrient management in the Bay region). 
301. See Horton, supra note 155, at 2, 21. See also EPA: Farms Are Wor.~t Polluters, DAILY 
PREss (Newport News, Va.), May 14, 1998, at C8 (noting that farming is "responsible for 70 percent of 
waterway pollution"). See generally Activities of the Environmental Protection Agency Related to 
livestock Feeding Operations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Forestry, Resource Conserllation, and 
Research, and the Subcomm. on livestock, Dairy, and Poultry of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 
105th Cong. 105-50 (1998) (discussing EPA's Draft Strategy on Animal Feeding Operations). 
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phosphorous runoff into Bay waters.302 Livestock farms compound the 
problem by producing large amounts of waste-on average about five tons 
for each person in the United States.303 Not surprisingly, instead of seeing 
a reduction in nitrogen ten years after the first Bay agreement was signed, 
experts noticed about a 2% increase in nitrogen from all sources.304 
Another serious problem involves the continuing decline in living 
resources. Though management of striped bass probably has "averted an 
irreversible decline of that species,"305 jurisdictions involved in the Bay 
program generally are "well behind promised deadlines to carry out 
management plans"306 for other fisheries. After decades of disease, 
overfishing, and pollution, the Bay's oyster population is "in serious 
decline."307 In 1993 the Chesapeake Bay Commission estimated oyster 
stocks "to be one percent of their historic levels."308 This decline has had 
serious ecological and economic impacts. Scientists now understand the 
valuable function that oysters play in filtering water; they can remove silt, 
algae, and pollutants from up to fifty gallons of water per day.309 Today 
the Bay's oyster population needs about a year to filter the same volume of 
water that oysters used to be able to clean in just a few days.310 In addition, 
scientists now understand the value of the habitats provided by the reefs 
that oysters naturally grow; dredging and oyster harvesting have seriously 
depleted those reefs.311 Once reaching from the Bay's bottom to its water 
surface, oyster reefs now only "lie low and scattered across the bottom of 
the bay."312 In economic terms, the drastic decline in the oyster population 
has meant a significant loss of revenue. For decades, Virginia was a 
leading producer of American oysters, with oyster harvests totaling eleven 
302. See Horton, supra note 155, at 31. 
303. See National standards sought for manure management, BAY J., Mar. 1998, at4. The waste 
from the 600 million chickens produced each year on the Delmarva Peninsula exceeds 3.2 billion 
pounds per year and contains "as much nitrogen as a city of almost 500,000 people." ld. The EPA 
recently blamed 70% of waterway pollution on agricultural uses, which contributed more pollution to 
American waterways than sewage waste treatment plants, urban storm sewers, and pollutants deposited 
from the air. See EPA: Farms Are Worst Polluters, supra note 301. 
304. See Horton, supra note 155, at 31. 
305. Costanza & Greer, supra note 152, at 178. See also CHEsAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTEcnON AGENCY, THE STATE OF THE CHEsAPEAKE BAY: 1995, at 31-32 [hereinafter 
STATE OF THE CHEsAPEAKE] (discussing successes of the striped bass program); Striped Bass: A 
Chesapeake Treasure, BAY J., Sept. 1991, at 7 (discussing management of striped bass). 
306. Costanza & Greer, supra note 152, at 178. 
307. 1993 CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 265, at 39. 
308. ld. 
309. See id.; Horton, supra note 155, at 31. 
310. See 1993 CHEsAPEAKEBAYCOMM'NREPORT,supranote265, at39. 
3ll. See id.; Costanza & Greer, supra note 152, at 179. 
312. Costanza & Greer, supra note 152, at 179. 
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million pounds as recently as 1981; today Virginia does not even have a 
sufficient oyster population to support an oyster industry.313 Other 
fisheries have experienced less devastating declines.314 Despite these 
declines, fisheries management has tended to favor preservation of the 
watermen's livelihood over preservation of the species supporting their 
livelihood.315 
Loss of habitat and ecologically significant land cover also remains a 
serious problem within the Bay system.316 Forests and wetlands are critical 
to maintaining the resilience of the Bay ecosystem. Both types of land 
cover trap pollutants, preventing them from reaching more sensitive parts 
of the Bay system.317 Yet both now "cover only about half as much of the 
watershed as they once did,"318 and they continue to decline in acreage. 
Indeed, despite the no net loss policy in place since 1989, wetlands still are 
being lost in the Bay watershed, though at a slower rate. One study 
indicates that during the 1980s alone the Bay lost 3,000 acres of wetlands 
313. See CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N, ANNuAL REPORT TO TilE GENERAL ASSEMBLIES OF 
VIRGINIA, MARYLAND & PENNSYLVANIA: 1994, at 43 [hereinafter 1994 CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N 
REPORT]; 1993 CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 265, at 39; Bun.ER & LIVINGSTON, 
supra note 2, § 4.2, at 76. Maryland has experienced similar losses in its oyster industry. See Costanza 
& Greer, supra note 152, at 177. 
314. See 1996 CHEsAPEAKE BAY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 299, at 27-34; 1993 CHESAPEAKE 
BAY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 265, at 41. 
315. See DAVISON ET AL, supra note 272, at 190-94; Horton, supra note 155, at 31. For 
examples of the pressures that regulators face, see Mark Di Vincenzo, Watennen Battling New River 
Lease Law, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.), Apr. 1, 1993, at C1; Tina McCloud, Mathews 
Watennan vs. New Bay Rules, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.), Oct. 27, 1992, at B1; Stephanie 
Sharpe, Watennan Lobbies to Be Sure He'll Have a Tomorrow, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.), 
Aug. 27, 1990, at B 1. See generally Kim A. McDonald, As Catch Goes Down, Arguments Well Up, 42 
CHRON. OFH!GHEREDuc., Nov. 24, 1995, atA3 (discussing the debate over management of declining 
fisheries nationwide). 
316. A 1995 report stated that the Bay watershed was losing eight acres per day of wetlands and 
had lost 300 acres per day of forest land from 1980 to 1990. See STATE OF TilE CHESAPEAKE, supra 
note 305, at 3, 6. The report projected the amount of urban and suburban land to increase 35% over 
1935 acreage by the year2000. See id. at5. 
317. See Horton, supra note 155, at 31-32. See also CoMMITJEE ON CHARACTERIZATION OF 
WETLANDS, NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL, WETLANDS: CHARACTERISTICS AND BOUNDAPJES 34-41 
(1995) (discussing wetlands' functions); 1993 CHEsAPEAKE BAY CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 265, at 
33-35 (describing the environmental benefits of riparian forests); Forests Offer Tree-mendous Benefits, 
supra note 187 (describing the many benefits provided by trees). Although forests still cover almost 
60% of the lands in the Bay's watershed, the forests are only responsible for 14% of the nitrogen and 
3% of the phosphorus runoff. See Bill Matuszeski, Commentary, Readiness to sacrifice forests for 
sprawl is almost stumping, BAY J., Mar. 1998, at 20. Like wetlands, then, "forests represent a huge 
natural pollution treatment system." /d. 
313. Horton, supra note 155, at 31. See also supra notes 182-137 and accompanying text 
(discussing the decline of tree cover in the Bay watershed). 
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annually.319 Among other factors, the continuing loss has been attributed 
to unregulated land uses, sprawling development, and regulations that 
allow destruction of small wetland tracts.320 Despite the laws protecting 
wetlands, the overwhelming majority of wetlands permit applications are 
approved.321 In addition, suburban sprawl is now consuming almost "four 
times as much open space for every new resident" as the "more compact 
housing patterns" prevalent through the 1950s.322 
Nontraditional management approaches and decisionmaking processes 
are needed to deal with the environmental problems caused by sprawling 
development, escalating land and water use, and nonpoint source pollution. 
Those problems require solutions that consider the interactions between a 
user and the environment, and that impose restraints on land and water use 
to reflect those interactions. Because of the pathological effects of property 
norms, traditional management approaches and decisionmaking processes 
have not dealt effectively with these types of environmental problems-
problems that involve components interacting across a range of scales and 
hierarchical levels. Property norms influence the decisions of lawmakers, 
regulators, managers, and planners by funneling their decisions towards 
rights-based choices and ignoring considerations of scale relating to 
individual land and water use. Although these choices may make some 
sense from traditional property law and political theory perspectives, they 
ignore the scale-dependency of ecosystems and ecological integrity.323 
The Bay program demonstrates the influence of property norms in a 
number of ways. Participating jurisdictions have taken atomistic and 
product-oriented approaches in setting and implementing goals. Both 
Maryland and Virginia, for example, have gone to great lengths to protect 
the economic interests of existing users of valuable ecological "products." 
Delaying implementation of fishing limits, avoiding fishing bans, and 
limiting the territorial or seasonal scope of fishing restrictions are common 
319. See Directive goes beyond 'no net loss,' requires gain in Bay states' wetlands, BAY J., Dec. 
1997, at 12. 
320. See id.; Horton, supra note 155, at 31-34. 
321. See CHEsAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, WETLANDS PERMlTilNG PROGRAMS IN THE 
CHESAPEAKE BAY AREA 4 (Oct 1994) (noting that 7% or less of individual pennit applications for Bay 
area projects are denied). 
322. Horton, supra note 155, at 31, 34. See generally LeeR. Epstein, Where Yards Are Wide: 
Have Land Use Planning and Law Gone Astray?. 21 WM. & MARY ENVTI.. L. & POL'Y REV. 345 
(1997) (discussing the problem and causes of sprawl, and proposing a new American dream). For a 
discussion of the impact of land use on watersheds and estuaries, see Charles S. Hopkinson, Jr., & 
Joseph J. Vallino, The Relationships Among Man's Activities in Watersheds and Estuaries: A Model of 
Runoff Effects on Patterns of Estuarine Community Metabolism, 18 ESTUARIES 598 (Dec. 1995). 
323. For further discussion of the concepts of scale and integrity, see infra Part II.B.2. 
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tactics of management plans for Bay fisheries, even when population 
declines are serious.324 In addition, despite the now well-documented link 
between land use and the environment,325 the Bay program's land use 
management efforts have been rather limited in scope, focusing primarily 
on land use within the immediate coastal area and often providing 
exemptions, variances, or generous grandfather provisions to property 
owners within regulated areas.326 Virginia laws governing land use within 
the Bay watershed, for instance, have tended to include generous 
grandfather provisions for regulated property owners.327 Further, 
government regulators at all levels remain reluctant to adopt 
comprehensive and aggressive land use management programs that would 
apply throughout a watershed and control growth for environmental 
purposes.328 
The effect of property norms on the Chesapeake Bay management 
program is most evident at the local government level where critical 
decisions are made about water and sewer service and about permissible 
324. For some examples of these approaches to fisheries management, see DAVIS ON ET AL., supra 
note 272, at 190-94. See also Houck, supra note 30, at 946-53 (discussing the problematic approaches 
to fisheries management taken by the United States). A comparison of two annual reports of the 
Chesapeake Bay Commission reveals how little progress has been made in the fisheries management 
area. Compare 1993 CHESAPEAKE BAY CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 265, at 39-43 (describing the 
serious decline in the oyster population, the troubling decline in the crab fishezy, the encouraging 
increase in juvenile striped bass, the problem of exotic species, and the need for more effective 
management) with 1986 CHESAPEAKE BAY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 285, at 15-22 (discussing the 
low stock levels of oysters, striped bass, herring, and perch, as well as the need for improved 
management efforts). Even though the oyster population has experienced devastating reductions, 
heated debate arose when the Chesapeake Bay Foundation called for a three-year moratorium on 
oystering. See DAVISON ET AI-, supra note 272, at 191-92; Tom Horton, To Restore & Protect 
Chesapeake Bay, in CIIESAPEAKEBAYFOUNDATION, SAVETHEBAY: 25m ANNIVERSARY 3, 16 (1992) 
[hereinafter CBF 25m ANNIVERSARY]. 
325. See STATE OF THE CHESAPEAKE, supra note 305, at 5-9; Butler, supra note 111, at 883 & 
n.226. 
326. Virginia's Chesapeake Bay laws generally protect 100 feet landward of tidal waters and 
wetlands from development and use, though exemptions and reductions in the protected buffer may be 
granted. See Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Bd., Revised Final Regulation VR 173-02-01, 
Chesapeake Bay Preservation Area Designation and Management Regnlations, 7 Va. Regs. Reg. 3778 
§§ 3.2(B)(5), 4.1(B), 4.3(B), 45, 4.6 (Aug. 26, 1991). Other Virginia laws protecting coastal resources 
also contain exemptions enacted for the benefit of private property owners. See, e.g., 1988 Va. Acts. 
ch. 740, amended by 1991 Va. Acts. ch. 114 (to expire July 1, 1993) (exempting landowners in the 
Sandbridge Beach area from the state's Coastal Primacy Sand Dune Protection Act to allow them to 
construct bulkheads or other protective structures). Mazyland generally uses a 1,000 foot buffer zone. 
See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. II § 8-1807 (Supp. 1999). See generally DAVISON ET AI-, supra note 
272, at 201-10 (discussing the Mazyland and Virginia Chesapeake Bay acts). 
327. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 111, at 910 & n.331. 
328. For a discussion of failed efforts to adopt stringent land use controls within the Bay 
watershed, see infra notes 334-343 and accompanying text 
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land uses. Once the decision to provide water and sewer service is made, 
the battle over preservation or conservation of undeveloped land is usually 
lost. Local officials rarely take action to prevent sprawling land 
development, not even when they could legitimately do so by refusing to 
extend public water and sewer service.329 Although this failure is 
undoubtedly due to a variety of political pressures exerted on government 
decisionmakers,330 property owners nevertheless play a significant role in 
local, state, and federal political processes.331 Further, though localities 
have promoted lower density uses through their zoning laws and 
comprehensive plans, those uses still result in loss of ground cover and 
contribute to the problem of sprawling development.332 
Overcoming the pathological effects of property norms requires a 
recognition of the importance of considerations of scale and integrity to 
land use decisionmaking. Private landowners, governmental units, courts, 
and other parties making land use choices need to recognize that different 
types of integrity are at issue. In addition to the personal integrity involved 
in the concept of constitutionally protected property rights,333 land use 
choices involve the integrity of the property system and the integrity of 
ecosystems. Parties making land use choices need to recognize the 
importance of scale to system integrity. Until land use choices reflect the 
true scales of private land use, the long-term integrity of ecosystems, and 
perhaps even the property system, will continue to be threatened. 
329. See, e.g., supra notes 223-240 and accompanying text Current legal and economic 
pressures pose serious obstacles to government action that would prevent development of a tract of 
land. Recent Supreme Court decisions provide greater protection for the development and use of 
private property. In a 1992 decision, for example, the Court concluded that government action that 
resulted in a total deprivation of value was a taking. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1019, 1030 (1992). Although a government decision to deny the extension of water and 
sewer service to a particular tract of land arguably does not diminish the value of land that already lacks 
such service, the economic pressures on local officials to approve development projects are substantial. 
330. A number of land use experts have commented on the messy politics of local zoning 
decisions. See, e.g., RICHARD F. BABCOCK, 1HE ZONING GAME 104-11 (1966) (discussing the 
judiciary's lack of confidence in local land use dccisionmaking); Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan 
Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 30-32, 36-
39 (1992) (discussing the territorial nature and capture theory oflocal government politics). 
331. See Lynda L. Butler, The Politics of Takings: Choosing the Appropriate Decisionmaker, 38 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 749, 756-58 (1997). For a discussion of the influence of property norms on 
state environmental programs, see Butler, supra note 111, at 838-44. 
332. The environmental impacts of low-density sprawling development are substantial. See 
Epstein, supra note 322, at 349 & n.15. 
333. For a discussion of the importance of property to individual freedom and to the integrity of 
the person, see FluEDRICH A. HAYEK, 1HE CONSTITUI10N OF LmERTY 124-27, 140-42 (1960). See 
generally MARGARET J. RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993) (discussing various theories of 
property rights). 
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Although some policymakers in the Chesapeake Bay program have 
taken the ftrst step in overcoming the pathological effects of property 
norms by recognizing the importance of considerations of scale in land use 
management, much work remains to be done. A panel of experts, 
appointed by the Chesapeake Executive Council to study the impacts of 
growth and development on the watershed and called the Year 2020 Panel, 
found low-density sprawl to be the most destructive pattern of development 
to the Bay.334 The panel noted that undeveloped land in the Bay watershed 
had been developed at a rate exceeding the rate of population growth. 
Between 1950 and 1980 the population for the Chesapeake basin increased 
almost 50%, while the amount of land developed for residential and 
commercial purposes increased 180%.335 The panel estimated that between 
1980 and 2020, 59% more land in the Bay's watershed would be developed 
if land consumption continued at the same rate, and between 1990 and 
2020, 2.6 million more residents would populate the watershed.336 The 
report called for stringent measures to avoid the serious harm that 
unchecked growth would otherwise cause.337 The measures included 
concentrating development in suitable areas and directing growth in rural 
areas to existing settlements.338 The report's most controversial 
recommendation was the ''usurpation of local prerogatives by a statewide 
land use management scheme" that included all state lands in the 
watershed. 339 
To date, none of the jurisdictions participating in the Chesapeake Bay 
program have wholeheartedly adopted the report's recommendations. In 
Maryland a coalition of farmers, developers, and property rights advocates 
defeated legislative proposals that would have adopted the Year 2020 
Panel's measures, including statewide land use management.340 Eventually 
the Maryland legislature passed a weaker act requiring localities to add the 
panel's key policies to their comprehensive plans and to implement the 
334. See YEAR 2020 PANEL TO THE CHEsAPEAKE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, POPULATION GROVflll 
AND DEVELOPMENTINTHECliESAPEAKEBAYWATERSHEDTO THE YEAR2020, at 1-2,28-29,36 (Dec. 
1988) (on file with the author) [hereinafter 2020 PANEL REPORT}; CBF 25m ANNIVERSARY, supra note 
324, at 12. 
335. See 2020 PANEL REPORT, supra note 334, at 28-29. 
336. See id. at 1, 27, 29; DAVISONET AL.,supra note272, at 216. 
337. See 2020 PANEL REPORT, supra note 334, at 4-8; DAVISON ET AL., supra note 272, at 218. 
338. See 2020 PANEL REPORT, supra note 334, at 5-6; DAVISON ET AL., supra note 272, at 218. 
339. DAVISON ET AL., supra note 272, at 218. See also 2020 PANEL REPORT, supra note 334, at 
4-5. 
340. See DAVISONET AL., supra note272, at218. 
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policies through zoning and other ordinances.341 In Virginia, a commission 
appointed to consider the 2020 report proposed legislation that was 
defeated. 342 The Pennsylvania governor did not even appoint a panel to 
consider the 2020 proposals, calling the proposals "'draconian. "'343 These 
experiences suggest that property owners and policymakers still have not 
recognized the true scales of private land use or the importance of scale to 
ecosystem integrity. The importance of considering scale and integrity in 
land use decisionmaking is discussed next. 
2. Considerations of Scale and Questions of Integrity 
Property norms have influenced the landscape scales and the types of 
integrity considered in land use decisionmaking. The legal system has 
narrowly defined the scales of land use to exclude significant externalities 
and has restricted the types of integrity considered in defining property 
rights, obligations, and liabilities. The narrow definitions of scale include 
ecologically irrelevant temporal and spatial scales, as well as ecologically 
inconsistent scales of observation, particularly management units 
controlling land use decisionmaking. For most land use choices, the 
principal management unit is the individual landowner, who, as a general 
matter, need only consider the spatial limits of his or her tract of land and 
the temporal scales most likely to maximize net profit. In other words, the 
scales of the key land use decisionmaker-the private landowner-are 
generally much smaller than the actual scales of the owner's land use and, 
therefore, are much smaller than the scales needed to maintain the integrity 
of the ecosystem.344 Further, the types of integrity that are important to the 
individual user-economic and personal integrity-tend to undermine the 
integrity of ecosystems. Land use decisionmakers who need focus only on 
their own economic well-being and personal freedom have little, if any, 
incentive to consider the integrity of the whole ecosystem.345 A discussion 
of the concepts of ecosystem, ecosystem integrity, and landscape scales 
341. See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. ll § 8-1808 (Supp. 1999); DAVISONET AL., supra note 272, 
at218. 
342. See DAVISONET AL., supra note272, at218. 
343. SUSAN Q. STRANAHAN, SUSQUEHANNA, RiVER OF DREAMS 300 (1993). A state legislative 
committee, however, considered the Year 2020 Panel's proposals and made some recommendations. 
As of 1996, the recommendations had not been adopted. See DAVISON ET AL., supra note 272, at 218. 
For an update on a 1999 bill proposed to revise land use practices in Pennsylvania, see Bills would 
revise land practices in PA,jund open space purchases, BAY J., June 1999, at 17. 
344. For further explanation of the relationship between scale of use and ecological integrity, see 
infra notes 351-355 and accompanying text 
345. For further explanation, see Ganett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 
(1968). 
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will demonstrate how detrimental the narrow conceptions of scale and 
integrity are to environmental quality. 
The concept of an ecosystem includes not only its constituent 
components, but also the interactions among the components and their 
structure and functioning.346 In other words, an ecosystem is greater than 
the sum of its parts because of the dynamic interactions occurring among 
those parts and because of the structure and function of the ecosystem.347 
Under this conceptual definition, an ecosystem is not limited to a particular 
level of organization or hierarchy, or to particular temporal or spatial 
scales; rather, it may involve a range of scales and hierarchicallevels.348 
The concept of ecosystem integrity involves the functions and 
structure of a system, as well as maintenance of its components and the 
interactions among them.349 No single component should be treated in 
isolation from the system's functions, structure, and other components. 
Ecosystem integrity, however, does not necessarily require preservation of 
all components. Some changes in structure have little, if any, impact on the 
functioning of an ecosystem. An ecosystem may be resilient to the loss of 
even common components because of functional redundancy or 
equivalence; system components may perform equivalent functions that 
compensate for a change in structure. When redundancy or equivalence 
does not exist, however, changes can result in significant alterations in 
ecosystem function.350 
Because the concept of ecosystem integrity "implies maintenance of 
some normal state" of operation, function, or structure measured over 
sufficient time and space, ecosystem integrity is "scale-dependent."351 The 
scale of an ecosystem may refer to its spatial and temporal dimensions, as 
well as to "the observation set used to define ... [the] system and measure 
ecosystem integrity."352 The spatial dimension involves the area occupied 
by the ecosystem, while the temporal dimension refers to the time period 
346. See King, supra note 30, at 25. 
347. Ecosystem function "generally refers to the functioning or operation of the ecosystem, ••• 
and not the role or job of the ecosystem." !d. at 20. Ecosystem structure "commonly refers to the 
distribution of matter and energy among system components." !d. 
348. See id. at 23. 
349. See id. at 25. 
350. See id. at 25-27. Perspective does, of course, affect whether a change is viewed as a loss in 
ecosystem integrity. The loss of a rare species may be considered a loss of ecosystem integrity when 
viewed from a community, ethical, or aesthetic perspective, but not when viewed from an ecosystem 
function perspective. See id. at 27. For further discussion of the importance of perspective, see id. at 
26-27. 
351. /d. at29. 
352. /d. at 28. 
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used to describe the system.353 The scale of the observation set may be 
determined by the scale of the management unit monitoring or measuring 
integrity.354 If the extent (areal expanse or length of time) of the 
management unit does not match the attributes of the monitored ecosystem, 
invalid measurements of ecosystem integrity loss may result. Ecosystems 
require minimum spatial and temporal extents for system functions to occur 
and system structure to be maintained. A loss in ecosystem integrity may 
result when a management unit has a smaller spatial and temporal reach 
than that of the ecosystem it is managing, or when a management unit 
develops management practices for scales less than the minimum amount 
required for ecosystem interactions to occur.355 
Property rights in land have not traditionally been defined in light of 
the spatial and temporal dimensions of land use. For years traditional 
property norms have reflected a "liberal conception of ownership"356 that 
includes an individualistic view of scale based on personal economic and 
political freedom.357 Proponents of this concept of ownership generally 
adhere to a theory of limited government. Under this theory the primary 
purpose of government is to protect individuals from violence, including 
violence against an individual's property rights. Supporters of this theory 
generally believe that "the only legitimate functions of government are the 
protection of life, liberty, and property from external threats (the military), 
internal threat (the police), and civil disputes (the courts)."358 To a 
libertarian, society consists of "an aggregate of discrete, autonomous 
individuals, each owning items and parcels of property, totally 
encapsulated by title and well-defined boundary lines."359 
Although the liberal conception of property has played a critical role 
in the development of the American political structure and legal system,360 
353. See id. 
354. Seeid. 
355. See id. at 28-29. 
356. CHRISTMAN, supra note 21, at 3. 
357. See id. at 29-31; AlExANDER, supra note 42, at 1, 3-7; ELY, supra note 2, at 153. For 
further discussion of the relationship between liberty and liberal ownership, see CHRISTMAN, supra note 
21, at 67-83. 
358. Partridge, supra note 112, at 264. For a discussion of a more modem, libertarian view of 
property, see Eric T. Freyfogle, Owning the Land: Four Contemporary Narratives, 13 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 279,286-92 (1998) (discussing Richard Epstein's revised version of the libertarian concept 
of property). 
359. Partridge, supra note 112, at 264. 
360. See ELY, supra note 2, at 26-58 (discussing the role of private property rights in establishing 
the new constitutional order in America). But see CHRISTMAN, supra note 21, at 67-83 (critiquing 
defenses of liberal ownership based on considerations of liberty); William J. Novak, Common 
Regulntion: Legal Origins of State Power in America, 45 HAsTINGS LJ. 1061 (1994) (arguing that the 
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the liberal view is not the only conception of property that has been 
important to American legal thought. The conception of property as "the 
private basis for the public good" also has had a long tmdition.361 In 
Commodity and Propriety, Professor Gregory Alexander explains that this 
alternate vision of property reflects the notion that the individual human is 
an "inherently social being, inevitably dependent on others not only to 
thrive but even just to survive. This irreducible interdependency means 
that individuals owe one another obligations, not by virtue of consent alone 
but as an inherent incident of the human condition."362 The public good 
view of property recognizes that property is central to social stability, 
"anchor[ing] the citizen to his ... rightful place" and providing a basis for 
imposing social obligations for the good of the community.363 This vision 
thus prefers to view property as providing a basis for social stability and 
participation mther than a basis for personal gain, commodification, and 
speculation.364 
Further, even if the liberal conception of property controlled the 
development of American political and legal thought, that conception still 
needs to be reexamined in light of modem ecological problems and 
conditions. Such an evaluation would reveal that the liberal conception of 
property fails to consider concepts and principles that are critical to 
ecological integrity. Omitted from the liberal conception of property is a 
sense of responsibility for externalities imposed by property owners on 
important common resources and on the components, structure, and 
functioning of ecosystems. Under tmditional property law, a landowner 
''has no direct incentive (in the absence of negotiations)" to consider costs 
that he imposes on other resources, whether privately or publicly owned.365 
He only has the incentive to consider costs and "economize on the use of 
those resources from which he has the right to exclude others."366 Also 
liberal theory of ownership and government was not the single or even dominant theory in the early 
republic). 
361. ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 1. See also David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal 
History: Conflicting Depictions of Property in the American Political Founding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HJST. 
464 (1993) (discussing two sometimes contradictory approaches to analyzing American political theory 
and their impact on depictions of property: a rhetorical approach focusing on the expressed views of the 
founders and an institutional approach looking at how the law treated property). 
362. ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 1-2. 
363. /d. at 2, 4. For a discussion of four views of property now affecting legal discourse, see 
Freyfogle, supra note 358, at 286-303 (discussing the libertarian ideal of individual autonomy, the 
more traditional narrative of property that focused on economic opportunity, a community-centered 
narrative of property, and a bio-centric narrative of property). 
364. See ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 40. 
365. Demsetz, supra note 242, at 356. 
366. Id. 
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omitted from the liberal conception of property is any recognition of the 
carrying capacity of land or the finiteness of natural resources. One of the 
implicit assumptions of liberalism is the "infinite availability of the natural 
resources necessary" for the "pursuit of material comforts."367 The 
traditional, geometric-based approach to allocating land rights has, for the 
most part, reinforced the limited externality perspective and the assumption 
of infinite availability underlying the liberal conception of property. This 
reinforcement has occurred through the traditional approach's focus on 
discrete, unitary tracts of land and its failure to consider the interactions 
and interdependencies existing between landowners and the foundation 
ecosystem.368 Traditional property law thus fails to include the principles 
of ecological connectedness and carrying capacity in the definition of 
property norms, rights, and obligations. 
Because land is a critical part of the ecosystem, property rights in land 
should, as a matter of ethics and ecology, reflect the ecological and 
landscape dimensions of land use, not just the individual user's economic 
considerations. A property system that defines land rights primarily in the 
context of a society's individual rights-based approach to political or 
economic systems is ignoring the physical, chemical, and biological 
processes linking individual tracts of land to the ecosystem. In addition to 
being viewed as the subject of individual ownership, appropriation, and 
commodification, rights in land must be defined in light of land's role as 
"one of the key constituents of life on earth."369 Scale should become a 
"fundamental determinant" in defining the moral and legal obligation of 
landowners when the consequences of failing to consider appropriate scales 
could result in serious damage or avoidable, catastrophic losses.370 
367. Susan M. Leeson, Philosophic Implications of the Ecological Crisis: The Authoritarian 
Challenge to I.iheralism, 11 POUTY 304, 305 (1979). For arguments that resources remain abundant, 
see Sagoff, supra note 241; Julian L. Simon, Scarcity or Abundance?, in nm BUSINESS OF 
CoNSUMPTION, supra note 112, at 237-45. 
368. See Sterk, supra note 21, at 90, 93-95. 
369. PI.Arr, supra note 171, at 4. Platt maintains that land also needs to be defined in light of 
cultural and other noneconomic values that people attach to land as a sense of place. See id. at 5-6. For 
a general discussion ofland's critical importance to humans and of the need for improved management 
ofland's resources, see ANrnONY YOUNG, LAND REsOURCES (1998). 
370. K.S. Shrader-Frechette & E.D. McCoy, Statistics, Costs and Rationality in Ecological 
Inference, 7 TRENDs IN EcOLOGY & EVOLUTION 96, 98 (1992). The inherent complexity of natural 
systems means that many different models or characterizations of the systems are possible. See Bryan 
G. Norton, Improving Ecological Communication: The Role of Ecologists in Environmental Policy 
Formation, 8 EcOLOG!CALAPPUCATIONS 350,358 (1998). Because of the numerous models available, 
the choiee of scale often reflects a choice of values; the modeler chooses to model a subset of the 
system's "actual dynamics .... Those choices express evaluations of ecological and social 
significance." /d. at 359. While scientists often prefer scales with ecological significance, lawmakers 
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Indicators of system integrity are necessarily greater than social parameters 
when the system involves natural resources that are critical to ecological as 
well as social systems. Maintaining the integrity of ecological systems 
requires consideration of scales that are greater than individual landowners 
or individual tracts of land. The scales of space, time, and observation help 
to capture the interactions among the system components, as well as the 
structure and functions of the system. Incorporating considerations of scale 
into the definition of property rights, powers, and obligations, in other 
words, would capture the connections between individual rights, property 
system integrity, and ecosystem integrity. Such incorporation would help 
to ensure the inclusion of important ecological interests in the concept of 
landed property in ways that are tailored to individual users. 
The massive Chapman's Landing development project proposed for 
southern Maryland demonstrates the importance of considering 
ecologically relevant scales of private land use. The project proposed the 
residential and commercial development of approximately 2,250 acres 
covering about 2.25 miles of the Potomac River shoreline in Maryland.371 
The master plan for Chapman's Landing called for the creation of a city 
comparable in size to Annapolis. The development would have included 
4,600 dwelling units, 2.26 million square feet of commercial space, a 
marina, and a 200-acre golf course-all on a tract of land that is about 90% 
forested, much of it old growth.372 
The development plan called for the destruction of significant 
historical and ecological resources. The site contains historical resources 
from the colonial and early statehood periods, as well as important 
archaeological resources dating back to prehistoric times.373 Chapman's 
Landing has an unusually broad range of habitats that support a unique 
assemblage of flora and fauna, including many rare, threatened, and 
endangered species.374 The site is rich in amphibians, reptiles, birds, 
defining property rights have, in the past, chosen scales with social-that is, political-significance. 
Effective ecosystem management requires greater sensitivity to the value choices underlying the 
definition of scale. This sensitivity is especially needed when serious but avoidable losses are possible. 
371. See Friends of Mount Aventine, Help Protect Chapman Forest on the Potomac River 
South of Washington, D.C. (visited Jan. 1998) <http://www.radix.net/-foma/fomnhpfucts.html 
[hereinafter FOMA, Facts]; Friends of Mount Aventine, Main Issues (visited Feb. 4, 1998) 
<http://www.radix.net/-foma/topics.html#TOP> [hereinafter FOMA, Main Lvsues]; Friends of Mount 
Aventine, The Keystone Report: Establish the Potomac River Heritage Reserve (visited July 6, 1998) 
<http://www .radix.net/-fomalkeystone.htm> [hereinafter The Keystone Report]. 
372. See FOMA, Facts, supra note 371; FOMA, Main Issues, supra note 371; The Keystone 
Report, supra note 371. 
373. See The Keystone Report, supra note 371. 
374. Seeid. 
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mammals, fish, rare butterflies, and plants,375 and includes a tributary of the 
Potomac River having exceptional water quality and fish habitats.376 
In assessing the environmental effects of the project, the Army Corps 
of Engineers and the Maryland state and local governments generally 
examined direct impacts only, ignoring important considerations of scale 
involving indirect and cumulative impacts of the project on the surrounding 
environment.377 According to one scientist, instead of trying to provide 
meaningful protection to wildlife, the developer proposed to protect a 
"quarter-mile no-build zone around a bald eagle nest and a ravine wetland 
filled with very rare ferns!t378 Instead of trying to protect an exceptional, 
continuous habitat of old growth and mature forest, the developer proposed 
the largest single loss of forest habitat since the passage of the Chesapeake 
Bay legislation.379 The geographical context of the tract suggests the 
magnitude of this loss. Located on important waterways and surrounded 
by other undeveloped lands, Chapman•s Landing forms an intricate part of 
a relatively large area of continuous forest habitat. Due to its steep ravines, 
the tract has remained "essentially intact.••380 Development of the tract 
would seriously fragment the forest habitat and decimate critical interior 
forests.381 Rather than examining the impact of the development on 
transportation, schools, and other infrastructure needs, or on the species 
dependent on the continuous habitat, the local government made some 
changes in its land use laws to allow increases in the development's 
375. Seeid. 
376. See Andrew H. Macdonald, Good Engineering Will Not Protect the Bay from Chapman's 
Landing, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 1, 1997, at 15A; FOMA, Facts, supra note 371; The Keystone Report, 
supra note 371. For a discussion of the serious threat to fisheries that development of Chapman's 
Landing poses, see James P. Long, Threat to Anadromous and Semi·Anadromous Fish by Development 
Plans for the Chapman Forest (visited July 6, 1998) <http://www.radix.net/-foma!LongAnad.htm>. 
377. See Macdonald, supra note 376; Letter from W. Michael McCabe, Regional Administrator, 
U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, to Colonel Bruce Berwick, Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
Baltimore Dist. (Oct. 10, 1997) (visited Apr. 20, 2000) <http://www.radix.net/-fomal 
epa2corpsl097WEB.html>. The Chapman's Landing developer met with the Army Corps of Engineers 
to discuss preparation of a wetlands permit application under a joint state/federal permitting process. 
The public was not invited to any of these meetings. See Friends of Mount Aventine, Maryland 
Regulatory Process on Chapman's Landing (visited July 6, 1998) <http://www.radix.net/-fomal 
MruylandRegulatoryStatus.htm>. 
378. Macdonald, supra note 376, at 15A. 
379. See Charles County Weighs Development Many Fear the Impact of /2,000-Resident Housing 
Project, DAILY REcoRD (Baltimore, Md.), July 21, 1995, at 5; FOMA, Facts, supra note 371; The 
Keystone Report, supra note 371. 
380. See The Keystone Report, supra note 371. 
381. See generally id. (discussing the serious effects of fragmentation on ecological resources in 
the Chapman's Landing tract). 
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density.382 Instead of examining the water supply needs of the entire 
proposed development or the impact of increased water use on other areas, 
Maryland issued a water appropriation permit for up to 390,000 gallons per 
day, only enough for the first 600 homes.383 
Eventually the Governor of Maryland and environmentally active 
groups worked together to preserve Chapman's Landing. Early on, those 
efforts had no impact. By mid-March 1998, the developer had begun to 
clear the land despite ongoing negotiations with the state and a private 
conservation group interested in buying the property.384 This action caused 
the Governor of Maryland to announce that the state would use its power of 
eminent domain to protect at least part of the site.385 The announcement 
failed to halt the clearing operations; by the end of June 25, 1998, the 
developer had cleared approximately 80 acres.386 Finally, on October 28, 
1998, the Governor of Maryland announced that the Mellon Foundation 
purchased the remaining portion of Chapman's Landing to spare it from 
development.387 
Although some may question whether the Chapman's Landing dispute 
demonstrates the pathology of property norms, given the ultimate 
resolution of the dispute, it is not the final result that is critical to evaluating 
the pathology of property nonns, but rather the rights, obligations, and 
nonns affecting the private landowner. The developer in Chapman's 
Landing had the right to develop the tract, assuming compliance with 
traditional permit and zoning requirements, and owed no obligation to 
account for ecological costs not reflected in those requirements. Indeed, 
the developer did not even have to account fully for increased demands on 
infrastructure or water resources. 388 Had it not been for the activities of 
concerned citizens and the persistence of the Maryland Governor and a 
private foundation, the development would have proceeded. Further, for 
every land development dispute like Chapman's Landing, many more are 
not resolved in such an environmentally friendly manner. The Chapman's 
382. See FOMA, Main Issues, supra note 371. 
383. See Macdonald, supra note 376. 
384. See Heather Dewar, Chapman's Landing Work Begins Despite State Talks: Developer Says 
He's 'Open to Proposals' for Land, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 27, 1998, at 2B. 
385. See Michael Dresser, State to Acquire Frostburg Depot for $600,000: Board Abo Gives OK 
to Seek Condemnation of Chapman's Landing, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 16, 1998, at 1B; Friends of 
Mount Aventine, Dramatic Events in Campaign to Preserve Chapman Forest (visited July 6, 1998) 
<http://www .radix.net/-foma/fomanews0498.htm> [hereinafter FOMA, News]. 
386. See FOMA, News, supra note 385. 
387. See Md. Governor's Press Office, Chapman's Landing Preserved in Entirety (visited June 
17, 1999) <http://www.gov.state.md.us/gov/press/1998/oct/html/chnplast.html>. 
388. See supra notes 382-383 and accompanying text. 
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Landing tract happened to get everyone's attention; it had the right 
combination of ecological, historical, and social conditions working in its 
favor. Most other tracts of undeveloped land are not as appealing targets 
for government or private foundation acquisition, though the costs of land 
development may be just as significant. 
Incorporating considerations of scale into definitions of property 
rights and obligations would not mean the end of private property rights in 
land. What would change is that the scale of individual land use would be 
reflected in the evaluation of the rights, obligations, and the expectations of 
property owners, as well .as the importance of the government interest. 
Instead of using traditionally limiting property norms and rules to 
determine the benefits and burdens of government action and the 
reasonableness of private owners' expectations, lawmakers and 
policymakers would use a more integrated concept of property that 
included the ecological costs of land use. Individual landowners would 
continue to have the power to make use decisions, take economic gambles, 
and exclude others, but would bear responsibility for the scales of those 
decisions. The integrity of the person still would be protected through the 
concept of property. This protective function, however, would not be 
performed in a void, without consideration of the impact of property rights 
on the integrity of the ecosystem. Rather ecological concepts of scale and 
integrity would be used to evaluate whether a private land use is adversely 
affecting common environmental resources that are part of the public stock 
and upon which we all depend. Private property rights would be defined in 
light of the impact of private use on resources that perform important 
ecological services critical to system integrity. After all, the nature and 
desirability of a free society would change considerably if the exercise of 
private rights so depleted natural resources and degraded the environment 
that the health or survival of humans was seriously threatened. 
Accounting for the true scales of land use will require a systemic 
approach that reflects an integrated or holistic concept of integrity. 
Although traditional property norms protect the personal integrity of an 
individual owner in both an economic and political sense, they fail to 
consider ecological or system integrity. Because of its focus on personal 
integrity, the liberal conception of property discounts the importance of 
system counectedness and integrity and of sustaining the resource base of 
the foundation ecosystem. In determining the benefits and burdens of 
government action affecting land use and the legitimacy of private 
expectations, lawmakers need to consider the true costs of private land 
use-not only to other rightholders but also to the ecosystem. Concepts of 
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scale and ecological integrity would help to detennine those costs. 
Government action that forces internalization of private land use costs by 
restricting land use or imposing some sort of stewardship obligation on 
property owners would represent an important step toward a more holistic 
concept of integrity. 
The concept of integrity used to define property rights thus must itself 
become integrated. It must involve not only personal integrity, but also 
system integrity. Although an exploration of the meaning of system 
integrity is beyond the scope of this work, several scholars have begun the 
task of defining a principle of integrity which can produce a much needed 
"changed consciousness" in western societies.389 Necessitated by the 
magnitude of environmental problems, this changed consciousness would 
require an ''understanding of the self not as primarily individualistic, but as 
relational in line with the primacy of ecosystemic wholes."390 Such an 
understanding would provide a better basis for justifying the imposition of 
an environmental obligation on landowners391-that is, for developing the 
concept of a "citizen landowner." Ultimately adherence to· the holistic or 
integrated principle of integrity would help to restore harmony to 
ecological systems.392 
An important cause of the individualistic perspectives now controlling 
American legal and economic systems is the pathology of property norms. 
To alter the present pattern of escalating land and water use, and of 
ineffective ecosystem management over the long term, the legal system 
must wholeheartedly embrace the concept of ecological integrity. That 
embrace must include the limits that ecological integrity places on 
individual action; those limits are "the limits of humankind as a species."393 
Considerations of scale would help to recognize these limits. 
One example of how a systemic approach to scale would shift 
property norms from a personal to an integrated concept of integrity 
involves the debate over the appropriate property benchmark to be used in 
defining constitutionally protected property and measuring the economic 
impact of government action on property rights. A majority of the 
389. See LAURA WESTRA, AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROPOSAL FOR Ennes: TilE PRINCIPLB OF 
INrEGRITY 8 (1994). See also Christopher B. Barrett & Raymond E. Grizzle, A HolLftic Approach to 
Sustainability Based on Pluralism Stewardship, 21 ENVTL. ETHICS 23 (1999) (advancing a holistic 
approach to environmental policymaking based upon the principle of pluralistic stewardship). 
390. WESTRA, supra note 389, at 9. 
391. See id. at 17. 
392. See id. at 14-15. 
393. Id. at 12. 
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Supreme Court has clarified that government action that deprives a 
property owner of all economically beneficial use is a per se taking.394 
Supreme Court justices, however, have disagreed about the appropriate 
property benchmark. Some justices have focused on the regulated 
portion-the property directly affected-in measuring the economic 
impact.395 Others have examined the property as a whole in deciding 
whether the government action constitutes a taking, and refuse to divide the 
property into discrete segments.396 An approach that isolates the discrete, 
regulated portion ignores the scales of private land use choices and 
recognizes only the economic incentives of the modern real estate market. 
Today the market provides significant monetary rewards for the 
subdivision of land. A landowner's power to subdivide has become a 
highly refined tool for maximizing profit, and will only increase in value 
and importance as the quantity of undeveloped land declines. This 
valuable power and right to subdivide has contributed to the shift from 
more compact urban settlement patterns to sprawling development. Use of 
the discrete, regulated portion benchmark would allow the property owner 
to manipulate the dimensions of the protected property to maximize the 
amount of economic loss. As Justice Stevens noted in a dissenting opinion, 
the "smaller the estate, the more likely that a regulatory change will effect a 
total taking."397 Under a systemic approach to scale, the discrete, regulated 
portion would not be isolated from the whole in evaluating rights, 
obligations, and expectations of the property owner. 
Another example of how systemic consideration of scale would alter 
property norms concerns the validity of time-specific moratoria on 
development. Because government action that prohibits the development 
of undeveloped land for a set period of time prevents the landowner from 
making an economically viable use during that period, some have argued 
that such action constitutes a taking.398 Others have disagreed, reasoning 
394. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
395. See, e.g., id. at 1016 n.7 (suggesting that a court examine the degree to which state law has 
"accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest in land with respect to which the 
takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) value"); Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393 (1922) (focusing on the regulated portion). 
396. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497-502 (1987) 
Oooking at the propeey as a whole); Penn Cent Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 
(1978) (focusing on "rights in the parcel as a whole"). 
397. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
398. See ]UUAN C. JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND 
CONTROL LAW §§ 9.5, 10.8.B., 10.9.C (1998) (explaining and criticizing this temporal segmentation 
approach to takings). 
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that moratoria are temporary and only prevent immediate development.399 
Under a systemic approach to scale, economically viable use would be 
defined in light of long-range, as well as immediate, time scales. Future 
development opportunities would be considered in deciding whether an 
economically viable use remained. 
A final example of how systemic consideration of scale would alter 
property norms concerns the question of how the calculus of takings would 
be affected by the existence of a power to transfer development rights to 
another tract of land located in an ecologically less sensitive or critical area. 
Some have maintained that giving transfer development rights to regulated 
landowners does not negate the existence of a taking, and may not even 
reflect the amount of just compensation due.400 Others argue that transfer 
development rights speak to the economic impact of the government action 
on the property owner and therefore should be considered in deciding 
whether a taking exists.401 Under a systemic approach, the scope and 
nature of property rights would be defined in light of ecological concepts 
like connectivity, continuity, and scale of habitat. Because transfer 
development rights provide a way to exercise property rights in land 
located in ecologically fragile areas without seriously damaging the areas, a 
systemic approach would favor the inclusion of such rights in the 
landowner's bundle of rights in evaluating the existence of a taking. The 
transfer development rights concept allows property rights in land to be 
exercised in ways that reflect ecological scales of use, minimizing habitat 
fragmentation and destruction in ecologically sensitive areas. 
Fulfilling the obligation to consider the scales of land use often will 
involve relatively minor changes in the way land uses are conducted. In a 
voluntary program in Pennsylvania, for example, farmers are considering 
the scales of their land use by achieving ''nutrient balance," limiting the 
amount of nutrients that are released to the amount that the farmer uses.402 
One farmer has worked with an agronomy professor from Pennsylvania 
State to limit excessive use of nutrients. In addition to weighing "every 
pig, every bag of feed and fertilizer, every truckload of hay, livestock 
bedding, and manure leaving and entering his operation,"403 the farmer 
used government funds to build storage pits to hold manure until it could be 
399. See id. § 10.9.C (concluding that moratoria are not per se takings). 
400. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 745, 746-48 (1997) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138, 150-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also 
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 398, § 9.9. 
401. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137-38; JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 398, § 9.9. 
402. See Horton, supra note 155, at 21-22. 
403. /d. at21. 
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removed by a neighbor who needed fertilizer. The use of the storage pits 
reduced runoff from the farm and decreased the neighbor's use of 
commercial fertilizer by 30%.404 
The complexities of the temporal and spatial scales of private land use 
admittedly obfuscate the connections between individual land use and 
ecosystem integrity. Incorporation of temporal scales is difficult to achieve 
when the impacts of uses and the solutions for minimizing those impacts 
take longer than the lives of those who remember pristine conditions. The 
passion for cleaning up the Chesapeake Bay may ebb with the death of the 
generation who can remember clear waters, abundant oyster reefs, fourteen 
foot sturgeon, and submerged aquatic grasses so extensive and rich with 
life that forest ecosystems paled in comparison.405 Incorporation of spatial 
scales also is difficult to achieve when the affected area is as expansive as 
the Chesapeake Bay watershed. Questions of jurisdiction and complex 
biological, chemical, and physical interactions all add uncertainty to the 
task. Even if all of the interactions are not understood, though, land use 
decisions that reflect some of the scales of land use are more likely to 
produce a resilient ecosystem than management efforts based on the 
individual focus of traditional norms.406 Unless the individual manager-
the property owner-begins to consider the temporal and spatial scales of 
private land use, the threat to ecosystem integrity and ultimately to property 
system integrity \vill grow. 
ill. BREAKING THE PATHOLOGICAL EFFECTS 
OF PROPERTY NORMS 
Innovative solutions are needed to break the pathological effects of 
property norms on ecosystem integrity. First and foremost, lawmakers and 
policymakers must confront and reexamine the property norms driving 
resource use and affecting management decisions. Until the impact of 
these norms on ecosystem integrity is better understood, future 
management efforts are, at best, likely to produce the same short-term 
success and long-term dangers that already have been observed in managed 
ecosystems. To the extent possible, management goals must be translated 
404. See id. at22. 
405. See id. at 22-23, 26. 
406. One argument sometimes made in response to proposals to promote ecological integrity 
relies on the scientific uncertainty of the ecological integrity concept. Understanding all of the 
intricacies of the concept, however, is not a necessary condition to achieving more resilient ecosystems. 
After all, "scientific uncertainty accompanies all human intervention .... " WESTRA, supra note 389, at 
so. 
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into behavioral incentives that encourage policymakers and landowners to 
avoid the property norms "trap"407-the individual-rights-based thinking 
that diverts attention from the scales of private land use and decouples 
human and ecological systems. Some fundamental changes in property 
norms-or at least the interpretation or application of those norms-must 
occur if environmental quality is to be achieved within the current political 
framework. 408 
The sources, bases, and assumptions of those norms need to be 
reevaluated in light of tlte historical development of the property concept 
and in light of the economic, political, and ecological conditions of modem 
life. 409 Such a reevaluation must keep in mind the inherent adaptability of 
the property concept,410 distinguishing between the core essence of 
property that should remain unchanged and the remaining portion that is 
free to adapt to change.411 Such a reevaluation also must keep in mind the 
civic nature of property ownersltip-tltat is, the notion that property 
ownership is intimately connected to civic virtue, providing a basis for 
leaders to become sufficiently independent from self-interest and therefore 
capable of acting in the interest of the greater public good.412 The 
407. See Costanza & Greer, supra note 152, at 203-06 (discussing the "social traps" that lead to 
mismanagement of ecosystems). As these scholars explain, human institutions provide "incentive 
structures [that] often lead to behavior that is directly counter to the long-term health of the whole 
system." I d. at 203. Decisionmakers become trapped by local conditions and cultural values. See id. 
408. For further discussion of the relationship between property rights and political values, see 
infra notes 421-429 and accompanying text For a pessimistic view of the relationship between 
environmental quality and democratic values, see generally WILLIAM OPHULS, EcoLOGY AND THE 
POLITICS OF SCARCITY (1977) (discussing how American political values are unsuitable for dealing 
with growing ecological problems); WILLIAM OPHULS, EcOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 
REviSITED (1992) (continuing his discussion of how American political processes are ill-equipped to 
deal with the worsening environmental situation). 
409. Some scholars have already begun this reevaluation process. Commentators, for example, 
have reexamined the role of property in American legal thought and the relationship between property 
and fundamental political values. See, e.g.. ALExANDER, supra note 42 (discussing different 
conceptions of property). See also John D. Echeverria, 1he Politics of Property Rights, 50 OKLA. L. 
REv. 351, 374 (1997) (arguing that the role of property in promoting liberty is less important now); 
CHruSTMAN, supra note 21, at 3 (arguing that the traditional liberal conception of property is "truly a 
myth that ought to be exposed and abandoned"). Commentators also have begun to define a green 
theory of property. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 239 (1990). 
410. For a discussion of the adaptive nature of American property law, see Butler, supra note 33. 
For a similar discussion of the flexibility of German property law, see RUDOLF Doi.ZER, PROPERTY 
AND ENVIRONMENT: THE SOCIAL OBUGATION INHERENr IN OWNERSHIP (International Union for 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 12, 1976). 
411. For an example of the results of a similar reevaluation under German law, see DOI.ZER, supra 
note 410, at 57 (identifying the power of disposition and the power to exclude as part of the 
unchangeable portion of property under German law). 
412. See ALExANDER, supra note 42, at 1-2, 12-13, 22-23, 40-41. For discussions of the social 
or civic view of property, see id. at 26-42; Jeny L. Anderson, Takings and Expectations: Toward a 
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libertarian view of property defmes "in material terms the legal and 
political sphere within which individuals are free to pursue their own 
private agendas and satisfy their own preferences, free from governmental 
coercion or other forms of external interference";413 this individual-rights-
based view generally ignores the tradition of the civic conception of 
property present in American legal thought.414 Over the years property 
rights advocates have tended to focus on the unchangeable portion of the 
property concept, allowing that portion to control the entire property 
concept. Lost in that focus have been the inherent adaptability and the 
civic nature of property. Finally, a reevaluation of property norms must 
consider the limiting effect of property-rights-based thinking on the 
development of market models and economic concepts, especially 
economic thinking about externalities and obligations to ecosystems.415 
Traditional property-rights-based thinking has produced a market model 
that reflects social preferences for individualism and autonomy; discrete 
packages of rights and narrow definitions of externalities focusing on 
relations between insular individuals are natural consequences of 
traditional thinking. Educational, legal, and political efforts are needed to 
overcome traditional thinking and help instill a sense of civic and 
ecological responsibility in the property concept.416 
Second, in addition to the internal reevaluation of property norms, 
lawmakers and policymakers should adopt an external solution that will 
maintain pressure on the property system to account for ecological costs. 
Lawmakers and policymakers could accomplish this goal by adopting an 
adaptive, ecologically based approach to ecosystem management that 
consistently ties management efforts to ecological integrity and forces 
resource users to consider and respond to ecological conditions in making 
use decisions. An adaptive approach recognizes the spatial and temporal 
scales of human uses, and varies its response according to differences in the 
scales of land uses and to successional changes in ecosystems. Such an 
approach also understands the need to separate the ecosystem management 
unit from the individual user.417 
"Broader Vision" of Property Rights, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 529 (1989); Stanley N. Katz, Thomas 
Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J. L. & ECON. 467 (1976); Schultz, 
supra note 361. 
413. ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 1. 
414. See id. at 1-2. 
415. For a discussion of traditional economic models and theory in the environmental context, see 
HACKEIT, supra note 33, at 17-59. 
416. For further discussion, see infra Part lli.A. 
417. For further discussion, see infra Part lli.B. 
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Finally, lawmakers and policymakers need to adopt an information-
gathering solution to ensure that fair and effective changes are made in 
property norms and ecosystem management practices. Lawmakers and 
policymakers could accomplish this goal by recognizing the importance of 
comprehensive monitoring not only to ecological integrity but also to 
distributive justice and individual fairness. An effective monitoring 
program allows scientists to gauge the health of ecosystems and identify 
causes of continuing pollution. Equally as important, it allows scientists to 
measure the scales of private land use and therefore helps to ensure the 
proportionality of use restrictions to the scales of a particular land use.418 
Through comprehensive and experimental monitoring, policymakers can 
learn about the spatial and temporal extent of land uses, the impact of 
different land uses on ecosystem integrity, and the effectiveness of current 
solutions.419 Each of these types of solutions will now be introduced. 
A. A VOIDING THE PROPERTY NORMS TRAP: 
REDEFINING PROPERTY RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
Breaking the pathological effects of property norms on ecosystem 
integrity will require a reexamination of the nonns shaping the behavioral 
incentives of land use decisionmakers. The norms need to be redefined in 
light of the spatial and temporal dimensions of land use. A resource 
allocation system that allows users to ignore significant scales of use 
eventually will self-destruct. As a general matter, the common law system 
of property only requires property rightholders to account for costs 
imposed on the interests of other rightholders and virtually ignores the 
costs imposed on ecological resources and non-rightholders. At the very 
least, property owners should bear an obligation to consider fully the costs 
of their land use choices over time and to account for those costs in an 
appropriate manner. The power to make use decisions should not be 
divorced from the obligation to consider and account for the costs of land 
use decisions on human and ecological systems.420 
418. Hopefully such proportionality will help the government to defend land use regulations 
against takings challenges. In Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Supreme Court required the government to 
show rough proportionality between a land use exaction and the projected impact of the proposed use. 
512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). The exaction conditioned approval of development on the dedication of 
property to public use. See id. In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., a unanimous 
Supreme Court clarified that the rough proportionality test of Dolan had not been extended "beyond the 
special context of exactions." 526 U.S. 687,702 (1999). 
419. For further discussion, see infra Part III.C. 
420. Urban economists have stressed the importance of forcing users to take into account the 
marginal costs .of their uses-that is, the costs attributed to the last unit of production, ns opposed to the 
costs that have been averaged out across nll users in the defined set. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban 
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1. Reexamining the Bases for Property Norms 
The sources or bases for traditional property nonns first need to be 
examined in light of the historical development of the property concept and 
in light of current political, economic, and ecological conditions. Modem 
interpretations of property nonns primarily focus on the relationship 
between property and political and economic freedom, justifying property 
rights because of their importance to individual liberty. Some scholars 
have questioned whether this singular focus makes sense now given the 
development of American law and society in ways the framers did not 
anticipate.421 Such developments include changes in the role that land 
plays in our political and economic systems. Because land is no longer the 
primary source of wealth, land rights are not as critical as they once were to 
promoting economic freedom. Further, the political functions served by 
land ownership have changed as other protections for individual freedoms 
have developed. Although land ownership still is important in providing 
individuals with a zone of privacy insulated from most government control, 
land ownership no longer is critical to the existence of an individual's 
political and economic freedom. Land's role in maintaining ecological 
integrity, in contrast, remains essential, and indeed is probably becoming 
more critical as supplies of undisturbed and undeveloped land dwindle. 
Property nonns should respond to these key changes in the role of land in 
our political, economic, and ecological systems. 
For example, traditional property norms reflect an economic view of 
the role of government that tends to ignore externalities extending beyond 
the interests of individual rightholders. Under that view the purpose of 
government is primarily to define the sphere of property: to define the legal 
and political realm within which individuals are free to satisfy their own 
preferences and pursue their own vision of what is good.422 Proponents of 
Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE LJ. 385, 441-43 (1977) (discussing and 
critiquing this position). 
421. See, e.g., CHRISTMAN, supra note 21, at 125-39, 161-84 (arguing for the abandonment of the 
traditional, liberal conception of property in favor of a model that is distribution-sensitive); JENNIFER 
NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND Tim LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTinmONAUSM (1990) (arguing 
that private property is inappropriately insulated from democratic debate and bas distorted American 
constitutionalism away from egalitarian principles). See also William H. Simon, Social-Republican 
Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335 (1991) (offering social-republican property as an alternative to 
classical liberal property and classical socialism). 
422. See AlExANDER, supra note 42, at 1-2, 379, 382-83. Under Richard Epstein's interpretation 
of Locke's theocy of civil government, individuals surrender their right to use force to the sovereign in 
exchange for "a superior form of public protection." EPSTEIN, supra note 262, at 15. "The private 
rights of individual relationships are ... preserved as much as possible even after the formation of civil 
society." !d. at 12-13. The task of government thus is "to ensure that all of the surplus [created by the 
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this view recognize the social good in protecting individual rightholders 
from externalities but ignore or reject the social good in protecting common 
environmental resources from externalities.423 The focus on externalities 
imposed on insular individuals has proven insufficient to restrain rights-
based thinking in ways that adequately promote ecosystem integrity.424 By 
focusing almost exclusively on externalities imposed on insular individuals, 
particularly rightholders, proponents have ignored the broader scales of 
private land use. 
The preference-satisfying, economic view of property that currently 
controls the interpretation of property norms also ignores the public or civic 
dimension of property that has long been part of American legal thought. 
Under the civic conception of property, "the core purpose of property is not 
to satisfy individual preferences or to increase wealth but to fulfill some 
prior normative vision of how society and the polity that governs it should 
be structured."425 This conception has a much broader focus than exchange 
value or individual marketplace preferences, intentionally including 
noneconomic interests and values not reflected in marketplace 
transactions.426 Until the law and economics movement succeeded in 
changing the rhetoric of property to an instrumental, market-oriented 
rhetoric, noneconomic values like the right to life, liberty, and personal 
security were regularly part of the property dialogue.427 Property norms, in 
other words, did not focus primarily on exchange value and satisfaction of 
personal preferences through marketplace transactions. Noneconomic 
values were very much a part of the property dialogue. Returning to some 
version of this tradition of civic property would allow ecological interests 
to be reflected in property norms. 
fonnation of a civil society], save that necessary to govern the state, is retained by the individunl 
members of the union." !d. at 10. Private property plays a criticnl role in this overall scheme of 
government, representing the "sum of the goods that the individunl gets to keep outside of the control of 
the state." /d. at 13. 
423. This view of government is frequently reflected in statements attacking various 
environmental laws as unfairly singling out private property owners to bear the public costs of 
environmental protection. No mention is made of the costs imposed by private land use on ecosystems. 
A private landowner's degradation of natural resources or ecologicnl systems apparently is not 
considered a cost of conducting the land use. See, e.g., Private Property Rights and Environmental 
lAws: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Env'tand Pub. Works,104th Cong.181 (1995) (statement 
of Jonathan H. Adler, Director ofEnvironmental Studies for the Competitive Enterprise Institute). 
424. See HACKETT, supra note 33. See also Kenneth J. Arrow, Foreward to RIGHTS TO NATURE, 
supra note 1, at xiv (noting that "traditionnl economic annlysis of production ••• fails to be rich enough 
to encompass the actunllinks observed in the use of natural living systems as resources"). 
425. ALEXANDER, supra note 42, at 2. 
426. Seeid.at379-81. 
427. See id. at 380. 
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The reevaluation of property norms thus need not result in the 
abandonment of the private property system and the development of an 
alternative, environmentally friendly approach to defming relationships 
among individuals, government, the public, and natural resources. 
Although such an alternative approach might be especially appropriate for 
certain types of common pool resources,428 it could, if taken too far, ignore 
the fundamental building block role that private property has played in 
American economic and political systems. Though private property now 
may have certain functional equivalents that are performing some of 
property's political functions, private property still remains an important 
part of American political and economic systems.429 Any effort to break 
the pathological effects of property norms on ecological integrity therefore 
should recognize that the core essence of the private property concept must 
remain. If a redefinition of traditional property norms can correct the 
environmentally destructive path now taken by property norms, it is 
imperative that such a reexamination be conducted before more drastic 
alternatives are taken. 
2. General Redefinition of Property Norms 
Although specific recommendations about the redefmition of property 
norms must await a careful reevaluation of those norms, some general 
observations can be made at this time. First, it is clear that property norms 
must impose a greater degree of responsibility for the environment on 
property owners. Ecological integrity must be promoted at the individual 
as well as the societal level. Lawmakers must recognize the dual nature of 
property ownership: In addition to giving the holder rights and powers, 
private property obligates the holder to act as a responsible member of 
social and ecological systems. The political and legal systems that define 
the relationship of individual citizens and government to resources now 
must formally recognize the ecological connectedness of all natural 
resources, whether owned privately or held in common. Property rights 
must be interpreted in light of the need to maintain ecological processes 
and sustain species and ecosystems. 
This directive admittedly does not answer some of the "big picture" 
questions raised by the call for a reevaluation of property norms. It does 
not, for example, tell us how much ecological integrity is necessary. Nor 
does it tell us what morals should be used to develop a stewardship 
428. For a discussion of some alternative approaches, see RIGIITS TO NA1URE, supra note 1. 
429. See ELY, supra note 2, at 153-56 (discussing the continued importance of property). 
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obligation or an adaptive or sustainable property concept.430 It does, 
however, lay down an important principle: that the private property concept 
must move towards sustainability and a process of adaptive definition. 
Possible ways to achieve this principle now being explored by scholars 
include developing new priority principles that do not prefer human 
interests;431 calculating the economic value of ecological services;432 
modifying economic systems to reflect various sustainability concepts;433 
and considering greater use of a variety of property and social control 
arrangements.434 
Moving land ownership norms toward a sustainable and adaptive 
property concept will require basing those norms not only on the economic 
and political functions of property but also on the ecological services 
provided by land. The individualistic, "island view" of property that 
developed under traditional American law reveals much about us as 
citizens and people. In addition to showing the importance that we attach 
to individualism, it reveals that we do not believe landowners owe a legal 
obligation to social and ecological systems. This belief is hostile, in some 
fundamental ways, to modern notions of responsible citizenship. Though 
landed property traditionally was tied to good citizenship, this relationship 
was individually based; wealthy landowners tended to participate more in 
government. As social and ecological conditions change, the concept of 
the citizen owner also must change. It is no longer enough for citizen 
landowners to participate actively in government; citizen landowners also 
must think ecologically beyond their property boundaries. 
3. Judicial Redefinition of Property Norms 
One key step in moving toward sustainable and adaptive property is 
judicial recognition of the spatial and temporal dimensions of private land 
use in resolving property conflicts and defining property rights. Because of 
the external and cumulative effects of individual land use and because of 
430. For a thoughtful critique of the concept of ecological integrity as the basis of a set of morals 
that would collectively form an environmental ethic, see WESTRA, supra note 389. For an argument 
that a holistic approach based on pluralistic stewardship is needed, see Barrett & Grizzle, supra note 
389. 
431. See, e.g., PAUL W. TAYLOR, RESPEC'fFORNATIJRE: A THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL Ennes 
(1986). 
432. See, e.g., Costanza eta!., supra note 33. 
433. See, e.g., HACKETT, supra note 33, at 249-305 (discussing sustainable development, 
production, and consumption); James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the Law, 27 ENV1L. L. 
1243 (1997) (discussing sustainable consumption from a legal perspective). 
434. See RJGHIS TO NATIJRE, supra note 1; Sterk, supra note 21. 
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the relationship between scale and integrity,435 courts need to capture scale 
dimensions in defining the rights, powers, obligations, and liabilities of 
property owners. It is time for courts to recognize the legitimacy of 
imposing an obligation on property owners to account for the ecological 
costs of land use choices determined in light of appropriate considerations 
of scale. It is also time for courts to recognize that the liberal, economic 
view of property has skewed the definition and evolution of property rights. 
For the most part, changes in the common law of property do not occur 
under the economic view unless the desires of interacting persons to adjust 
to changes in costs and benefits have produced some corresponding new 
private property right in someone.436 Court decisions involving property 
rights generally do not recognize the scale of land use. When a property 
conflict involves two private property owners, the dispute tends to be 
framed in the context of the conflicting private interests. When the 
property conflict involves a private landowner and a governmental unit, the 
broader public interest admittedly may help to establish the basic 
constitutional legitimacy of the government's exercise of power or explain 
why the private use is harmful or illegal. In evaluating the constitutionality 
of the economic impact of the government action on the property owner, 
however, the public interest apparently is not even to be considered.437 
This refusal to consider the public interest in determining the legitimacy of 
the economic impact on the property owner reflects a failure to recognize 
the temporal and spatial scales of private land use. 
Recognition of the temporal and spatial scales of land use is especially 
important to a determination of the fairness of the government restriction to 
the individual. Before a court can determine whether government action 
unfairly singles out a private landowner, the court needs to have an 
accurate understanding of the scales of the regulated conduct. Considering 
the consequences of land use over spatially and temporally relevant scales 
will help to ensure that fairness is defmed in light of the individual 
landowner's impact on future generations, the public interest, and 
ecological integrity over the short and long term. Current landowners 
435. See supra notes 351-355 and accompanying text 
436. See Al..EXANDER, supra note 42, at 379-82; Demsetz, supra note 242, at 348-53. 
437. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992) (adopting 
a per se taking rule for total deprivations of value that does not normally allow for "case-specific 
inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint''); Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393,413 (1922) (noting that "usually in ordinazy private affairs the public interest does not warrant 
much" government interference with property rights). The phrase "public interest'' is being used 
broadly here to include the interests of non-rightholders and the promotion of ecological integrity. 
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should not have monopoly power over the use of a scarce or irreplaceable 
resource like land when that resource is vital to everyone's survival.438 
The common law of property provides sufficient basis for 
reinterpreting or redefining property norms to reflect considerations of 
scale and impose an ecological obligation on property owners. Under the 
common law, property rights change over time as circumstances and 
conditions change.439 In the nineteenth century, courts began to recognize 
the dynamic, evolving nature of common law property and moved away 
from a static approach.440 Under the dynamic view, common law property 
rights are relative, varying in meaning and strength even at the same point 
in time according to the nature of the conflicting interests.441 The inherent 
flexibility of property, long recognized by the common law, provides the 
means for developing an adaptive property concept that is sufficiently 
experimental to allow the concept to react to new scientific data about the 
scales and impacts of land use. The challenge for modem courts 
formulating the adaptive property concept is to identify its core essence 
which should remain unchanged. Recognizing the existence of an 
unchangeable core is not, however, tantamonnt to denying the adaptability 
of property. Nor is it tantamount to conclnding that private property rights 
are absolute and generally free from government restraint.442 
The common law of property is inherently adaptable and evolving in 
large part because it is not controlled by a single theory or conception of 
property. Rather property law has been defined through a dialectic 
involving conflicting conceptions of the dominant role and purpose of 
438. In the nineteenth centwy, courts began to recognize that an absolutist conception of property 
stressing dominion, priority in time, and a broad power to exclude created monopoly power in protected 
property rights. To encourage competitive economic development, the courts gradually freed property 
from these absolutist, exclusionary biases "by enlarging the range of noncompensable injuries.'' 
HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 40. See generally id. at 31-62 (discussing the transfonnation of the 
conception of property from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries). 
439. See Butler, supra note 33, at 660-61; Carol M. Rose, Property Rights and Responsibilities, in 
'DUNKING EcOLOGICAU. Y: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POUCY 49, 50 (1997). See 
also Demsetz, supra note 242, at 350 (recognizing that adjustments in property rights occur in response 
to gradual changes in social mores, technology, and people's desires to respond to new cost-benefit 
possibilities). 
440. See HORWITZ, supra note 7, at 1-4,31-34. 
441. See ALExANDER, supra note 42, at 319-23,325-29, 381 (recognizing contributions ortega! 
realists such as Hohfeld and Ely in defining social and relational aspects of property ownership); Butler, 
supra note 33, at 658-59. 
442. Indeed, there is ample historical evidence that private property was not meant to be absolute, 
but rather subject to the public good. See AIJ;XANDER, supra note 42; Anderson, supra note 412; 
Echeverria, supra note 409. 
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property.443 One conception, the vision of civic property, affected the early 
formation of property theory, while a second, the commodification or 
economic view, has controlled property law more recently.444 That one 
conception now dominates the legal and scholarly discourse does not 
signify the end of the dialectic. It simply means that negative reaction to a 
now subordinate conception led to the dominance of another vision. 
Nothing in the ongoing dialogue about property suggests that future shifts 
in property theory will not occur.445 To the contrary, the history of the 
common law of property suggests that it has used the dialectic "to correct 
itself in ways that improve American society.'>«6 This corrective function 
has, for hundreds of years, served an invaluable role in making property a 
stable American institution and should be allowed to continue. Now the 
dialectic needs to be allowed to readjust the relationship between property 
norms and ecology, and resolve the problems of scale and integrity caused 
by current property norms. 
The common law of property also has recognized the legitimacy of 
restricting private land uses in light of their cumulative effects on natural 
systems.447 Although this recognition has occurred primarily in situations 
involving traditionally recognized public rights or nuisances, it nonetheless 
provides reluctant courts with a basis for expanding consideration of 
cumulative effects to include private property's "piggyback" use of 
common environmental resources. 448 Further, through its efficiency norm, 
the common law of property provides a basis for imposing an obligation to 
internalize the ecological costs of land use. While such internalization may 
not have been necessary when natural resources were more abundant and 
ecological systems were better able to absorb the adverse effects of land 
use, the decline in the quantity and health of ecological resources is now 
well documented.449 
To counter argnments for greater accountability and restriction of 
landowners, proponents of a liberal conception of property sometimes 
443. See ALExANDER, supra note 42, at 384-85. 
444. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 42 (discussing the conflicting conceptions). 
445. See id. at 384. 
446. /d. at 386. 
447. See Rose, supra note 439, at 52. 
448. See id. at 51. As support, Professor Rose points to traditionally recognized public rights like 
fishing and traditionally accepted nuisances like noise, smoke, and odors that involve tangible physical 
invasions. See id. at 52 & n.7. 
449. See, e.g., COUNCil. ON ENVIRONMENrAL QUAUTY, supra note 127; U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY: A FRAMEwORK FOR ACilON (1983). 
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argue that property owners traditionally have practiced stewardship.450 As 
evidence, they point to private landowners like the Nature Conservancy 
that have protected hundreds of acres of environmentally sensitive lands. 
Advocates of this position stress that private property laws are neutral and 
that what matters most is who owns the land. While one landowner might 
be motivated by profit, another could be influenced by conservation. 
Private property laws allow both motives to impact land use. 
That some property owners are guided by the conservation motive 
does not mean that property norms do not have pathological effects on 
ecological systems. Not all property ownership must lead to environmental 
degradation for a problem to exist. Landowners like the Nature 
Conservancy are the exception rather than the rule. The bias of the 
property system towards economically valuable use and consumption 
means that most ordinary landowners cannot afford to conserve their land 
in a natural state. The ordinary landowner, even an environmentally 
friendly one, cannot afford to choose stewardship over profit; his resources 
simply are too limited for him to have the ability to ignore the normal 
market incentives promoted by property norms. 
Further, even assuming that the stewardship ethic was once the norm, 
it clearly is not the norm today. Not enough private landowners are 
voluntarily preserving enough acres of land to make voluntary stewardship 
the key to protecting ecological integrity. Land settlement patterns have 
changed siguiflcantly since the colonial and early statehood periods when 
land was the main source of wealth and more compact urban settlements 
and large landholdings were commonplace.451 More importantly, the 
economic value of a landowner's power to subdivide has become too 
siguificant for landowners to ignore. Just as the nature of the landowner's 
power to subdivide has changed in response to market conditions, so must 
the judiciary's definition of property rights and obligations change m 
response to ecological conditions. 
450. See 10 RICHARD R. POWElL, POWElL ON REAL PROPERTY§ 69.02, at 69-4 (Patrick J. Rohnn 
ed., 1998) (the "law of land in England and in America ... [reflects] a change from the viewpoint that 
he who owns may do as he pleases with what he owns, to a position which hesitatingly embodies an 
ingredient of stewardship"). This view has, at times, controlled resource management decisions. For 
example, the ideal that farmers had a "'love of land [that] bonded ••. [them] to the rigorous observance 
of rules"' designed to protect the earth was once a key premise of the management program for the 
Florida Everglades. Stephen S. Light, Lance H. Gunderson, & C.S. Holling, The Everglades: Evolution 
of Management in a Turbulent Ecosystem, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 9,~t 103, 124-25 
(quoting J.E. DoveU, A History of the Everglades in Florida (1947) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)). 
451. See Butler, supra note 33, at637; Shabmnn,supra note 128, at 3-4;supra notes 176-178 and 
accompanying text. 
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4. Legislative and Administrative Redefinition of Property Norms 
In addition to judicial consideration of scale in defming property 
rights, legislative and administrative branches must incorporate the 
temporal and spatial dimensions of land use into laws governing 
development and growth. Innovative and bold approaches to land use 
management are becoming increasingly necessary. While it is important 
that the courts redefine property norms to reflect the scales of land use, this 
process of change will necessarily be gradual and ad hoc. Legislatures, on 
the other hand, can address issues of scale comprehensively and 
systematically through a number of devices designed to alter the behavioral 
incentives of land users.452 These devices will not be effective, however, 
unless they are followed by timely implementation and persistent 
enforcement. Only through the combined efforts of all branches of 
government can a redefinition of property norms occur. 
One way to incorporate ecologically relevant considerations of scale 
into land use choices is to mandate that local governments consider off-site, 
as well as on-site, impacts of proposed projects. Unless statutes authorize 
such consideration, many courts tend to defme strictly the scope of a 
locality's power to review land development projects.453 Statutory 
authorization and direction to consider off-site impacts would recognize the 
need to incorporate the scales of private land use into land use 
decisionmaking. 
In addition to mandating consideration of scale by land use 
decisionmakers, legislatures could impose an affirmative obligation on 
property owners to consider scale by requiring property owners who are 
proposing development projects of a certain size or density to conduct more 
effective impact analysis for manmade and natural infrastructures and 
systems.454 This analysis would include an evaluation of the impact of the 
proposed development on the transportation infrastructure, the ground and 
surface water supply, drainage and sewerage systems, schools, ecological 
systems, and other shared resources. If the proposed development would 
impose new demands on the water supply, for example, the landowner 
would be required to demonstrate how those demands could be met using 
available resources. If the proposed development would eliminate 
452. In dealing with the problem of nutrient runoff, for example, a legislature can, with the 
passage of a single act, impose fines on farmers to force them to reduce nutrient runoff. See, e.g., 
Maryland Senate OKs Farm Runoff Fines, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.), Feb. 25, 1998, at CS. 
453. See DANIELR. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW§ 9.09 (4th ed. 1997). 
454. Some states have already adopted statewide land use planning programs that incorporate 
growth controls. See generally id. at421-35 (discussing growth control programs). 
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wetlands or other critical environmental resources, the landowner would 
have to explain the impact of the loss on the watershed from the 
perspectives of ecosystem functions and integrity, focusing not only on the 
loss to the developed tract but also on the cumulative impact of the loss to 
the watershed as a whole. If the development would result in a loss of land 
cover or cause erosion and runoff, the landowner would have to document 
the amount and type of land cover lost455 or ground eroded, assess the 
ecological and physical effects of the lost land cover or increased erosion 
and runoff on the watershed, and explain how those effects could be 
minimized, mitigated, or reversed. Such explanations should consider the 
spatial and temporal dimensions of the impacts given conditions within the 
watershed. 
Although these infrastructure impact studies admittedly would 
increase the costs of development, internalization of the costs of private 
land use is needed to control growth and effectively protect ecosystems. 
All too often, developers either are not required to conduct ecosystem or 
watershed based infrastructure studies, or are able to avoid them through 
private agreements or court challenges.456 When the demands of 
development on natural and manmade infrastructures are not adequately 
addressed, the results can be serious. Just consider the plight of New 
Zealand's largest city, which experienced a blackout blamed on rapid 
growth. The last of four aging power cables failed on February 20, 1998, 
sending the city of one million into darkness for weeks. In addition to 
economic losses resulting from closed shops and businesses, the city 
experienced fires, spoiled food, and other health and safety problems.457 
455. The Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County, Virginia, voted in March 1999 to require 
developers to document the location, type, and condition of all trees, shrubs, and other plants before 
developers cut them down. Although the County cannot require developers to save trees, it hopes that 
the documentation requirement will encourage voluntary efforts to minimize the loss of vegetation. See 
VA to require developers to document vegetation, BAY J. (May 1999), at 16. A legislatively imposed 
obligation to minimize loss of ground cover is needed to deal with the growing problem of lost 
vegetative land cover. 
456. In the Chapman's Landing project discussed earlier, the developer apparently tried to divide 
the project into smaller parts, possibly to avoid comprehensive review. The developer also met in 
private with the Army Corps of Engineers, Maryland's Department of Natural Resources, and other 
federal and state agencies to discuss the application that the developer eventually would file. See supra 
notes 371-388 and accompanying text. 
457. See New Zealand Blackout Blamed on Rapid Growth, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.), 
Feb. 26, 1998, at All. Another power failure also occurred in May 1998. See Power Outage Again 
Hits New Zealand, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.), May II, 1998, at Al2. Although a subsequent 
study faulted the utility, see Utility Faulted for Five-week Blackout in New Zealand, DAILY PRESS 
(Newport News, Va.), July 22, 1998, at AS, earHer news accounts suggest that rapid growth played a 
major role. See New Zealand Blackout Blamed on Rapid Growth, supra. 
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Land development is not simply a matter of whether a structure can be built 
on a particular site; it also raises important questions about the ability of 
manmade and natural infrastructures to absorb the impacts of development 
and sustain ecosystems. 
Furthermore, the infrastructure and system impact studies must 
become the responsibility of all landowners proposing a development or 
use of an ecologically significant size, density, or scale of use. The studies 
should not be imposed only on owners of land in critical or buffer areas; 
uses in the interior portions of a watershed also can seriously degrade the 
ecosystem. Ecological problems are caused by land uses occurring 
throughout a watershed, not just those in the coastal area. The scales of 
land use extend well beyond the temporal and physical constraints of the 
individual user. Land uses not only affect ecological resources located 
miles away; they also interact and combine with other uses, causing more 
serious consequences. It is time for landowners to recognize and account 
for their interference with the "life-support services" provided by 
ecological systems.458 
The infrastructure impact studies must also be required early enough 
in the decisionmaking process to make a difference. Preliminary 
government decisions that make development possible must be recognized 
as critical decisions. Once a local governmental unit decides to allow the 
extension of water and sewer service to a particular area, development 
eventually will follow unless preexisting rights or interests prevent 
development.459 Those types of decisions must be made only after 
meaningful consideration of the impact on available natural resources and 
ecological systems. At present, the key to growth control is effective 
management of water and sewerage services. The importance of such 
services would change, of course, if technologically advanced septic 
systems gain widespread acceptance. Those systems use technology that 
allows land not previously suitable for development to be developed.460 
458. See Jane Lubchenco, Entering the Century of the Environment: A New Social Contract for 
Science, 279 SCIENCE 491, 492 (1998). 
459. A local government, for example, may seek to acquire conservation easements restricting 
development on agricultural land. See Stephen C. Fehr, Montgomery's line of Defense Against the 
Suburban Invasion, County Preserves Open Space, Allows Dense Development Elsewhere, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 25, 1997, at Al. 
460. See Judith Haynes, New Septic Systems Could Open Land for Development, DAILY PREss 
(Newport News, Va.), Mar. 9, 1998, at B2 [hereinafter New Septic Systems]. See also Judith Haynes, 
Va. Tests Septic Options, DAILY PREss (Newport News, Va.), Mar. 9, 1998, at Bl (discussing use of 
new septic system technology in Virginia). See generally SITE CHARACTERIZATION AND DESIGN OF 
ON-SITE SEPTIC SYSTEMS (M.S. Bedinger et al. eds., 1997) (discussing dramatic changes in on-site 
septic system technology). 
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Poor percolation of land traditionally has been an important constraint on 
development. A locality which adopts the new technology no longer will 
be able to control growth simply by relying on the fact that the soil will not 
percolate sufficiently to support a conventional septic system.461 
Although some jurisdictions have adopted innovative growth 
management programs that consider scale through infrastructure impact 
reviews,462 significant differences exist between these programs and the 
suggested approach. First, the programs do not redefine the norms 
underlying property rights to impose an ecological obligation on property 
owners, recognize sustainable or adaptive property concepts, or capture 
ecologically relevant spatial and temporal scales. Under an ecologically 
based approach to land use management, a decisionmaker evaluating a 
proposed or current land use or defining authorized land uses would 
consider, among other factors, whether individual tracts of land performed 
critical ecological functions, played an important role in sustaining 
ecosystem structure, or promoted ecosystem resilience.463 If so, the land 
use decisionmaker then would consider the type of obligation that should 
be imposed on the landowner to protect ecosystem functions, structure, and 
integrity.464 Such an ecologically based view of land is not generally 
reflected in the innovative land management programs in effect today;465 
ecological concepts are not typically used as guiding principles in land use 
decisionmaking. Nor do current growth management programs necessarily 
force landowners to bear the marginal costs of their land use.466 Rather the 
programs tend to assume the continuing existence of traditional property 
rights and norms, and view growth management primarily as the control of 
461. See New Septic Systems, supra note 460, at B2. 
462. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06 (West Supp. 1999) (regulating developments with 
regional impacts); MD. CoDE ANN., ENVIR. § 9-512(b)(l) (1996) (linking building permits to adequate 
water and sewerage systems); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 195.020(3}-(4), 195.060, 195.065, 195.070, 195.075, 
195.145, 197.295, 197.296, 197.298, 197.303, 197.307 (1991 & Supp. pt. 3 1998) & 268.390 (Supp. pt. 
4, 1998) (providing for the creation of urban growth boundaries, urban service agreements, and urban 
reserve areas to control growth); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6086(a)(9)(A), (G), (H), (J), (L) (1997) 
(requiring state officials reviewing development permit applications to consider the impnct of growth, 
utility services, the costs of scattered development, and rural growth areas, among other factors). 
463. See Keiter, supra note 48, at 336; Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of 
Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1442-46 
(1993). 
464. See Keiter, supra note 48, at 336. 
465. Nor is this view widely shared by state legislatures or courts. See id. 
466. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3180(7) (West Supp. 1999) (allowing averaging In 
calculating the level of transportation service in compact geographic areas). For a discussion of the 
impact of considering average costs instead of marginal costs in making use decisions, see Ellickson, 
supra note420, at441-43. 
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the characteristics of growth (e.g., rate, type, amount, location, and 
quality). While the negative impact of growth on manmade and natural 
infrastructures is a concern of the programs, this concern is reflected in 
strategies to control input features of growth, not in a redefinition of 
property rights and obligations.467 
Further, even when land use programs require consideration of the 
impact of proposed development on the infrastructure, they tend to discount 
the importance of the ecological infrastructure. In Maryland, for example, 
state and local governments must, before issuing a building permit, 
consider existing and approved developments in the relevant service area to 
determine if the water supply, sewerage, or solid waste systems would 
adequately serve the proposed development.468 Florida goes a step further, 
requiring certain necessary public facilities and services to be available 
when development is approved.469 Those necessary facilities include 
roads, potable water, sanitary sewer, solid waste, drainage facilities, parks 
and recreation, and mass transit.470 Noticeably absent from the lists of 
infrastructure services are ecological services. Although ecological 
considerations admittedly appear in other parts of the states' environmental 
or land use laws,471 their absence from the provisions governing the 
regional impact of development on infrastructure suggests that the life" 
support services provided by the ecological infrastructure are taken for 
granted. 
Protecting the important ecological services provided by land and 
other natural resources will require changes in private property nonns to 
incorporate principles of ecology. It also will require changes in ecosystem 
management approaches to reflect the latest ecological concepts and 
infonnation. Through the adoption of an adaptive approach to ecosystem 
management, external pressure can be imposed on the property system to 
take into account ecological principles and data. 
467. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, & JOHN M. PAYNE, PLANNING AND 
CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 653-59 (4th ed. 1995) (comparing growth management programs to 
traditional zoning). See also MANDELKER, supra note 453, §§ 10.01-10.12 (discussing legal issues 
raised by growth management programs). 
468. See MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 9-512(b)(l) (1996). 
469. See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 163.3180(1) (West Supp. 1999). 
470. See id. § 163.3180(1). Florida requires the public facilities and services "needed to 
support development" to be available "concurrent with the impacts of such development" /d. 
§ 163.3177(10)(h}. 
471. See, e.g., 1 FLoRIDA BAR, FLA. ENVI1... AND LAND USE LAW, (1986, 1988, 1991 & 1993) 
(discussing environmental provisions in the Florida Code); 2 FLORIDA BAR, supra, (2d ed. 1994 & 
1996) (again discussing environmental provisions in the Florida Code). 
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B. ADAPTIVE ECOSYS1EM MANAGEMENT 
Effective ecosystem management requires a flexible, adaptive, and 
ecologically based approach to management. Instead of striving to tame 
the environment in order to promote social objectives, adaptive 
management tries to manage the environment in a way that responds to the 
variations, rhythms, and cycles of nature.472 Rooted in ecology, adaptive 
management links management policies to biological time scales and to 
ecosystem integrity. Concepts like resilience, cycles of ecosystem 
succession, functional equivalence, and population fluctuation play an 
important role in adaptive management policies.473 Under the adaptive 
management concept, human interactions with nature are viewed as 
experiments that provide opportunities for learning. Eventually, once the 
lessons are learned, adaptive management policies are changed to reflect 
the new understandings and knowledge.474 Surprise and uncertainty, in 
other words, are "integral" parts of adaptive management.475 Crises and 
unpredictable interactions are viewed as inevitabilities requiring adaptation 
of appropriate policies.476 
For years humans have responded to the dynamic nature of the 
environment by attempting to control-or as some would say manipulate-
the variability of different components of natural systems. Fish populations 
have been controlled through fishing restrictions and manmade fish 
ladders, pests in forest ecosystems through spraying, and grass on public 
rangelands through the selection of drought-resistant species. Although 
these strategies may work in the short term, they also have contributed to a 
loss of resilience in the foundation ecosystem.477 Because of this and other 
long-term, adverse consequences, some scientists have begun urging 
management institutions to recognize the need for adaptive management. 
Instead of using technology and engineering to control the variability of 
change in' the environment, these scientists stress the need to adapt to 
change. Instead of managing the environment primarily or solely for social 
472. See Frances Westley, Governing Design: The Management of Social System~ and Ecosystems 
Management, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 9, at 391, 394. 
473. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 20-23; Kui N. Lee, 
Deliberately Seeking Sustainability in the Columbia River Basin, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra 
note 9, at 214, 229; R.E. Munn, Monitoring for Ecosystem Integrity, in EcOLOGICAL INTEGRITY, supra 
note 30, at 105, 105-06. 
474. See Lee, supra note 473, at 227, 229. 
475. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 12-13. 
476. See Gunderson et al., supra note 133, at 490-92. 
477. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 6-9. 
HeinOnline -- 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1011 1999-2000
2000] THE PATHOLOGY OF PROPERTY NORMS 1011 
objectives, the scientists identify sustainability as their goal.478 Instead of 
allowing private property rights to control ecosystem management, 
proponents of adaptive management treat "economic uses of nature as 
experiments" that might require new management policies and rules to deal 
with adverse impacts.479 
An adaptive ecosystem management approach will help to ensure that 
the ecological dimensions of property use are considered-that is, that 
ecologically sustainable scales are defmed and incorporated into property 
rights. Under mainstream economic thinking, economic growth provides a 
solution to, or at least a justification for ignoring, the problems of 
inequitable income distribution and maintenance of economic scale within 
sustainable limits.480 Increases in productivity theoretically mean more 
wealth is available for everyone.481 Further, because a growth-oriented 
policy provides real benefits, making many better off without directly 
making anyone worse off, "bigger'' is presumed to be the optimal scale. 
One key problem with this reasoning is that it only addresses economic 
scales at a microeconomic level. Adaptive ecosystem management would 
serve as a check on microeconomic analysis, ensuring that ecological 
scales are considered at the management level in solving ecological 
problems.482 
An adaptive management approach to ecosystem management may 
require greater caution in making land use decisions. Because of the 
unpredictable and ever-changing nature of ecosystems, many land use 
decisions are made under uncertainty. Some scientists have urged the 
adoption of a policy of prudence or caution to minimize the possible 
adverse ecological consequences of decisions made under uncertainty.483 
Under a policy of prudence, decisionmakers facing uncertainty would 
"have an ethical obligation to risk erring on the side of preservation" of the 
natural environment.484 To justify this approach, scholars explain that 
ethics require decisionmakers to minimize avoidable catastrophic 
478. See Lee, supra note 473, at 234. 
479. !d. at227. 
480. See HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE EcONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 48-52 (1996) (discussing allocation, income distribution, and scale under economic 
thinking). 
481. See id. at 51. 
482. In recent years a group of scholars has begun to use principles of biology, ecology, and 
environmental science to reform assumptions of macroeconomics. For an introduction to some of the 
thinking of these ecological economists, see EcOLOGICAL EcONOMICS: THE SCIENCE AND 
MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABll.ITY (Robert Costanza ed., 1991). 
483. See, e.g., Noss, supra note 107, at 896-97. 
484. /d. at 897. 
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consequences.485 Many ecosystem management decisions would fall into 
this situation.486 
Altering decisionmaking preferences will, in tum, require a rethinking 
of property norms. The rights-based focus of traditional property norms 
can lead to the view that economic expectations and uses generally deserve 
constitutional protection from government interference. Under this view 
government should compensate property owners adversely affected by 
regulation benefiting the public regardless of its negative externalities to 
ecological systems or common environmental resources. The more 
absolute this view becomes, the more it limits the effectiveness of the 
adaptive management concept. Incorporating an expectation of the 
unexpected into property rights will require a change in thinking about the 
nature of constitutionally protected property. Although constitutional 
protection of property would remain a fundamental part of our political 
values and structure, such protection could not entail the same sense of 
constancy that now prevails among many courts, legislators, academics, 
and property owners. The scope of constitutionally protected property 
rights should no longer be determined at the time of the initial investment 
or purchase of the property. The nature of a landowner's power and right 
to control use of her land should no longer ignore the negative externalities 
to ecosystems. Property rights should not be defined without sufficient 
regard for the foundation ecosystem. Ecological integrity will require a 
more informed view of the relationship between property rights and 
ecological resources-one that recognizes the importance and necessity of 
an adaptive property concept that complements the adaptive management 
approach. 
Once more flexible approaches to defining property rights and 
managing ecosystems are taken, a system for ensuring fair, accurate 
changes in property rights and management techniques will be needed. A 
comprehensive monitoring system can help to meet this need. 
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF MONITORING FOR SURPRISE 
Comprehensive monitoring of ecosystems is important not only to the 
health of the systems but also to the landowners who use the resources 
within the ecosystem. Studies of managed ecosystems indicate that 
management institutions have tended to ease up on monitoring over time as 
initial management goals are reached and short-term successes are 
485. See id. at 896-97; Shrader-Frechette & McCoy, supra note 370. 
486. See Noss, supra note 107, at 896-97; Shrader-Frechette & McCoy, supra note 370. 
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achieved. Instead of continuing to monitor the ecosystem for "surprises," 
the management institutions typically have shifted resources to operational 
objectives.487 Funds once used for experimental monitoring are instead 
used for improving operational efficiency. What monitoring efforts that 
remain tend to focus on the targeted ecological product. The managed 
ecosystem's gradual loss of resilience and gradual increase in vulnerability 
often goes unnoticed.488 
These studies provide compelling evidence of the importance of a 
comprehensive and experimental monitoring program to ecological 
integrity. A management program that monitors for surprise ensures that 
the indicators of ecological integrity are constantly and objectively 
measured, and that the measurements are reproducible.489 Because of the 
complexity of monitoring for ecological integrity, however, management 
institutions need to set monitoring priorities. Factors and questions 
developed by researchers can be used to set those priorities.490 
Comprehensive and experimental monitoring recognizes that 
ecosystems do not follow predictable linear paths of succession. Change in 
ecosystems can be unpredictable and chaotic; insignificant or noncritical 
attributes are not necessarily the first to be affected. By monitoring for 
surprise, a management program ensures that changes in critical attributes 
are identified relatively quickly. An adaptive ecosystem management 
program cannot succeed without an effective monitoring plan for 
identifying changes in conditions on a continuous basis. Although some 
changes may be irreversible, many others will occur at the margin or will 
be symptomatic, providing evidence of ecosystem health. Identifying those 
more marginal or symptomatic changes through monitoring will allow the 
management program to respond before the changes affect the ecosystem 
in its entirety. 
487. See Holling, What Barriers? What Bridges?, supra note 132, at 8. 
488. Seeid. 
489. See Munn, supra note 473, at 105, 108. 
490. One scientist suggested consideration of the following factors in setting monitoring priorities: 
critical limiting factors for sustainability; current threats to ecosystem integrity; the existence of 
irreversible trends; interactions between various societal interests; surprises or discontinuities that mig!tt 
occur within the next thirty to fifty years; and the types of questions that the monitoring system would 
be expected to answer. See id. at 110. The abundant literature on ecological integrity provides a strong 
foundation for developing more specific monitoring programs. See id. at 112. See generally Andrew 
Robertson, Paul Orlando, & Donna Turgeon, Monitoring the Coastal Environment (visited May 25, 
1999) <http://state_of_coastnoaa.gov/bulletinslhtrnYmcwq_12/mcwq.html> (discussing the importance 
of monitoring coastal areas and the need for new approaches to environmental monitoring). 
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Comprehensive and experimental monitoring of ecosystems also can 
help to produce data needed to measure and understand the scales of land 
use. Besides providing property owners with scientific evidence of the 
temporal and spatial scales of their land use, the monitoring data can 
provide a rational basis for defining criteria and standards to govern land 
use and development. This function is especially important given the 
general "concerns for proportionality [that] animate the Takings Clause."491 
Further, although the Supreme Court has not extended the more specific 
"rough proportionality" test developed in Dolan v. City of Tigard beyond 
the exactions context, the Dolan decision clearly establishes a more 
demanding standard of judicial review for some land use restrictions.492 
Some scholars have argued that fairness and equity require treating the 
first land user in an area the same as the last similar user. The apparent 
thinking is that the behavior of the users is equivalent and that the first 
contributes as much to the congestion as the last.493 This position seems 
persuasive when fairness is defmed in the present and focuses only on the 
status of being a land user; hindsight tells us that all users are part of the 
problem. The argument loses persuasiveness, however, when other 
temporal and spatial dimensions are considered. The timing of a use, for 
example, can affect the ecological impact of the use. Uses conducted at a 
time wheu ecosystems are resilient will have a different impact than similar 
uses conducted at a time when ecosystems are stressed and more 
vulnerable. The cumulative effects of piggybacking onto common 
resources also are likely to differ for earlier and later uses. Temporal and 
spatial scales, in other words, do matter in measuring the ecological 
consequences of development and use. Comprehensive monitoring can 
help to ensure that land use restrictions roughly reflect the scales of 
particular uses. 
CONCLUSION 
Modem society faces increasingly serious problems of escalating land 
and water use and of ineffective watershed and ecosystem management 
over the long term. Although some progress has been made in recognizing 
and correcting the ineffectiveness of traditional management systems in 
dealing with those problems, the steps taken generally do not recognize the 
role of traditional property norms in contributing to those problems. The 
491. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999). See 
supra note 418 and accompanying text 
492 See supra note 418 and accompanying text. 
493. See Ellickson, supra note 420, at 447-48. 
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traditional norms' focus on the relationship between property and 
individual freedom leads to land use and ecosystem management practices 
that ignore the pathological effects of property use on environmental and 
other common resources. Although the fundamental building block role 
played by private property in the American economic and political systems 
suggests that the core essence of private property must remain intact, the 
increasingly stressed conditions of modem ecosystems require private 
property law to move toward a more adaptive conception of property. Such 
an adaptive approach would take into account the impact of property use on 
ecological and other common systems. Such an approach also would 
recognize the legitimacy of imposing a greater degree of responsibility for 
the environment on property owners through judicial, legislative, and 
administrative action. One key way private property law could not only 
become more adaptive but also impose greater responsibility is to 
incorporate the scales of land use into the definition of property rights, 
powers, duties, and liabilities. 
In addition to solutions that work within the private property system, 
external solutions also are needed to impose pressure on the property 
system to respond to modem ecological conditions. One external solution 
that would parallel the adaptive conception of property is the adoption of 
an adaptive approach to ecosystem management. Under such an approach, 
interactions between property owners and nature would provide 
opportunities for assessing impacts and fine-tuning or changing 
managemeut policies. Although constitutionally protected property rights 
would remain a fundamental part of our legal and political structure, the 
scope of those rights would no longer be defined solely or primarily from 
the economic view of property. 
Finally, a comprehensive monitoring system is needed to ensure that 
fair, accurate changes in management policies and property rights are 
made. A monitoring program that monitors an ecosystem for surprise 
provides valuable information about the health of the ecosystem. Equally 
as important, such a monitoring program produces data needed to measure 
the scales of private land use, and thus helps to ensure that land use 
restrictions are generally proportional to the scales of particular land uses. 
